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The following is a true story, as related to me by a student in my Masters course
on wireless communication. This student (whose identity I will protect by calling
him Oliver) had had a big night out on the town. At three in the morning he and a
flatmate decided to head home, only to discover at their front door that they both
had forgotten to bring their keys with them. There was no need to worry, they
thought; Oliver quickly took out his mobile telephone from his pocket, and
dialled the number of their one flatmate who had stayed home. Much to their
dismay, however, their sleeping friend had no desire whatsoever to be disturbed
at that late an hour, and had shut off his mobile telephone. Dumbstruck by this
unexpected setback, Oliver could think of only one solution for the awkward
situation he and his friend now both found themselves in: get on their bikes and
cycle twenty kilometres out of town to his parents’ house to get a spare key. Once
there, however, it turned out that his parents were away for the weekend. It was
only on their way back home, exhausted by their nightly workout and still won-
dering how they could get into their house, that it finally dawned on Oliver. There
had been a much easier way to signal his flatmate to have him open the door than
trying to call him on his mobile… the doorbell.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, mobile communication devices are
everywhere. What is more, they have quickly come to be considered – sometimes
foolishly so – as essential tools to handle almost any problem or situation in life.
It is astonishing to realise that merely two decades ago only very rich business
people could afford them, and that owners of mobile telephones were regularly
being mocked for thinking that it was necessary to be in constant touch. I can still
distinctly remember a Dutch comedian sneering, when he ridiculed the rising use
of mobile car phones in 1992, that truly important persons were supposed to be
unreachable. Today, his point arguably still stands, but the mobile telephone has
long ceased to be the rare and pompous status symbol of the wealthy. Moreover,
it has been joined by countless other communication technologies that keep peo-
ple and objects inconspicuously connected. We now live in a world in which
Blackberrys, WiFi-enabled laptops, iPhones, RFID chips, Android smartphones,
and so forth, have all but completely pervaded everyday communication pro-
cesses, making many people wonder how they could ever have done without
them. It is at times such as these that we have to be aware that mobile commu-
nication devices, in their mundaneness, become almost invisible, as they come to
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constitute our living environment. Herein lies the opportunity for the observant
media scholar to intervene, and expose what is actually happening… and why.
I was still studying to become a media scholar when, at the end of the 1990s, I
got my first mobile telephone. It was an Ericsson A1018s, a light-blue device mea-
suring around thirteen centimetres long, five centimetres wide and three centi-
metres deep, with a big antenna dangerously protruding from the top. It could
make mobile calls and send and receive text messages, but that was it. No games,
no camera, no polyphonic ringtones, no MP3 player, no video capabilities, and
certainly no Internet or apps. By today’s standards it would be considered a bulky
and feature-poor device, but at that time I was as happy as could be, very much
aware of my newly acquired position in a rapidly changing communication land-
scape. And it happened quite by accident, actually. Although I had already been
considering buying a mobile telephone – especially after my grandparents had
beaten me to it that summer, having purchased one for use in their rural holiday
house in France – I was waiting for just the right opportunity, model, and price.
However, I ended up acquiring one in a rather unconventional way: when my
parents bought themselves a new bed, they received with it a complete mobile
telephone package for free. As my father already had a car phone and my mother
saw no use for it, they decided to give it to me. Without having to think twice
about it, I happily accepted the device.
I still have that first mobile telephone. It is kept in a drawer, next to the Sony
Ericsson T65i, K700i, Z600, and K800i that I have owned in the past couple of
years. They are tangible evidence of not only my personal preference for Sony
Ericsson mobile telephones, but also of the pace with which the devices have
evolved, boasting more and more features with every generation. On a very small
scale, my collection represents what for many may seem to be a natural process in
the development of communication technologies: they become better every time,
increasingly fulfilling our communication desires. This highly charged idea of
communicative progress is what has fascinated me ever since I began to study
media, and it fascinates me still. It has led me to write this book, and I expect it
will provide me with many more projects, as it will continue to influence media
development. Every time someone asks whether I fear my work on mobile com-
munication devices might soon become outdated because of the rapid rate of new
product introductions, I smile, and say that each press release touting the long-
awaited arrival of the world’s best communication device actually reconfirms
what I firmly believe: like the torment of Tantalus, we are convinced that if only
we try harder, we will be able to reach far enough and finally fulfil our desires.
And yet, we always fail.
This book, then, is about communication utopia. It is about what could be
considered a tragicomical quest for communicative fulfilment, a quest that has
manifested itself countless times in human history, and that will likely continue
to be part of us forever. Mobile communication devices have become the latest
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embodiments of that quest, and probably more literally than one might think; in
every single device, you will find capacitors that are made with a heavy metal
called tantalum. So, each time you use one of them to fulfil your desire for com-
munication, remember: a true and pure connection is, and always will be, tanta-
lisingly close.
There are many people I would like to thank for helping me in my own personal
quest to finish this book. It has been a long and winding road, but never a lonely
one. First, I must thank the people at the Faculty of Humanities, at the Research
Institute for Culture and History, and at the Department for Media and Culture
Studies at Utrecht University for creating the best job in the world; it truly is won-
derful and inspirational working within the New Media & Digital Culture (NMDC)
Masters programme.
Ah, the NMDC group! Could there be a friendlier, funnier, more creative, intel-
ligent, and highly entertaining bunch of people than those that made me feel so
much at home at Utrecht University? Our irregular meetings in classrooms, res-
taurants, conference halls, and homes have always been truly pleasurable and
exciting, and I hope to be part of many more. The group would not be complete
without its mafiosi, though; my utmost gratitude goes out to Marianne van den
Boomen and Mirko Tobias Schäfer, without whom my academic and personal life
would not have been enriched with so many memorable experiences. Our semi-
nars, trips to faraway places, nights out on the town, heated debates, revelatory
and consolatory encounters, and, above all, our discussions on our research proj-
ects, have all contributed to what I consider to be the best stock-in-trade a person
can have on the route towards academic achievement. May we continue our fabu-
lous friendship for many years to come.
There are more who helped me by giving feedback on my ideas, writing style,
English vocabulary and grammar, and intermittent chapters; a big thanks to
Andreas Fickers, Steph Harmon, Jim Hurley, Frank Jansen, Tim Muentzer,
Mathijs Sterk, Merijn van der Vliet, all the participants of the Utrecht media semi-
nars, and all the students who attended my two Masters courses ‘Wireless Future’
and ‘New Media Archaeology’. Furthermore, I am deeply grateful to Simone Veld,
for helping me regain my motivation when I most needed it.
A special word of recognition and appreciation must be given to William
Uricchio and John Durham Peters, who, through their lectures, articles, and
books, have shaped my academic mind and have given me the basic building
blocks with which I was able to develop my own research interests. I hope this
book does justice to your work. Every bit as important in this respect are my
colleagues Frank Kessler and Joost Raessens, who provided me with direction
and valuable knowledge, were always willing to expand on things as necessary,
and kept encouraging me to be creative yet precise in my thinking.
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Inge Judith Nobel, Sander van Ouwerkerk, Petra Overdevest, Bart Sassen,
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By connecting all kinds of objects everywhere, we aim to achieve genuinely ubiquitous
communications. To this end we are developing fourth-generation technologies to realize a
true ubiquitous society. (NTT DoCoMo 2006)
Envisioning the mobile future
In 1999, Japanese mobile communications giant NTT DoCoMo created Vision
2010, a corporate strategy aimed at countering the effects of a slowing growth of
the market at the time. The project was framed in a familiar, tried-and-tested
manner: by portraying the contemporary state of mobile communications as one
that served user demands well but would inevitably run into problems with an
expected increase in the consumption of information, a necessity of progress
towards a better future presented itself. In a press release that announced its lofty
intentions, the company clearly was not afraid to allude to a command over
supernatural powers in bringing about this better future, as it promised to
improve ‘the quality of life’ by use of MAGIC: ‘Mobile multimedia; Anytime, any-
where, anyone; Global mobility support; Integrated wireless solution; Customized
personal service’ (NTT DoCoMo 1999). The use of fanciful acronyms did not stop
there; the goal of ‘Vision 2010’ was to be achieved by following the company’s
‘DREAM’: Dynamics, Relationship, Ecology, Action, and Multi-view, all words
that were elaborately described as being in some way connected to ideas of
change, growth, collaboration, and progress (ibid.). The message was unambig-
uous, and has remained so up until the present day: as the world progresses, new
and ubiquitous mobile communication technologies will increasingly help to ful-
fil our communicative needs – all thanks to NTT DoCoMo of course.
To promote Vision 2010, and thus make visible the company’s ideas of how
their new wireless technologies would help shape the future of communications,
NTT DoCoMo over the years created a series of concept videos that aimed to
unveil the world ‘beyond the mobile frontier’. Each video shows people using
wireless communication technologies in a wide range of everyday and less com-
mon situations, and gives an impression of how these technologies serve to make
life more convenient. In one of the first videos that was released, we are intro-
duced to ‘a typical Japanese family of four’ and are given an insight into their lives
both in the very near future (which, at the time the video was made, was projected
onto the year 2003) and in the more distant future (set in 2010).1 In the first part,
we see the family members use their mobile devices to audiovisually communi-
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cate with each other wherever they are, take remote English classes outside in the
park, control home appliances from a distance, receive offers from nearby stores,
download music, pay for cans of soda and connect to office databases from the
back seat of a moving car. In the second, more futuristic part, they partake in
virtual three-dimensional academic courses in which all spoken languages are
automatically translated, use jewellery as user identification systems that commu-
nicate with coffee machines, tell virtual agents to help plan dinners, and talk to
holographically projected friends. All the while and at regular intervals, a male
voice-over sums up the technologies and services with which all these activities
have been made possible, stressing each time that they will happen and will
become commonplace.2
What is important to consider when analysing what NTT DoCoMo’s strategy
directors think is in store for us is not so much the question whether their short-
term predictions have come true or if their long-term predictions are composed of
fantastic nonsense. It is far more interesting to study the language and images
that are used to convey ideas of what communication technologies are for. The
videos not only represent the discourse of desire that is a defining aspect of so
many advertisements, but they are exemplary of the way in which telecom indus-
tries in particular use a very specific notion of the place that mobile communica-
tion devices take in the overall media landscape. Additional textual analyses of the
NTT DoCoMo videos would show that they stress the potential gains to be made
in productivity, sociability, efficiency, safety, reassurance, and mutual under-
standing; in other words, they stress communication improvement and its bene-
fits, and present wireless communication technologies as the ultimate facilitators.
In many more commercial advertisements, press releases, and articulations of
popular culture, a similar reasoning process can be distinguished, one that is
repeated as a mantra: mobile communication devices are the self-evident techno-
logical expressions of a natural progression in the quest for ever-improved com-
munication.
At first, this observation might seem a bit stretched. Is it not simply a shrewd,
yet obvious, marketing strategy to present merchandise in such a way that people
think they need it in order to enhance their lives? Are mobile communication
devices not just another product to sell? The quick and straightforward answer to
both questions would be yes, of course. People buy mobile telephones just as they
buy other consumer devices; even if they still function quite well, they are effort-
lessly replaced by new versions that feature the latest gadgetry. Without advertise-
ments continuously telling us that we need to upgrade to the latest smartphone
the pace of adoption might not be as fast as it is now. But think of this: is today’s
mobile-saturated world truly merely the result of clever marketing? Have we all
been fooled by commercial advertisements into buying mobile telephones, and
would this never have happened if we had just not bought into all the marketing
hype? The answer is a resounding no, there is definitely more to it than that. The
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idea of personalised mobile communication carries with it an immensely power-
ful lure that is not simply pushed into our susceptible brains. By portraying
mobile communication devices as sources of unlimited potential that can solve
any problem imaginable while completing any known lifestyle, advertisements
certainly paint a pretty picture, but they also readily tap into our deepest desires
for wholeness and completeness, which we hope can be fulfilled by improving
communication.
This brings us to the task of figuring out what role our desires for communica-
tion play in bringing about what can be called the feverish mobile communication
condition of today. Before we can do so, however, it is necessary to ask what
exactly that fever in the current mobile communication condition is.
Hark now, hear the mobiles ring!
For quite some time now, mobile communication devices have been heralded as
revolutionising progress and radically changing for the better the ways we com-
municate, do business, think of time and space, play, romance, arrange meetings,
and so forth. And indeed, the speed and vigour with which these small computers
have pervaded many of our lives is astounding, not to mention the impact they
have had and continue to have on the way communication is conceived today. In
order to illustrate how this process is typically captured in numbers, here are
some examples: in October 2010, the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) reported that in the developed world mobile penetration was at an esti-
mated 116.1 percent, which is to say that there were more subscriptions than in-
habitants (ITU 2010b); in January 2011, Informa Telecoms & Media predicted that
SMS text messages sent in 2015 will reach a worldwide total of no less than 8.7
trillion, having risen from 5 trillion in 2010, making it one of the most accepted
and popular communication channels in the world (ITM 2011); the GSM stan-
dard, first commercially launched in Finland in 1991, took 12 years to reach one
billion subscribers and just a further two and a half years to reach the second
billion (GSM Association 2006).
These are impressive numbers, and, although they do not portray a balanced
perspective on how mobile communication devices are actually incorporated into
our daily lives, they are more often than not presented as the definitive proof of a
process of progress that is impossible to ignore. The perception that the arrival of
commercially viable mobile communication devices has been sudden, and the fact
that their penetration rate is the fastest of any personal electronic consumer good
in history, make a good case for the temptation to attribute revolutionary charac-
teristics to them. And how could they not be revolutionary, the industry might
argue. In the third quarter of 2010 the ITU estimated there would be a staggering
5.3 billion mobile telephone subscriptions at the end of the year (ITU 2010a), and
there are certainly more people who have access, sharing phones among family
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members and friends or borrowing them temporarily from savvy businessmen.3
Even non-owners who actively seek to avoid using the devices can hardly escape
their presence in public space. Mobile communication devices are ubiquitous,
and despite the fact that they appear in countless sizes and forms, boasting the
latest technical tricks or simply providing just talk and text messages, there is a
certain characteristic presupposed in them, representing what has become the
quintessential symbol of communication in the twenty-first century: to provide a
uniquely identifiable wireless connection, in whatever form, to any other node in
the information network that is our global society today.
This hype of celebrating a seemingly endless potential found in the sheer abun-
dance of mobile communication devices can easily lead to oversimplified and
deterministic notions that the possibility to own or access such a device appar-
ently does not discriminate between socially constructed categories such as class,
race, age, ethnicity, gender, or social identity.4 This, in turn, has resulted in high
expectations that the mobile telephone can – finally – provide realisable solutions
to long-time political, economic and social problems, again highlighting its revo-
lutionary utopian potential. These expectations are visible in multiple layers of
society: not only in popular press, specialised magazines, and science fiction, but
also in academic analyses of changing communicative practices and political
manifestos. Not to forget, of course, jubilant press releases by the mobile indus-
try. In a telling example of this last category, on 13 June 2006, a few days before
the second billionth GSM mobile telephone user was to be connected, Rob
Conway, then CEO of the GSM Association (GSMA), said that ‘GSM [had]
become the first communications technology to have more users in the develop-
ing world than the developed world’, which meant that ‘mobile phones are “brid-
ging the digital divide” at an astonishing rate with relevant, affordable solutions
that help families stay in touch, businesses to grow and economies to develop’
(GSM Association 2006). Further initiatives taken under the flag of GSMA’s vision
‘Connect the Unconnected’ were to develop a ‘sub $30 low-cost mobile phone’
and to call for the ‘removal of tax barriers on mobile products and services in
many emerging countries’ (ibid.).
Admittedly, expectations proclaimed by highly placed industry executives can
occasionally become reality, for instance when the application of strategic plan-
ning reveals typical examples of self-fulfilling prophecies.5 In the case of
Conway’s assertion that the digital divide will be bridged by mobile communica-
tion devices, the prophecy does appear to come true: sometimes called a leapfrog-
ging technique because it avoids the expense of laying land lines, the adoption of
wireless technologies by developing countries has indeed resulted in millions of
people having access to communication and information, which they could not
obtain before. Moreover, and building on the argument that gaining access alone
does not automatically entail social or economic equality, several studies con-
ducted by Jonathan Donner, researcher in Microsoft’s Technology for Emerging
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Markets Group, have shown that the introduction and use of the mobile tele-
phone in countries such as Rwanda have a significant measurable effect on social
and business networks (Donner 2003; 2005).
However, self-fulfilling prophesies only work when they account for technical
and economic realities, and more often than not facts of reality are bent in order
to suit a dominant paradigm in culturally constructed discourses. There is, for
instance, the most notorious and controversial example of the supposedly demo-
cratic potential of the mobile telephone, that of the ousting of Philippine presi-
dent Joseph Estrada in January 2001, which was thought to be brought about by
thousands of Filipinos who used text messages and phone trees to organise mass
protests.6 This illustration of the mobile telephone’s assumed ability to facilitate
political change pops up in many an analysis of its postulated far-reaching poten-
tial; it has become a stock argument that confirms and sustains myths of the
power of wireless technology. It is a truism to say that the mobile telephone does
not inevitably oppose dictatorships and help construct or restore social cohesion,7
but what is important to note here is that high expectations, whether they are
fulfilled or not, do have a considerable impact on how the discourse of mobile
communication technology is moulded, and how an aura of utopian possibilities
is maintained.
Media technology’s seductive promises
The utopian aura is but one aspect of mobile communication discourse, and can-
not in itself explain why wireless technologies in particular attract so much popu-
lar anticipation and scholarly attention. However unprecedented the potential of
mobile communication devices actually is to accomplish social, political, and eco-
nomic equality, the gush of revolutionary and utopian claims that accompanies
their incessant rise is not unique. Every existing communication technology was
once new and full of promise, as many scholars have demonstrated. Wireless
telegraphy, at its inception, was seen as ‘the means to instantaneous free commu-
nication’ (Flichy 1995: 109); telephony seemed to promise the banishment of dis-
tance, isolation, and prejudice (Briggs 1977: 45); radio was poised to pave the way
for contact with the dead (Sconce 2000: 59-61); and television would transform its
viewers into all-knowing eyewitnesses of everything that went on in the world
(Elsner, Müller & Spangenberg 1994: 110). However, all such claims have, in one
way or another, been condemned as much as praised (Davis 1976), or proved
inaccurate. Most of the exuberant expectations never really came to fruition,
many media technologies have developed in a different way from what was fore-
seen, and no single medium has been able to completely replace all other media.
Nevertheless, the process of praise for unprecedented opportunities remains con-
spicuous throughout media history.8
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This observation raises two important and interconnected issues regarding
how to understand today’s frenzied mobile communication condition: the first is
that, in spite of reality continuously disarming them, utopian and revolutionary
claims appear to be part and parcel of the arrival of new technologies; the second
is that these claims apparently possess and share particular discursive character-
istics. Let me briefly expand on this. The first issue, of the recurrent nature of
unbridled reverence for new media, has been addressed only relatively recently in
studies of media history. It is in Carolyn Marvin’s insightful When old media were
new (1988), for instance, that we read of how telephones and electric lights – new
technologies at the end of the nineteenth century – were not only awaited with
anxiety but were bestowed with magical beneficial powers as well. Since, in a
historical sense, new technologies have ‘simply been elaborations’ on old tech-
nologies, Marvin argues, it should not come as a surprise that our expectations
are therefore quite alike (Marvin 1988: 3). The same point is made by Vincent
Mosco in The digital sublime (2004), when, presenting us with a historical overview
of utopian hopes and desires in media reception, he tells that ‘[p]ractically every
substantial technological change has been accompanied by similar claims’
(Mosco 2004: 119).
While Marvin does not fully explore in detail the possible explanations for the
existence of these ‘hymns to progress’, Mosco holds that such hopeful stories are
‘myths’ that celebrate the ‘technological sublime’ (ibid.: 22). By referring to the
sublime as a powerful trigger to provoke the creation and telling of myths that
tout technologies, Mosco here explicitly sides with a range of scholars that have
done so before him, or have used a similar notion of how the sublime engenders
rhetorics of progress. Coined by Perry Miller (1961) and more fully developed by
Leo Marx (1964) and David E. Nye (1994), the term ‘technological sublime’ not
only alludes to an ‘essentially religious feeling’ of complete and transcendent
excellence induced by the confrontation with impressive technology, but also is a
‘defining ideal’ that binds people together (Nye 1994: xiii-xiv). As such, the sub-
lime is both an experience and an orienting force, tapping into ‘fundamental
hopes and fears’ and representing ‘a way to reinvest the landscape and the works
of men [sic] with transcendent significance’ (ibid.: xiii). It can be identified on
many different levels; as Nye has noted, the last decades of the nineteenth century
for instance saw the rise of what could be called the ‘electrical sublime’, engen-
dering and composed of a widespread belief in the supposedly unlimited powers
of man-made electrical contraptions (Nye 1994: 143-172).
Myths play an important part in upholding the sublime as an orienting force,
Mosco maintains, as they
mean more than falsehoods or cons; indeed, they matter greatly. Myths are
stories that animate individuals and societies by providing paths to transcen-
dence that lift people out of the banality of everyday life. They offer an entrance
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to another reality, a reality once characterized by the promise of the sublime.
(Mosco 2004: 3)
Myths, as culturally naturalised ideas, offer captivating promises that are ‘unful-
filled or even unfulfillable’, which makes them seductive and powerful (ibid.: 22).
Without so much saying so in such terms, Mosco defends the view that we live
with an instinctual urge to be astounded, that we are equipped with a persistent
willingness to believe revolutionary and utopian narratives because of the lure of
unfulfilled potential in new technologies, even if we, paradoxically, already know
we will never be able to actually reach the complete and transcendent excellence
that is the sublime.
This brings us to the second issue that needs to be addressed before we can
take on the investigation of the mobile communication condition, which is the
one that concerns the particular characteristics of discourses of new technologies
that bring about the continuous recurrence of their idealisation. If we are indeed
able to observe that utopian expectations not only are not unique to mobile com-
munication devices, but can also never be met completely, then surely there is
something that makes us (want to) forget this, something that coerces us to proj-
ect high hopes on the new communication technologies anyway. Here, the reason
lies in the adjective used in the term ‘new technologies’: arguably, nothing is as
seductive and full of promise as the phenomenon of ‘new’ itself. As philosopher
and media theorist Boris Groys (2002) notes, the ‘new’ has traditionally been
connected to ‘the idea of progress, the utopian future’: it lures, it does away with
what was before, and replaces things, often with a shock or with profound con-
sequences. It signifies change and difference, processes that are often associated
with improvement; in many an industry’s jargon, ‘innovation’ is a must-use word.
The new can also mark the endpoint of a circular process, and announce the start
of another iteration, or better yet, another opportunity. A new moon or a new day
is not necessarily an improvement over the previous version, but forms the next
iteration of a continuous loop. Thus, the new transforms but also allows repeti-
tion, and therefore offers promises of new hope and new chances. As such, it
contributes to the persistent feeling that, whenever something new presents
itself, opportunities to come closer to or to return to a sublime state of being are
near.
Questioning the communication sublime
What lies at the heart of this book is the intent to grasp the functioning of one of
the strongest and most appealing recurrent utopian myths that accompanies the
advent of new media, which is that communication technologies will eventually
endow us with omnipresence and omniscience. The expressions of this myth are
given shape by what I call the ‘communication sublime’, an awe-inspiring and
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immensely tantalising vision of a final and universally accessible communication
space where the accumulation and dissemination of information stands for the
most important condition of human progress, and where there can be no misun-
derstanding. Manifestations of this myth are visible in stories of success as well as
in those of failures, in press coverage, research reports, commercial advertise-
ments, and popular culture. What makes a study of this myth especially interest-
ing today is that wireless technology discourse upholds the illusion that mobile
communication devices come closer to realising the myth’s expectations than any
other medium before. The ‘anywhere, anytime, anyhow, anyone’ slogan, both
obviously and subliminally attached to every mobile apparatus, has convinced
countless numbers of people that a mobile communication device is of essential
importance to make their lives complete. Moreover, the record-breaking pace
with which mobile communication devices have spread among a multitude of
cultures suggests that they fit a fundamental communicative need, one that is
globally felt. As James E. Katz and Mark Aakhus concur in the introduction of
their aptly titled book, Perpetual contact (2002):
In the history of human imagination the power of real-time interactive oral
communication over great distances had been a power so great that even most
divine beings were considered incapable of it: Zeus, king of the Greek gods,
and the rest of the pantheon, had to rely on messenger-boy Mercury. Today a
good many messenger boys have their own mobile phones. (Katz & Aakhus
2002: 2)
By referring to mobile telephones and equating their functioning to the powers of
the supreme master of communication, Mercury,9 it is clear that Katz and Aakhus
ponder the idea that this god’s capabilities are now literally within our grasp, and
that mobile communication devices are the outcome of an elaborated process of
looking to fulfil a long-standing human communication dream.
Like Katz and Aakhus, I see an overarching logic associated with the evolution
of communication technology, one that is ‘grounded in broader ideologies that
are rooted in historical, materialistic, religious, and ideational ontologies, and
that have dominated human attempts to contextualize and make meaningful their
life experiences’ (ibid.: 305). In other words, when we look at how communica-
tion technologies have historically been imagined, constructed, received, and cri-
ticised, we may be able to uncover a continuously present undercurrent, a
recurring discursive trope that holds that new communication technologies will
improve our lives as long as they bring us closer to reaching the communication
sublime. Katz and Aakhus are on a similar track: they trace the origins of such an
undercurrent in the compelling image of ‘perpetual contact’, a myth that presents
us with ‘an idealization of communication committed to the prospect of sharing
one’s mind with another, like the talk of angels that occurs without the con-
18 tantalisingly close
straints of the body’ (ibid.: 307). The ideal of angelic communication is but one
expression – albeit a powerful one – of the communication sublime, but what all
of the myths share is a seductive power, one that deceivingly beckons to us with
an ultimate form of communicating that awes, inspires, terrifies, and amazes, but
that can never be truly reached.
Tying together the observations on the mobile communication hype, the pres-
ence of myths in media evolution, and the haunting characteristics of the commu-
nication sublime, this book aims to answer the question in what ways the
ongoing evolution of communication media is oriented by recurrent myths that
give expression to inherently unfulfillable desires to arrive at the communication
sublime. We will see that, throughout time, the communication sublime has
known many articulations through many myths and has expressed itself in differ-
ent discursive formations with each new attempt to improve communication.
Mobile communication technology is but the latest striving to realise a communi-
cation heaven on earth, and although it has opened up new paths that undisput-
edly lead towards an affirmation of the ‘anywhere, anytime, anyhow, anyone’
mantra that is a part of the communication sublime, just as with other, older
media it cannot prevent misunderstanding. In other words, the communication
paradox is upheld: knowingly unable to actually reach any of the idealised ideas of
communication, we still keep on trying, thinking that as long as we solve prob-
lems of communication by inventing new and better technologies, we will even-
tually eliminate all obstacles that stand in the way of true and harmonious
understanding.
How to approach communication myths in media history…
and why
The defining role of the new in fuelling myths, sustaining the communication
sublime and giving rise to a déjà vu of utopian claims, has had little attention in
the field of media history up until the 1970s. In earlier studies, media history is
typically seen as a chain of successful breakthroughs brought about by great
inventive geniuses, in which ‘newness’ merely functions as a marker on a teleolo-
gically constructed timescale, indicating how far we have progressed from primi-
tive machinery to cutting-edge state-of-the-art technology. As Siegfried Zielinski
writes, such genealogies are ‘comforting fables about a bright future, where
everything that ever existed is subjugated to the notion of technology as a power
to “banish fear” and a “universal driving force”’ (Zielinski 2006a: 3). In the last
decades of the twentieth century, however, sociocultural studies have demon-
strated the fallacy of such a deterministic vision by showing that failures can be
just as revealing as successes (Bijker 1992), that media do not simply replace each
other but are concurrently present in a broad media spectrum (Flichy 1995), that
media never remain unchanged nor are they used solely for intended purposes
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(Bolter & Grusin 1999), and that there are chance discoveries, power struggles
and social necessities that influence technology development (Winston 1998).
Still, the myth that we move forward along a line of successive and successful
media improvements persists, not in the least of course in strategies of commer-
cial industries that thrive on maintaining a sense of non-fulfilment that continu-
ously needs to be addressed.
In such progressive accounts of development, media are invariably charac-
terised as having ontological states instead of as being procedurally induced
unstable phenomena that constantly change appearance depending on the con-
text in which they are viewed.10 While the procedural view is far more elegant and
takes into account the multitude of factors that influence media development, it is
the ontological view that perfectly fits the pragmatic longing for cause-and-effect
explanations of why our media are what they are, and what they will become in
the future. In order to consider the functioning of both views, I aim to implement
the two guidelines of what media historian Erkki Huhtamo proposed as the rela-
tively new ‘media archaeological approach’:
[F]irst, the study of the cyclically recurring elements and motives underlying
and guiding the development of media culture. Second, the ‘excavation’ of the
ways in which these discursive traditions and formulations have been
‘imprinted’ on specific media machines and systems in different historical
contexts, contributing to their identity in terms of socially and ideologically
specific webs of signification. (Huhtamo 1994)
These guidelines enable me to investigate the sense of déjà vu that is so often
present in ontological accounts of media history, without falling into the trap of
implying that we are ‘simply re-running that which has come before’ (Park,
Jankowski & Jones 2011: xi). Indeed, media archaeology, with its explicit roots in
the work of Michel Foucault, shuns the idea of seeing history as producing a
continuous series of clearly defined media identities, focusing on the specific dis-
cursive formations of heterogeneous media manifestations instead.11 Huhtamo as
well contends that recently media scholars have begun to realise that a Foucaul-
tian ‘(re)placing’ of histories of media technologies ‘into their cultural and discur-
sive contexts’ can offer us a far more complete understanding of history as ‘a
multi-layered construct, a dynamic system of relationships’, in which the function
of discursive regularities in media development is recognised (Huhtamo 1994).
Taking a media archaeological approach will also allow me to step away from
unduly myopic approaches to the study of media development and use an inter-
disciplinary research method instead. As Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka note in their
edited volume on the emerging media archaeological field, ‘[s]uch “nomadi-
cism,” rather than being a hindrance, may in fact match its goals and working
methods, allowing it to roam across the landscape of the humanities and social
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sciences and occasionally leap into the arts’ (Huhtamo & Parikka 2011: 3). The
main advantage of using an interdisciplinary approach is thus that I will not be
constrained to rigid paradigmatic borders that prevent the excavation of fruitful
cross-references. In what follows I will therefore present hermeneutic analyses of
discursive regularities in myths of the communication sublime, conducted from
the perspectives of media history (Basalla 1988; Winston 1998) and comparative
media studies (Boddy 2004), while drawing upon relevant theory and knowledge
from a diverse field of disciplinary frameworks. These frameworks range from
sociology (Desroche 1979; Castells et al. 2007), mythology (Campbell 1949), and
philosophy (Bloch 1959) to evolutionary psychology (Dennett 1995; Gould 1997),
literary history (Wegner 2002), and communication theory (Peters 1999). By tak-
ing on a multi-sided perspective that adheres to the guidelines of a media-archae-
ological approach, I intend to uncover the regulative function of utopian
narratives and their various manifestations in media history.
Finally, by operating in this manner, I aim to extend the existing body of
research on mobile communication to include a more expanded (and, in some
respects, a more holistic) view of the development, marketing, and reception of
mobile communication technologies. Ever since mobile telephones started to
become truly commonplace in everyday life in the mid-1990s, there has been a
growing scholarly interest in their nature and function, but most of the studies
conducted to date are sociologically and empirically driven, and seek to describe
and explain very specific demographically dependent uses and effects. Although
such investigations can result in highly useful insights concerning mobile tele-
phones and adoption strategies (Ling & Helmersen 2000), fashion statements
(Katz & Sugiyama 2006), inter-family negotiations over ownership (Davie,
Panting & Charlton 2004), expressions of subcultural identities (Skog 2002),
changes in social interaction (Campbell & Russo 2003), and so forth, in general
they accept the presence and proliferation of mobile communication devices as a
given, and do not question the deeper underlying structures that have brought
about the current mobile communication condition. The goal of this book is to
address precisely this issue, and to provide a more comprehensive account of how
mobile communication technologies have come to occupy such a prominent posi-
tion in our media landscape. This does not mean that I will shy away from tap-
ping into the vast amount of empirical studies available on mobile
communication when needed, but large parts of my analysis will go beyond the
micro-scale, and oscillate between a macro- and meso-scale.
Structure
The general structure of this book is determined by the four themes that have
been identified in the recurrent mobile communication advertisement mantra:
1) a utopian belief in progress, that 2) engenders and reinforces ideas of perfected
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communication, which 3) find their expression in media evolution that 4) has
bred the current feverish mobile communication condition. My analyses of these
four themes are presented in two parts. In part I, ‘Venturing into the familiar
unknown’, a theoretical and historical framework is constructed on discourses of
hope, purpose, utopia, and progress (chapter 1) and on quests for improvement
found in communication theories and models (chapter 2). In part II, ‘Where
angels speak’, I use this framework to uncover myths of improved communica-
tion in media evolution (chapter 3) and reveal the practices and paradoxes of
idealised ideas of communication in the discourses of mobile communication
technology (chapter 4). In the following, a more detailed overview is presented.
In chapter 1, I start out by analysing the lineages of idealised ideas of commu-
nication, which I track in recurring discourses of utopia and progress. In order to
ask the question whether in the evolution of communication media we can distin-
guish a recurrent urge to reach the communication sublime, I start by investigat-
ing the notion that the reachability of any sublime, whether it is religious,
technological, or communicational, presupposes a fundamental need to gauge
the status of a contemporary situation, and then to project a vision of an ultimate
better place onto another time. Given that there are linear, cyclical, and spiral
models of time, I describe how each of these models give shape to the idea of a
better place, and then, in a brief historical overview, pinpoint several moments in
time when the urge for a better future, expressed in stories of hope and purpose,
has created visions of utopia and progress. Because reaching the sublime is by
definition impossible, because utopia and progress always interlock with dysto-
pian and regressive views, and because technology has also been the cause of
many disasters, I conclude this chapter by exposing the contradictory and para-
doxical elements that can be found in projects that aim to arrive at the sublime.
In chapter 2 an inquiry will be made into the various conceptual models of
communication found in communication theories, particularly in regard to each
theory’s angle on the concept of ‘ideal’ or ‘perfect’ communication. I first focus
on the spectrum of myths surrounding the communication sublime, and on how
these myths, while presenting paths to utopian worlds by offering a heteroge-
neous collection of solutions to the problems of misunderstanding, remain situ-
ated in largely theoretical or fantastical narratives. This spectrum of idealised
ideas of communication is structured into three main categories, which are
formed by the paradigms of one-to-one communication, one-to-many communi-
cation, and many-to-many communication. From there I shift my attention to
how these idealised ideas of communication, when we follow them to their radi-
cal vanishing points, invariably seem to lead to propositions of a world view that,
in reality, is untenable, and ultimately paradoxically negates any need for actual
communication. Subsequently, this observation calls for an analysis of how myths
of idealised communication are strategically used and deployed by social actors in
order to have them serve specific goals.
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In the second part of this book, chapter 3 examines how idealised ideas of
communication interlock with the evolution of communication technologies by
looking at new media discourses from a historical and comparative perspective.
First, I give an overview of the main positions in the debate on which theoretical
approach best covers the paths that the development and use of technology tra-
verse. My main focus here is, as in the two previous chapters, on the role and
persistence of progress-minded models and on their sceptical counterparts.
Arguing that we need a twofold scheme to study the continuously shifting posi-
tion of technology in society, one that accounts for differences in what seems
similar as well as for similarities in what seems different, I then proceed by
describing an evolutionary approach to studying technology development. This
approach aims to account for the multitude of factors that make media evolution
an erratic and unpredictable process, as well as recognise the myths, hopes, and
beliefs that have always been present and influential during technological devel-
opment. This is then put to the test by using the theoretical framework estab-
lished in part I to construct an encompassed understanding of how myths of the
communication sublime manifest themselves in media evolution. I give a histori-
cal overview of media development prior to (and partly overlapping) that of
mobile wireless technology, in which I trace continuously recurrent ideas of idea-
lised communication placed against a backdrop of social, cultural, political, and
economic factors that also played their part in this process.
In chapter 4, I carry over the perspective on the evolution of communication
technologies from chapter 3, and continue by specifically focusing on historical
accounts of how mobile communication devices have been developed and how
they have been able to pervade everyday communication situations. Again, I aim
to investigate how these accounts are rife with utopian thought and ideas of pro-
gress, and as such could be seen as a continuation of the discourses of potential
found in the imagining and marketing of earlier media. Next, I shift to an evalua-
tion of how such myths of the communication sublime in discourses of mobile
communication technologies are both seemingly fulfilled and at the same time
confronted by the paradoxical consequences of that fulfilment. Through an analy-
sis of the four most characteristic promises in the discourses of mobile commu-
nication, which I see as those of ubiquitous connectivity, fluid sociability, real-
time relief of anxiety, and omniscience through ever-present knowledge, I intend
to find if these do indeed largely meet the basic criteria required from a system of
pure communication; yet, I also ask whether they increasingly foreground the
inherently terrifying nature of such a system. I then end this chapter by making
the claim that the search for further improvements in communication will con-
tinue, and I elaborate on this by briefly tracing the paths that idealised ideas of
communication take in the present day towards discourses of location-based ser-
vices and of the ‘Internet of Things’.
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This book concludes with the observation that although there is no constitutive
deterministic or teleological force in the evolution of communication technology
per se, there is, however, a strong tendency to attribute utopian and progress
characteristics to new media, prompted and inspired by a human need for myths
that tell of reaching the communication sublime. These myths have made many
appearances throughout time, and many technological projects have reacted dif-
ferently to them, but their presence has been constant. It is the dominant discur-
sive elements of current mobile communication technology’s discourse that
represent the hallmark of the myths of the communication sublime, which is to
potentially contact anyone, anywhere, at any time. But, just as with older media,







1. Discourses of progress and utopia
As is so often the case in history, what a seer, prophet, or philosopher believes to be the
result of novel and original inspiration almost invariably turns out to be a remembered
insight from some perhaps long-forgotten book or author. (Robert A. Nisbet 1980: 117)
In order to construct a theoretical framework for a macro-scale perspective on
idealised ideas of communication in the ongoing development of media, it will
first be necessary to examine the nature and functioning of hopeful expectations,
utopian myths, and beliefs in progress. This will not result in an exhaustive over-
view of the body of work done on utopian thought, as a vast amount of literature
has already been written on this topic.1 The historical account that I construct
here will serve to describe the various ways in which longings for a sublime state
have expressed themselves through time, so that we are able to gain knowledge of
how the concepts of ‘utopia’ and ‘progress’ acquired and changed their mean-
ings, and how they have subsequently been incorporated in communication the-
ories and models (the subject of chapter 2), in accounts of improvement in media
evolution (the subject of chapter 3), and ultimately in mobile communication me-
dia discourses of the present day (the subject of chapter 4).
This chapter will assess the underlying premise of the existence of ideas of
progress and utopia, which I contend is ultimately rooted in a human urge to
hope and search for purpose and meaning. This urge expresses itself in ‘neces-
sary fictions’, regulative narratives that foster a sense of improvement by positing
two situations that differentiate in time and then presenting the latter of those
two situations to be in some way better than the former. Evidently, the ways in
which these necessary fictions function are very much connected to how relevant
cultural concepts of time and the future are structured, so a short overview of
three basic perspectives of time (linear, cyclical, and spiral time) will be given.
These perspectives of time are then traced throughout cultural and social history,
exposing their influence on ideas of progress and pinpointing the moment where
utopian thinking arises as a particular subset of these ideas. We will see that the
perennially recurrent hopes and beliefs in necessary fictions foster a poignant and
paradoxical conviction that humankind can actually pursue a progressive path
towards utopia. Through an analysis of dystopian and anti-utopian world views,
which always serve as shadows to utopian projects, I will show that future-
oriented necessary fictions invariably and tragically interconnect with notions of
cleansing, repair, and, ultimately, reunification with a sublime state. In the end,
the ultimate paradox is that humans cannot stop to ‘name the unnameable final
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destination, to construe the unconstruable question about the meaning of human
existence’ (Zipes 1988: xxvii).
Hope, belief, and purpose
Erwartung, Hoffnung, Intention auf noch ungewordene Möglichkeit: das ist nicht nur ein
Grundzug des menschlichen Bewußtseins, sondern, konkret berichtigt und erfaßt, eine
Grundbestimmung innerhalb der objektiven Wirklichkeit insgesamt.2
(Ernst Bloch 1959: 5)
Hoping and believing in the existence of purpose are arguably part of the most
powerful and significant emotions in the lives of human beings. Without a gen-
eral idea of where we are heading to, what is asked of us in the meantime, and
above all some indication that things are going well, life becomes hard to endure.
Moreover, in most times of hardship a basic drive towards self-preservation starts
to manifest itself, which is geared towards just one thing: to improve conditions.
Making life endurable can mean ensuring that there is enough bread, water, or
electricity to get through to the month’s end, but it can also take on a metaphysi-
cal form, as many world religions, new age communities, cults, self-help groups,
philosophical endeavours and psychological sessions continue to show. It is
through the cognitive acts of hoping and believing that ideas of purpose are con-
structed and sustained: while a strong belief may preclude the need for hope, and
hoping for something does not necessarily entail that you believe it will happen,
both hoping and believing can be employed to orient oneself, in the present, to a
specific instance of the future, which, more often than not, is projected to be a
better one.
The value of hoping and believing in making meaningful everyday experiences
as well as extreme events has widely been recognised by a diverse range of aca-
demic fields. In sociology (Desroche 1979), theology (Moltmann 1967), psychol-
ogy (Snyder 2000), and neurobiology (Newberg, D’Aquili & Rause 2002; Newberg
& Waldman 2006), hope and belief have been described as fundamental in shap-
ing a person’s sense of purpose and well-being in life. What many studies share is
their stress, first, on hoping and believing as relying upon a system of affective
forces that provides both shelter (from fear or suffering) and direction (towards a
better place), and second, on the premise that this system is accessible to anyone.
Particularly notable in this respect is the work of Austrian psychiatrist Victor
Frankl, who put forward one of the most compelling accounts of the benefits of
having something, anything, to believe in. As a former Auschwitz concentration
camp prisoner, he wrote about his experiences in …trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen: Ein
Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager [Man’s search for meaning], in which he
described how prisoners who believed that there was still some purpose or mean-
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ing left during all the suffering, and oriented themselves towards a future event or
task, had less trouble surviving. For Frankl, this undertaking was more than just a
mental trick; he refused to reduce the search for meaning to a mere ‘“secondary
rationalization” of instinctual drives’ (Frankl 1992: 99). Hence, as psychology
scholar Paul Wong has noted, Frankl places the source and continuous presence
of the need to hope and believe squarely in the human spirit, which houses ‘love,
the will to meaning, purpose, creativity, conscience, the capacity for choice, responsi-
bility, sense of humor, etc.’ (Wong 2001, emphasis added).
What makes Frankl’s contributions valuable for the understanding of utopian
beliefs in general and of ideas of progress in communication technologies in par-
ticular, is that he posits a future-oriented frame of mind as a given. His notions of
hope, belief, and purpose reflect a conviction that they constitute essential prop-
erties of what it means to be human, and that we cannot (or should not) do other-
wise than employ them. Moreover, as a therapist with a keen interest in
behaviourism, Frankl saw the search for meaning guided by an innate hierarchy
of values, which he thought was ‘founded on our biological past and […] rooted
in our biological depth’ (Frankl 1992: 146). In other words, he held that the drive
to look for purpose and meaning is a constitutive feature of humans, and that it
will therefore necessarily express itself in our actions, cultures, and, last but not
least, in (grand) narratives of how things came to pass, with what purpose, and
with what direction.
As such, Frankl’s views are in line with those of the school of evolutionary
psychology, in which biological traits are seen as constitutive elements of the
ways that humans reason. While reductionist explanations for certain types of
human behaviour can in some cases be quite controversial,3 they do provide
exemplary material to support the contention that to hope for and to believe in a
better life are undertakings that are shared across time and cultures. Evolutionary
biologist Daniel C. Dennett, for instance, maintains that human organisms come
equipped with a cognitive skill called a ‘hyperactive agent detection device’, which
has, over thousands of years of evolution, instilled in us ‘the urge to treat things
[…] as agents with beliefs and desires’ (Dennett 2006: 117). As a result, this urge
led to the notion of deities, ‘agents who had access to all the strategic informa-
tion’ that humans did not possess (ibid.: 126). Thus, the need to believe in God or
Allah or any other supernatural, omnipotent, and omnipresent force that guides
and steers us is, according to Dennett, the outcome of a biological and evolution-
ary process, one that favours the human organism’s susceptibility to having the
comforting thought that ‘something’ or ‘someone’ has made sure that we exist
and live for a reason. In other words, Dennett holds that this mode of making
understandable an otherwise chaotic world was favoured by natural selection as a
fruitful means to survive, thereby preserving and extending the strand of genes
that is carried by us god-fearing survival machines.4
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As will be elaborated further in chapter 3, such evolutionary models of why we
attribute purpose to what we do in life provide a useful analytical framework for
understanding the mechanisms underlying the development of media. But, I
should add, they are not without pitfalls. The notion that meaning and purpose
are part of our biological make-up, and even might constitute the driving force of
evolution itself, is not undisputed. The other side of the debate on the biological
nature of purpose is reflected well by the work of evolutionary biologist Stephen J.
Gould, who refused to adhere to the almighty power of the gene in gradually
steering evolution towards a determined destination. According to Gould, the
evolution of biological entities progresses without set goals; there is no purpose
to be found in its directive principle (Gould 2002). Moreover, in response to
Dennett’s attempt to describe the presence of just such a directive principle in
Darwin’s dangerous idea (1995), Gould held that sociobiological explanations of
human evolution and behaviour are ‘just-so’ stories, which only create the false
illusion of a consistent, contingent, and goal-oriented system, whereas empirical
research has so far not delivered substantial evidence to sustain the actual exis-
tence of such a biological blueprint (Gould 1997).
While Gould raises a valid point about the problems of the ease with which a
need for empirical evidence is discarded, his strategy of dismissing sociobiologi-
cal arguments by stating that they merely offer a compelling story does not
address the questions of why there is a human search for purpose to begin with,
or what is the purpose of hoping and believing in ideas of progress. And very
important questions they are: considering Victor Frankl’s findings, notions of
purpose and meaning are what drive us – perhaps, thus, up to the point where
they lead us to perpetuate compelling and deterministic stories that tell of their
embedment in evolution. What remains to be explained, then, is the fact that the
logic of purposiveness continues to have a strong foothold, as exemplified by
stories of ever-present improvement in communication technologies. The act of
searching for purposeful meaning and then finding it within directive systems
may not necessarily be the result of an evolutionary effect, but it is undoubtedly a
very powerful and recurrent trait.
The answer may lie in how the human psyche works, if we follow culture critic
Steven Shaviro; purposiveness is actually not something we discover, he holds,
but attribute, because we need this ‘necessary fiction’ in order to make sense of
our surroundings (Shaviro 2003: 209). Thus, while we are very well able to
acknowledge that we cannot understand a world without purpose, we should not
mistake its presence for proof that it is a constitutive element in the process of
evolution; instead, it performs a regulative function. This view on the need for
purpose as a regulative function that produces necessary fictions coalesces with
what Vincent Mosco calls ‘a remarkable, almost willful, historical amnesia’
(Mosco 2004: 117), meaning that without continuously and deliberately forgetting
that earlier attempts to reach an ultimate goal have failed, we will not be able to
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find purpose in trying again, nor persist in (re)telling myths that disclose the
ultimate route.5 This, as I will argue later in this chapter, is the prime reason for
the fact that so many utopian projects resemble each other: advocates of these
projects simply cannot escape the lure of the ever-present potential, while know-
ingly ignoring the fact that similar projects have never before been fully actua-
lised. They become both victims and proficient users of stories that tell that there
is purpose, and because there is purpose, there is direction. This is the regulative
function of necessary fictions.
Necessary fictions: Expressing the need for explanations
Religion is the greatest utopia to have appeared in history.
(Antonio Gramsci n.d. cited in Desroche 1979: 80)
The argument constructed so far is thus that, although there is no need to postu-
late a purpose in evolution, we need it so much to rearrange and order the per-
ceived chaos in our daily experiences of life that we incorporate it in necessary
fictions. Vincent Mosco’s engaging account of the persistence and omnipresence
of myths also suggests that these necessary fictions constitute an intrinsically
human condition, found everywhere around the world and transcending local
cultural traditions. As such, an analysis of myths could very well explain the fever-
ish notions of unlimited potential found in discourses of mobile communication
technologies, something that will be developed more fully in chapter 4. But I am
getting ahead of myself; in order to understand how necessary fictions lead to
utopian ideas of progress and subsequently to a need to improve communication
technologies, it will first be necessary to investigate the main reasons that make
myths appear particularly in progress-minded narratives, and to what extent the
acts of hoping and believing orient us towards directions that seemingly lead to a
fulfilment of utopian dreams.
One influential explanation for the recurrent nature of myths of progress is that
searching for, and hoping to find, the ultimate reason of why things happen as
they do is a fundamental part of human storytelling tradition. Comparative
mythologist Joseph Campbell has contributed abundantly to the view that human
history is driven by this search for universal truths, continuously reinventing and
retelling stories that narrate of ultimate journeys to those truths. Moreover, in The
hero with a thousand faces (1949) Campbell argued that these stories all follow a
single narrative pattern, that of the monomyth, of which thousands of variations
have been derived. Borrowing the term from a passage in James Joyce’s Finnegans
wake and partly basing his understanding of it on Jungian archetypes, Campbell
constructed an elaborate model of the monomyth, which in short and adapted by
Fredric Rice reads as:
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The hero is introduced in his [sic]6 ordinary world, where he receives the call
to adventure. He is reluctant at first but is encouraged by the wise old man or
woman to cross the first threshold, where he encounters tests and helpers. He
reaches the innermost cave, where he endures the supreme ordeal. He seizes
the sword or the treasure and is pursued on the road back to his world. He is
resurrected and transformed by his experience. He returns to his ordinary
world with a treasure, boon, or elixir to benefit his world. (Rice 2001)
Note here the ‘innermost cave’, which lures the hero into starting his quest; how
the hero is ‘resurrected and transformed’, indicating he is renewed, has pro-
gressed, has changed for the better; and how he returns with ‘a treasure […] to
benefit his world’, affirming that the risk of the journey was all worth it. The story
structure is very familiar, and contains plot elements we easily take for granted.
Using any derivation of this monomyth it is possible, as Roland Barthes already
noted, to give the elements that make up the myth a ‘natural and eternal justifica-
tion, […] a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of
fact’ (Barthes 1972: 143).
The power of the monomyth is thus that it can be used as a general template
for countless ideologically loaded stories, all of which will contain a readily recog-
nisable and accessible structure that, through retelling, is reaffirmed again and
again as the blueprint for how basic facts of life manifest themselves. A better
place really is just around the corner, it says; if only we believe it is, and take risks
in getting there, we will be rewarded and everyone will benefit. As already exem-
plified in the introduction of this book, advertisements for mobile communica-
tion technologies make full use of this type of necessary fiction. They present us
with an almost transcendental journey towards a place where everyone can con-
nect to each other, reach mutual understanding with ease, and will have left a
world of frustration and obstacles behind. As such, they uncannily reflect the
basic narrative structures of many religious stories of transcendence, which tell
of reaching a religious sublime state like heaven, nirvana, or satori.7 According
to Campbell, such similarities between religious themes and imaginative stories
are no coincidence; he found support for his argument that the monomyth is the
single most powerful narrative structure we know in the fact that he could recog-
nise it in the dogmas and utopian outlooks of all world religions, on which he
wrote extensively in his series of books The masks of God (1959-1968). He held that
there is a single, unknowable truth underlying all religions, an immanent force
that has given life to everything and into which everything will return in the end,
one that lies behind the creation of many if not all of the world’s stories.8 The
power of this force is immense; the mere fact that at the present day more than
85 percent of the world’s population declare themselves as religious,9 shows how
many people in one way or another are confronted with the question of purpose,
and try to approach that question in a meaningful way by immersing themselves
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in the narrative myths that the religious sublime supplies.10 A necessary fiction
‘purpose’ may be, but it is a very potent one that can claim cultural and religious
independency.
Another way to approach the manners in which utopian thought and ideas of
progress find their continuous and instantly familiar expressions in narratives is,
according to Campbell, through a probing of our collective unconscious, which
both sustains and is sustained by religious scripts, folk stories, fairy tales, urban
legends, and the like. Whether it is produced through mystical a-priori knowl-
edge or through common experiences, shared instinct and shared culture, our
collective unconscious holds dreams that reflect myths, and produces dreams
that reinforce myths. The functioning of these dreams has to be taken quite lit-
erally; as literary critic Leslie Fiedler noted, myths are experienced as ‘projections
of certain unconscious impulses otherwise confessed only in our dreams, but
which once raised to the level of full consciousness serve as grids of perception
through which we screen our so-called “reality”’ (Fiedler 1996: 34). And indeed,
just as Campbell’s analysis of religions uncovered a drive towards a single shared
truth, studies in psychoanalytical research have shown that there are many simila-
rities found in dream patterns across a wide variety of cultures (Domhoff 1996;
2005), suggesting that, again, there is a shared unconscious understanding of
expressions of what Campbell calls the universal or transcendent truth. This
understanding subsequently informs our actions in our waking hours, directing
us along the path of the monomyth.
In the evaluation of the nature of necessary fictions that tell of purpose, utopian
progress, and final resolutions, we have to be careful, however, not to settle, as
Campbell seemed to do, for the existence of archetypes as their prime driving
force. Similar to the problematic issues of controversial arguments in evolution-
ary psychology, the reduction of human behaviour and storytelling to mere effects
of archetypal determinism in the unconscious can lead to a rigid conception of
imagination, and does not adequately explain how visions of a better future are
translated into a myriad of different actual actions. Here it is instructive to turn to
the work of Ernst Bloch, German philosopher of revolutionary utopianism and
author of the seminal multi-volume Das Prinzip Hoffnung [The principle of hope]
(1959). Like Campbell (albeit within a broader political framework), Bloch studied
folk stories, fairy tales, and myths in order to find shared characteristics of visions
of a better life. Unlike Campbell, however, he did not think that looking for
Jungian archetypes was a productive exercise. He was highly critical of Jung’s
reworking of the Freudian unconscious into a collection of ‘primeval memories
or primeval fantasies’ (Bloch 1959: 62), and found that this prehistoric vision of
the unconscious – one that harboured archetypes as primary drives – was danger-
ous and objectionable, as it fed reactionary and irrationalist tendencies that could
lead to a justification for fascism.11 Moreover, it left no room for imaginative het-
erogeneity; used as templates, archetypes work as constraints, suggesting and
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almost dictating that derivations are impossible. Instead of seeing the uncon-
scious as a static and rigid entity, Bloch wanted to explore how a radical and
revolutionary new could be instigated from it, and how notions of such a process
were envisioned and expressed in stories of utopias, hopes, and beliefs.
In order to make room for a possible analysis of the radically new, Bloch intro-
duced the concept of the not-yet-conscious, which he posited as a supplement to
Freud’s unconscious. We do not really know ourselves, according to Bloch, so we
cannot extract everything there is to know about ourselves from our uncon-
scious.12 The not-yet-conscious, then, as scholar of folklore and fairy tales Jack
Zipes writes in his introduction to Bloch’s selected essays, is ‘formed by the
impulse of hope, in which inklings of what [humans] might become manifest
themselves. For the individual, the not-yet-conscious is the psychical representa-
tion of what has not-yet-become in our time and its world’ (Zipes 1988: xxxii).
The not-yet-become is thus the domain of everything-that-could-be in our daily
reality, and the not-yet-conscious is formed by stories of hope that tell of how the
not-yet-become, at some point, might come to be. The most important thing
about these stories, Bloch insists, is that they need to be productive, they need to
uncover themselves at spots where they can form an impetus for action. The
places where Bloch traces these manifestations of hope are primarily in day-
dreams, and not in dreams, as Jung and Campbell argued. There is a significant
difference between dreams and daydreams. Whereas the former are part of the
unconscious and ‘house repressed and forgotten desires and experiences’, writes
Zipes, daydreams fall into the realm of the semi-consciousness and therefore ‘can
be productive for the formation of individuals and the world since they […] point
to real, objective possibilities’ (ibid.). Daydreams can inform possible ways to take
action, and give shape to the means by which humankind expresses what these
roads to reaching certain objectives might look like. This is why, as Zipes sum-
marises Bloch’s viewpoint, ‘all art and literature that have anything to say to
humankind are utopian’ (ibid.). Utopia is not just a repressed ideal that keeps
churning out different versions of the same monomyth, it is an actual, objective
goal that can be reached by acting upon engaging and hopeful daydreams.
Bloch’s conception of the not-yet-conscious thus not only adds another dimen-
sion to how we can understand the recurrent nature of utopian myths that tell of
improvement and ultimately of reaching a sublime state, it also stresses that these
myths can be identified as having continuous and real effects on the creation of a
future-oriented mindset – even more so than when approached from the perspec-
tive of the monomyth or archetypes. They do something with us, they make us
susceptible to the lure of that-which-lies-before-us, and as such they make us
conscious of the fact that every time they are told they can set us in motion. They
constitute, in several ways of interpretation and differentiated in time, an insati-
able part of human reasoning that is aimed at bringing about change for the
better.
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This is why myths work so well in utopian stories, and what makes their pres-
ence so persistent throughout time. Grand ideas of where we are heading to, or
what we should do to improve things, grab hold of our imagination and propel us
into action, but each time they do so, the paradoxical nature of the ensuing quests
makes us think that we are not quite there yet, and the whole process starts again.
The recurrent tone of hope is ever present; as sociologist Henri Desroche concurs
in Sociologie de l’espérance [The sociology of hope], necessary fictions of hope, belief,
and purpose pass through recurring historical cycles, and lead us to realise that
‘[n]o route has ever led any caravan to reach its mirage; but only the mirages have
set the caravan in motion’ (Desroche 1979: 144, emphasis in original). Desroche
is quick to add that the process of hoping for and constructing plans to realise a
better life is not inevitably cyclical; neither is it ‘necessarily linear as the optimism
of a cumulative progress rising to infinity would postulate’, but it ‘could be a
spiral’, connecting both the recurrent linear and cyclical aspects of the ‘panorama
of millenarian phenomena’ he finds in human history (ibid.: 42-43, emphasis in
original). Pondering the thought that the ‘“messianico-religio-ideologico-revolu-
tionary” whole’, the concept with which he describes the matrix of articulations
of the hope for a better world, ‘constitutes a prophetic dimension of collective
consciousness’ (ibid.: 143), Desroche makes clear, as I have also argued so far,
that ‘to orient oneself to a better future’ is an inherent and shared human prop-
erty, but, it has to be noted, one whose description and articulation are dependent
on a vision of time as linear, cyclical, or spiral.
Concepts of time and progress
[T]he question to be addressed to [the utopian desire] is, does that desire work to pull the
present forward, progressively, towards the as-yet-inexpressible but hopefully better future
state, located in what Ernst Bloch calls the future unconscious, or is it a regressive
impulse, in search of some prelapsarian lost domain located in the past unconscious.
(Jan Relf 1993: 108, emphasis in original)
Meaning or purpose can be obtained by envisioning a more tolerable future place
that, when crisis is over, lies in front of us. In all guises, this thought that some-
where, just within reach, lies a better world, is arguably as old as the moment
humans began to make sense of their surroundings. Describing this better world,
setting out paths, undertaking the supposedly necessary or needed steps to reach
it and actually getting there is what is often called progress, a phenomenon that
must be approached quite carefully. Throughout history and within different cul-
tures, ideas of progress have manifested, and continue to manifest, in many
forms, depending on what concepts of time and future those cultures hold. To
construct a schematic overview of how ideas of progress evolved and exerted
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influence on the creation and sustenance of myths of communication improve-
ment, it will prove to be useful to group the many existing varieties of visions of
time and the future into the three basic categories that Desroche proposed in his
book on hope. Sohail Inayatullah, co-editor of the Journal of Future Studies,
describes these categories as three basic shapes: ‘the linear evolutionary shape of
progress (the dominant paradigm of development), the cyclical shape of the life-
cycle and the natural world, and the spiral shape that combines progress and
tradition’ (Inayatullah 2005).
Clearly, according to Inayatullah, it is the linear shape in particular that is asso-
ciated with progress, as it lends itself quite well to creating a mindset based on
making predictions. What lies further ahead may not be directly accessible, but at
least this ‘further’ holds the inherent possibility that there is a direct path or a
general direction that can be taken in order to arrive at a desired point in the
future. Progressive linearity denies degeneration, evades the idea of going back,
and tries to hold an equilibrium while continuously elevating it. There are, of
course, various periods of short-term ups and downs that become visible when
one zooms in on a small scale, but ultimately, and on a larger scale, the net result
projected by the linear perspective is advancement. Cyclical time, on the other
hand, knows only movement leading ultimately back to its origin. There are linear
aspects to be found in cyclical time as processes can temporarily go ‘up’ or
‘down’, but the process eventually ends at the beginning. In cyclical time, writes
Inayatullah, ‘change is normal and opposites exist in dynamic tension in every
stage’ (ibid.). There is no general direction – in the linear sense – towards which
cyclical time is heading, there are only recurrent phases.
There is reason to doubt, however, that the concept of progress can only be
found exclusively in linear perspectives. While linear views are not seldom seen
as optimistic (‘a better future lies just ahead’) and cyclical views as pessimistic
(‘we will inevitably return to from whence we came’), both schools recognise
there are positive as well as negative characteristics of their perspectives to be
pointed out. Linear time harbours promise and prediction, but also causes cata-
strophic scenarios when wrongly taken paths that lead to ‘progress traps’ cannot
be abandoned (Wright 2004: 5). Cyclical time preserves traditions and holds no
unpleasant surprises, but can create a feeling of powerlessness as the fate of his-
tory cannot be escaped. As a result, if the idea of progress is to be squarely
coupled to a model containing at least some positive connotation, both linear
and cyclical visions of time provide ample room for its incorporation. The fact
remains, however, that both visions are slightly handicapped metaphors; they do
not fully capture the idea that progress also knows its moments of déjà vu.
The ready answer to this problem is provided by the spiral vision of time, which
combines linear and cyclical time in order to connect progress with history.
According to Inayatullah, the spiral pattern
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intends to remove the future from the confines of pre-determined history,
from the cycle, and to create the possibility for […] an acceptance of structure,
but a willingness to transform the suffering associated with history, and to
find previous pockets of darkness and illuminate them, to pierce through
silences. (Inayatullah 2005)
As such, the spiral view recognises recurrent processes, concepts, and ideas, as
well as an imminently present higher plane towards which these processes,
concepts, and ideas can lead. Thus, progress in spiral time can take on the incre-
mental and accumulative properties of linear time, as well as the traditional and
value-preserving properties of cyclical time, without having to yield to a single,
restrictive framework.
The spiral, then, owing to its intricate integration of both linear and cyclical
attributes, is a powerful tool to express causal relationships and to provide expla-
nations of events for which there exists an urge to find their purpose. In the spiral
vision of time, events take place because the linear course of movement leads us
in a certain direction, or because the events happened before and must happen
again. Capturing the spiral in Ernst Bloch’s terms, hope works on the premise of
already having sensed but not yet experienced what we are looking for; utopia has
already existed, in ourselves, now we need to return to ourselves to find it again.
The reason for the spiral’s seduction therefore lies in its self-referentiality, a prop-
erty that is of significant importance for understanding ideas of purpose and pro-
gress, and which will be described in more detail later in this chapter. Because the
spiral connects itself to itself, it constructs, by definition, a constellation of every-
thing that can possibly happen, continuously moving and incorporating new
events, interpreting them in terms of old ones.
At this point it must be stressed that none of these time visions imply that
causality between events is a given; rather, perceived causal relationships in the
experience of time are more often than not induced by a psychical need that, quite
similar to the functioning of necessary fictions, asks for an imposition of order on
chaos. This urge for a ‘spatialisation of time’, as Henri Bergson (1910) called it,
underlies the distinctive teleological elements of determinism so often found in
ideas of progress, and masks the open and indeterminate character of time. Spa-
tial configurations of time quite easily lead to a depiction of time as a coherent
and seamless flow, whereas in an open-ended view of time, just as the outcomes
of successive throws of dice are not influenced by each other, each unit of time
can be seen as qualitatively distinct from every other. Bearing in mind this distinc-
tion between diachronic time as a research object and synchronic time as a frame-
work for a historical approach, the next two sections provide an overview of how
cyclical, linear, and spiral time each are seen to have had their dominant periods
in history, co-shaping ideas of progress and utopian stories along the way. This
overview should be seen as a necessarily selective look at a heterogeneous body of
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ideas consisting of what can be called ‘historical constellations of utopian
thought’ (Manuel & Manuel 1979: 15ff); not all stories share the exact same struc-
ture or themes, but they do enlighten the multitude of ways in which the future-
oriented mindset has expressed itself through time.
Visions of time and progress until the Renaissance
We dream much of paradise, or rather of a number of successive paradises, but each of
them is, long before we die, a paradise lost, in which we should feel ourselves lost too.
(Marcel Proust 1924: 186)
While our current day-to-day experience of time can give rise to a fairly strong
feeling that the structure of life is governed by causes and effects, and therefore
always already has allowed for a linear realisation of goals that have been set in
the past or present, this is generally thought by history scholars to be a fairly
recent and mostly Western vision of progress. Lacking the experience of a swiftly
changing world, the argument goes, people for a long time did not see any appar-
ent direction that history was moving towards, and this attitude was more or less
carried over until at least the Renaissance.13 A majority of studies of ideas of pro-
gress therefore hold that only when the field of science established discrete sys-
tems, in which accurate measurements delivered undisputable proof of
advancement and thus of the accumulation of knowledge, only then could the
linear idea of progress as we now understand it develop and claim its important
place in Western civilisation (Ginsberg 1953: 7).
Although there is much merit to this view, if only because the exact wording of
what we now mean by ‘progress’ cannot be transposed to other historical periods
such as classical antiquity,14 I would suggest that myths that tell that humankind
can advance to higher levels of civilisation and will continue to do so in the future
are not unique to the last few hundred years, but have had a regulative role in
many eras, in various shapes and roles. The modern era did not invent the idea of
progress, but intensified and politicised its mythical underpinnings to an unpre-
cedented extent, so much so that we are still entangled in it to this very day, and
experience its influence on discourses of media evolution. The present section
will substantiate this claim by showing that the human inclination to maintain a
future-oriented outlook based on hope and a belief in purpose can be traced in
many more and earlier times. The observations presented here should not be
interpreted solely as constructing an account of chronological developments, but
more as presenting a number of systematic and representative cuts in a historical
timeline, and thus as showing the broad genealogical transformations in the
thinking of time, progress, and utopia.
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In most present-day historical research it is generally acknowledged that
accounts of the structure of time in ancient – mostly Greek – sources emphasise
its cyclical nature. Time cycles were believed to follow an eternal arc that
stretched from a Golden Age to a Silver, Bronze, and finally, an Iron Age, after
which divine intervention reset time back to a Golden Age. In these ‘ages of the
world’, systematically written down for the first time around 700 bc by Hesiod in
his ῎Εργα και ΄Ημέραι [Works and days], humankind typically experiences a
slow but sure moral and spiritual decay, from a peaceful and happy time during
the Golden Age to a dismal and chaotic epoch ruled by war and greed in the Iron
Age.15 In this cyclical chain of events there is no progressive improvement to
speak of, only a progressive degeneration from a once sublime state that only at
an indefinite point in time could be restored. Most early Greek poets and philoso-
phers therefore rarely looked ahead, instead turning their attention to the Eden-
like past and emphasising the deplorable state of their own society. Technological
developments may have provided the most palpable examples of how the Greeks
might have experienced something that resembles our current notion of progress,
but these developments were more often seen as bringing decline instead of
advancement.
By describing man’s transformations in life as part of a cyclical and recurrent
journey away from an ideal place, and positing them as ubiquitous and fixed
truths about the human condition, the logic that connects the ages of the world
is made up of two influential forces of human hope, and thus of desire and
action: first, a feeling of loss caused by separation from one’s origin, and second,
the recognition that there will never be a final stable state, that things are bound
to happen again and again. Both forces engender their own specific necessary
fictions. The first conveyer of desire and action, a feeling of loss, is in Greek
mythology most prominently visible in Plato’s Symposium (written some four hun-
dred years after Hesiod), in which he recounts how the poet Aristophanes tells of
the creation of the two sexes. This creation myth describes how, long ago,
humans came in three genders (androgynous, male, and female) and lived in per-
fect harmony. But, because the humans became complacent and did not properly
honour the gods – especially Eros – they were punished and split in two, resulting
in a division of humankind in heterosexual men and women, homosexual men,
and lesbians. Since then, every one of us is eternally searching for our lost half,
hoping to be reunited again in a state of bliss, under the guidance of Eros. The
story outline thus acutely sets up an erotic longing for a return to a sublime state,
propagating countless quests aimed at reaching that state; as Eros does not exon-
erate us, however, it is a longing that can never be fulfilled. Nonetheless, the story
stirs us into action because it presents us with a goal that lies in the future: there
is a path, and it should be travelled.
The second influence upon desire and action, the acknowledgement that
things never remain as they are, gives expression to feelings of nostalgia as well
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as of hope; both look in opposite directions for a point in time where things were
or will be better. According to historian Robert Nisbet (1980) this opposition can
be observed in any discursive account on ideas of progress, and therefore it is
possible to argue that not all Greek philosophers and poets saw their time on
Earth as part of a cycle of regress. Moreover, even though Hesiod is often asso-
ciated with having a regressive view on history,16 he could actually be seen as
writing about progress in a very familiar modern fashion. In a second infamous
myth in Works and days, Nisbet exemplifies, Hesiod tells of Prometheus, who
stood up to the will of Zeus and single-handedly helped humankind make its first
advance to civilisation by stealing fire from Mount Olympus and giving it to the
pitiful humans. Then, having ‘lifted mankind from its primal degradation and
misery to a level where man might seek to rival the gods’, Prometheus was pun-
ished by Zeus for all eternity (ibid.: 19). Thus, from that propitious moment on,
humans were endowed with reason and gained the almost inescapable drive to
build upon self-made stepping stones and progress to a better life. While Nisbet
admits that it is not exactly clear what the nature of this progress was – Hesiod
did not differentiate between moral, ethical, technological, or other forms of pro-
gress – it is a vision of progress nonetheless, and it had a considerable impact on
classical thought. As Nisbet continues to show, throughout the classical period,
Hesiod’s suggestion of the possibility of an unlimited advancement of human-
kind has influenced many writers, such as Aeschylus, Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius,
and Seneca, all of whom had respect for ‘knowledge […] that gives protection,
comfort and well-being to mankind’, had a clear conception of ‘the acquisition of
this knowledge by man through his own abilities’, and recognised that this acqui-
sition had ‘taken place cumulatively over a period of time’ and would continue to
do so (ibid.: 46).
We therefore see that, while the cyclical model of time is held by many histor-
ians to be dominant in myths of life in classical times, complementary notions of
linear progress can also be distinguished, thus negating the view that those myths
told of nothing but recurrent decline and degradation. This observation has a
significant impact on the current project of tracing the genealogy of stories of
improvement. The Greek (and later Roman) society is widely held to be the start-
ing point of Western civilisation, of the origin of many seeds of present-day
thinking, so if ideas of improvement can be found amidst a Zeitgeist that is sup-
posedly free of any belief in linear advancement, it makes their relation to con-
temporary ideas all the more potent. This is of course not to say that ideas of
progress have not changed for more than two thousand years, or knew no alter-
natives. Although I am inclined to disagree with historian Morris Ginsberg when
he says that ‘we are not justified in ascribing to [progress] universality, continuity
or necessity’ (Ginsberg 1953: 5), because in my view there is a certain widespread
psychological necessity to entertain a – any – notion of ‘that which is better’, I
agree that any attempt to reduce the myriad forms of ideas of progress to a single
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unbroken strand is futile. Rather, all these variants should be taken into account,
composing a broad and contextually sensitive perspective on the manifestations
of ideas of progress. The conditions that influence how we look at our own con-
temporary existence are dynamically structured, constantly shifting the bound-
aries of what is considered as ‘better’.
Linear ideas of progress found in myths in classical times were thus oversha-
dowed by cyclical thinking, and differ from the contemporary version we have
come to know. Not only was the progressive accumulation of knowledge more
an individual than a collective process (one that did not necessarily entail social
or ethical advantages), classical ideas of linear progress are also generally not
endowed with much potency: according to historian Sydney Pollard, they were
more ‘poetic explorations’ than ‘firmly based philosophic views’, and served no
systematic search for a universal law of progress (Pollard 1968: 2-3). Accounts
vary as to the moment in time when allusions to the modern notion of progress
did find their first articulation; while most historians follow the argument that a
belief in progress ‘could not take a firm hold over men’s minds’ until the doctrine
of Providence was abandoned when modern science emerged (Ginsberg 1953: 7),
others squarely place the seeds of the modern idea of progress much earlier, in
Saint Augustine’s De Civitate Dei [City of God]. In this chief orthodox Christian
work, Nisbet, for example, already sees notions of ‘a unity of all mankind’, ‘his-
torical necessity’, and ‘a confidence in the future that would become steadily
greater and also more this-worldly in orientation as compared with next-worldly’
(Nisbet 1980: 47).
Whether the work of Augustine indeed presents us with the first glimpses of
the roots of modern progressive ideas, or, as Pollard asserts, was actually ‘written
to combat the doctrine of mundane progress’ (Pollard 1968: 5), what it did do was
introduce to Christianity – and consequently to much of Western philosophy of
history in the ensuing centuries – the originally Jewish notion of millenarianism,
the ‘expectation that the end of the world is near and that, accordingly, a new
earthly paradise is at hand’ (Noble 1997: 23). This apocalyptical view of the future
of humankind marked an important change in the dominant understanding of
time – from cyclical to finite, and thus linear – as well as initiated a goal-oriented
pragmatism by foretelling that a paradisiacal state would await the chosen ones.
The basic elements that make up the ingredients of the monomyth can be seen to
express themselves: the universal truth lies at the end of a long road, and people
have to travel this road in a certain way in order to actually arrive at that truth.
The growing conviction in Christian thinking that a new millennium was at
hand, however, is not necessarily seen in historical studies as the fundamental
driving force behind a change in the general attitude towards the manipulability
of the fate of humankind. Many historians discussed so far believed that, long
engulfed in a mindset of inferiority, Christian thinkers in Europe did not assume
it was possible or even appropriate to actively pursue the worldly implications of
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the Final Truth. For orthodox Christianity, progress along the earthly road meant
spiritual progress only, obtained by abiding by religious dogma and passively
waiting for God himself to announce the Final Judgement. It is Robert Nisbet,
again, who disagrees with the dominant vision of the Middle Ages as a period in
which ‘thought was lost in contemplation of the heavenly hereafter and in despair
of or disdain for the things of this world’; he names Joachim de Fiore as the most
powerful of prophets, whose ideas of a future earthly paradise would make their
way from the ‘twelfth down to the nineteenth’ century and inspired numerous
thinkers of progress (ibid.: 93-95).17 When we look at the multitude of myths
present in the latter of these centuries, there are strong hints that, after the
Renaissance, the resigned attitude towards the inevitability of fate slowly
morphed into a growing belief that man was capable of altering his living condi-
tions for his own benefit after all (Gombrich 1974).
The birth of utopia and its progressive realisation
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it
leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity
lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation
of Utopias. (Oscar Wilde 1891: 16-17)
In his book Utopie en kritisch denken [Utopia and critical thinking], Dutch philosopher
Martin Plattel notes that although the urge to transcend everyday reality and strive
for a better life has seen many different historical manifestations from classical
antiquity and onwards, it was not until Thomas More wrote his 1516 novel Utopia
that stories of human endeavours towards progress began to gain true momen-
tum in the socio-cultural imagination (Plattel 1970: 27-30). Key in this respect
was that More gave a name and a place, or, rather, a ‘non-place’ (from the Greek
οὐ τὸποσ [ou topos]) to this envisioned better world: he described Utopia as an
island where all inhabitants lived together in harmony, thereby making this a
‘good place’ (derived from εὐ τὸποσ [eu topos]) as well. Although More portrayed
Utopia as a fantasy,18 and did not consider it to reflect his own personal political
and social ideals, he cleverly imitated the mixture of fact and fiction that was
characteristic of stories of discovery in his time (such as those of Marco Polo),
thereby making Utopia believable and successful, and essentially founding the
genre of the utopian novel.
As is predominantly the case with imaginative projections of possible ideals on
future or not-yet-existing worlds, Utopia was born out of dissatisfaction with the
contemporary state of affairs. Elaborating on Plato’s ideas on the ideal configura-
tion of government of the city state in Πολιτεἰα [The republic],19 More presented an
alternative societal structure to that of Britain, France, and other European feud-
42 tantalisingly close
alist nation-states, indirectly criticising their unwillingness to create a more
humane system and put into practice important ideals of Christianity. The char-
acteristic that can be recognised as most significant about Utopia is that More did
not describe it as a natural, untouched paradise to be found, but as a society that
could be constructed. In other words, Utopia is a narrative that meets – or essen-
tially constitutes – Ernst Bloch’s basic prerequisites for expressing the not-yet-
conscious, the daydreams that should be acted upon in order to bring forth truly
utopian societal change.
Utopian fictions such as Utopia thus present us with an imaginative other place
that can be interpreted as the ultimate reward for quests for a better life. As nar-
rative theorist Phillip E. Wegner points out in Imaginary communities (2002), uto-
pias are ‘“nowhere” […] precisely to the degree that they make somewhere possible,
offering a mechanism by which people will invent anew the communities as well
as the places they inhabit’ (Wegner 2002: xvi-xvii, emphasis in original). This
theme of perceiving the world as open to human discoveries and hospitable to
utopian ventures can clearly be seen as gaining significance in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Written at a time when Christopher Columbus and
Amerigo Vespucci had just made their great expeditions to the West, Utopia very
much exudes New World pheromones, mingled with an invitation to re-invoke
Saint Augustine’s image of the City of God, a perfect place on Earth. In the 1620s
and 1630s, around the time Francis Bacon wrote his Utopia-inspired The new
Atlantis, the utopian theme was literally exported from the British homeland by
the Puritans. Their main goal was to complete the English Reformation and
establish a truly spiritual society; by shaping the foundations for this exemplary
righteous community, a New Jerusalem, they created a utopian backdrop against
which many later American communities were modelled.20 As anthropologist
Steve Mizrach notes, America became ‘the vehicle for Europe’s utopian imagina-
tion, […] a place where the regeneration of the age promised by the Rosicrucians
and other groups might come about, home to bold experiments in the investiga-
tion of nature and society’ (Mizrach 2001).
Social experiments such as those of the Puritans, an increasing stream of pub-
lications that aimed to describe all-encompassing models of how the world
worked,21 a rise in the number of New World expeditions: these are all reflections
of an intensifying tendency to act upon utopian daydreams of progress in the
seventeenth century, an era that is marked by a ‘growing confidence of the power
of man over his environment and, ultimately, over his destiny’ (Pollard 1968: 13).
Thomas More was of course not the sole instigator of this change, nor was he
merely the nomenclator of an idea that ‘had always already existed in some nat-
ural, ideal realm’ (Wegner 2002: 27), but Utopia became the reference work for
anyone thinking about social reform in the following centuries. In the wake of the
Reformation, which had already signalled a slow change in the dominant attitude
towards the fate of inescapable degeneration and the circularity of time, the
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theme of societal manipulability gradually took hold, expressing itself in neces-
sary fictions while surfing on the rising tide of a new idea of progress, which was
soon to find its zenith in the Enlightenment.
The Age of Enlightenment, which roughly spans from the second half of the
seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, is widely held to be the
period during which a rational belief in linear progress both truly emerged and
reached its highest peak. At no other time do we find so much optimism about
the future and man’s role in constructing a utopian version of it than in these
centuries. It was then that the belief in progress acquired its definition as ‘[mean-
ing] that mankind has advanced in the past – from some aboriginal condition of
primitiveness, barbarism, or even nullity – is now advancing, and will continue to
advance through the foreseeable future’ (Nisbet 1980: 4-5). It is also the time
when a linear sense of history manifested itself more fully. The prime force
behind this belief in linear progression was reason; human rationality became
seen as the most powerful way to break free from irrational fears, dogmatic
beliefs, and dangerous ignorance, and to establish standardised methods for
engendering improvements.
The fields in which these improvements were best visible were the mechanical
arts and sciences. This was not only due to the refinement of instruments, but
also, and more importantly, because the accumulation of scientific knowledge
could seemingly go only one way, and that was forward through generation upon
generation. The Apocalypse still had a prominent place in Enlightenment views of
the world’s fate, but humankind no longer had to suffer while waiting for the
subsequent Paradise. Moreover, progress in the mechanical arts and sciences
became seen both as a sign of immanence of the awaiting Paradise and as the cause
of this immanence. A certain historical need for continuous improvement thus
arose: without it, there would be no progress, and without progress, there would
be no redemption (see Tuveson 1949: 153-203). As will be further elaborated in
chapter 3, this is one of the main themes running through myths of technological
evolution from the eighteenth century onwards: the mechanical arts became com-
monly viewed as the driving force in history that brought a human-made earthly
paradise closer with each new invention and improvement, and this view still
resonates in present-day conceptions of technology.22
What is clear to discern from the events that took place in this period of chang-
ing worldviews is that there was an intimate correlation between the production
and distribution of necessary fictions that told of reaching a better place through
processes of progress. Together with the heightened significance of the gathering
of knowledge, as well as the conviction that improvements in knowledge would
automatically result in an improved society, the amount of utopian texts pub-
lished during the Enlightenment rose to an unprecedented number.23 While such
an outburst of creativity could have signalled a wide diversification of themes, the
original blueprint of More’s Utopia always remains visible. The contents of
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Enlightenment utopian texts invariably focus on the distribution of wealth and
labour, the configuration of the governing political system, and on true justice
and morality; the solutions to the problems posed by these questions all deal
with specifying strict relations between groups and individuals, defining socially
determined spatial zones, and placing the utopian city radically outside of con-
temporary societies yet in reach of those that really wanted to change things
(Baczko 1978: 30-38). As would become clear in later centuries, this enormous
gulf of imaginary and projected social ideals set the tone for many of the plans
for social revolutions in Europe, as well as for the birth of modern positivist
thinking.
At this point it should be noted that, in the accounts of historical manifesta-
tions of ideas of progress and utopian thought up until and including the Enlight-
enment, only two of the three visions of time that were discussed earlier are seen
to have expressed themselves most visibly, namely cyclical and linear time. How-
ever, although their narrative expressions have indeed known dominant periods,
they did not possess any exclusivity. The cyclical worldviews in classical Greece
were accompanied by linear subplots, and the linear stories of progress during
the Enlightenment were often coupled to the desire to return to a reconstructed
Eden, the Paradise before the fall of man. This also means that the third vision of
time, the spiral vision, understood as a blend of cyclical and linear time, had
always been potentially present, although it had not manifested itself explicitly in
Western thought. It is therefore fitting that, at a time when both visions of cyclical
and linear time had clashed violently in a major paradigm shift, just after the end
of the eighteenth century, German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
put forward an idea of time and history that resembled a spiral-like movement
towards the Absolute.
For many historians writing on ideas of progress, Hegel is a mandatory stop-
over. According to Nisbet, there is ‘scarcely a work in Hegel’s voluminous writ-
ings that is not in some fashion or degree built around the idea of becoming, of
growth and progress’ (Nisbet 1980: 276). Similarly, Pollard writes that Hegel’s
work represents the view that ‘the actual development of the world’, or what
Hegel called Geist [Spirit], necessarily and unequivocally marches forward towards
a state of complete consciousness of itself (Pollard 1968: 89). This progression is
the result of a dialectical mechanism: every phenomenon (‘thesis’) is met by
opposition (‘antithesis’), out of which, on a new and higher level, another phe-
nomenon (‘synthesis’) arises, and then the whole process starts again. As Charles
Van Doren notes in his review of Hegel’s position among authors who see pro-
gress as the result of some natural cosmic principle, there is thus a ‘rhythmic
pattern […] to be observed in all phenomena’, in which ‘[e]verything comes to
fruition, then to grief, then to a higher truth’ (Van Doren 1967: 91). The spiral
emerges: the process by which Geist heaves itself up is repetitive and therefore
circular, the direction towards the Absolute is linear.
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Hegel’s account of the structure and motion of time and history thus stood for
unchecked progress towards a final goal, which strongly resonated with the uto-
pian mindset of the time. Plattel even states that the structure of every utopian
thinking follows the basic Hegelian triad: ‘it moves away (antithesis) from the
status quo (thesis), and focusses on a better future (synthesis)’ (Plattel 1970: 47).
What is important to stress here, though, is that humankind’s role in Hegel’s
view was that of an intermediary: we have little to no agency in the forward move-
ment, it is Geist that progresses and makes its strides visible through the actions of
humankind. Moreover, according to Hegel, attempts to actively enforce utopian
conceptions of progress form the necessary dialectical counterpart of universal
will, and are destined to bring about Terror. Published at a time very much char-
acterised by the French Revolution and its grim aftermath, Hegel’s description of
progress as the manifestation of a natural cosmic principle deeply contrasted with
the deeds sparked by the utopian mindset of revolutionaries, or what he called
‘specific individual acts of will’ (Hegel 1967: 604). We will return to the dark and
paradoxical sides of utopian projects soon, but here it suffices to say that, to
Hegel, the image of the ideal Absolute Mind serves as the ultimate synthesis
towards which the dialectical process itself moves, constantly setting humankind
up for struggles between conflicting states of being.
Notwithstanding Hegel’s reservations regarding the terrifying effects of speci-
fic individual acts of will, at a time when necessary fictions of hope and purpose
became more and more occupied with the notion that an earthly paradise could
be installed, Hegel’s views on history and progress, as controversial as they were
then and are now,24 were, in a variety of interpretations, shared, used, or
expanded on by some of his early nineteenth-century contemporaries (like Henri
de Saint-Simon, Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and, later, Auguste Comte) in
their diverse utopian schemes. The theories they used and the objectives they pur-
sued differed from person to person, but overall a shared conviction can be iden-
tified that progress towards a more just and more peaceful society was feasible
through instigating a revolutionary change and then building society anew by
using a combination of science-based knowledge and technologies. While the
main criticism of these ‘utopian socialists’, as they were somewhat disdainfully
called by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, was that they merely sketched fantasti-
cal visions that could never be realised, their writings have been very influential in
shaping a more scientific view on the manipulability of society, and inspired the
foundation of many utopian communities, again confirming the power of the
utopian impulse (see Schehr 1997).
The period from the middle of the nineteenth century up to the present day is
one that shows an oscillating pattern in the ways that ideas of progress and uto-
pian thought were perceived. First, amidst accumulations of scientific knowledge
and rapid technological developments that gave rise to the Industrial Revolution,
in Western societies the modernist belief took hold that progress was not only
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feasible, but could be steered towards very particular notions of what a utopian
future should look like. As Plattel concurs, the utopian mindset ‘was no longer
aimed at finding new possibilities, as it was during the Enlightenment, but at mak-
ing and creating them’ (Plattel 1970: 35, emphasis in original). New scientific dis-
coveries and new technologies increasingly strengthened the idea that all kinds of
futures were now wide open, waiting to be realised. The vision of utopia as pre-
dominantly separated from us by space largely made way for a vision that saw
utopia more as distant in time, something that can be distinguished in moder-
nity’s necessary fictions, as reflected by the popular works and novels of Albert
Robida, H.G. Wells and Jules Verne. From the beginning of the twentieth century
onwards, however, ideas of progress lost much of their appeal due to large-scale
failures of utopian social projects, and because there was a growing sense that
new technologies could wreak havoc as much as they could propel humankind
forwards towards a brighter and better future. Both world wars and other con-
flicts and catastrophes in the latter part of the twentieth century radically tem-
pered the belief that humankind was indeed progressing towards a better life.
Moreover, in what can be broadly described as a postmodern reaction to moder-
nity’s conceptions of historical progression, a highly discontinuous and contin-
gent view of time and history arose, in which there was no room for postulating
the existence of hierarchical or organising principles such as those attached to
progress and utopia (Marx 1994).
However, despite intellectual and cultural mistrust of grand narratives that tell
of a better life that should be within reach, elements of their discursive construc-
tions remain visible in stories in popular culture, in prophetic books on the opti-
mistic future of what has been called the Information Revolution since the 1990s
and onwards, and of course in advertising and publicity material for the sophisti-
cated problem-solving capabilities of networked communication technologies
(Hughes 2004: 107-109). Especially industries in capitalist societies are very well
aware that the idea of advancement is a necessary element to their existence.
Therefore, while necessary fictions of hope and purpose have known many mani-
festations that were invariably allied to dominant visions of time, and thus cannot
be perceived as having a single definitive function, they continue to create new
expressions of utopian narratives and stories of progress, which in turn persist in
influencing decisions, processes, and actions in everyday life. The lure of thinking
in terms of absolutes, universals, or totalities when daydreaming of better futures
may have diminished in the latter part of the twentieth century, but it has not
been discarded completely: much like in the spiral vision of time, the experience
of a rhythmic pattern of rise and decline is today still coupled with a belief in a
more general forwards movement. This also means that the inherent paradoxes
of such spiral-inspired utopian thinking remain nurtured in conceptions of better
futures. As we will see, the paradox forms the tragic disposition of necessary fic-
tions in general, and of communication myths in the mobile age in particular.
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When utopia meets dystopia: Behold the paradox
To be sure, I believe that without the notion of an unfettered life […] the idea of utopia,
the idea of the utopia, cannot even be thought of at all […] There is something pro-
foundly contradictory in every utopia, namely, that it cannot be conceived at all without
the elimination of death; this is inherent in the very thought. (Theodor W. Adorno 1964
cited in Ziper 1988: 10, emphasis in original)
So far in this chapter it has been argued that necessary fictions are part of a psy-
chological need to create order out of chaos, to create utopian landmarks that we
can look out for while travelling along the paths of life. Because, inevitably, a
sense of hope is projected upon the creation and preservation of such land-
marks,25 the genealogy of ideas of progress and utopian narratives has up to now
predominantly been discussed in the light of how they present us with a pristine
state of ‘better’. What makes utopian landmarks so powerful as blueprints for
hoping for the better is that, because they are foremost experienced as exactly
just that, a blueprint, they can take on any interpretation of what exactly constitu-
tes a better place. As a result, the utopian mindset becomes a locus where all
possible interpretations come together to form a heterogeneous composite of
deeply ingrained longings. Moreover, this imaginative constellation is so complex
that, in the end, it cannot exist except as the paradoxical fulfilment of an unfulfill-
able desire. This paradox is inevitable: the human yearning for resolution, as a
manifestation of the belief in a purpose to our existence that is recurrently
expressed in narratives of progress and utopia, will always generate as well as
face paradoxical problems when confronted with actual endeavours to achieve a
final or other ultimate state of being. In a tragic yet unavoidable fashion, human-
kind cannot fully embrace this view; it vehemently tries to cope by either orienting
itself towards a final change, putting its faith in transcendental ideals and envi-
sioning the implementation of perfect societal structures, or by combining all
these views in a belief in a millenarian apocalypse, the ultimate revolution that
will establish a thousand-year-long divine heaven on earth before the end of time
comes.26
This inherent paradoxical inclination is very much a recognised element in
studies of the utopian mindset, and thus should be included in any analysis of
how future-oriented processes – such as those that can be found in the mobile
communication condition – try to deal with or even conceal conflicting aspects of
their projected outcomes. Approaching the specificity of utopian thought from a
psychoanalytical standpoint, English scholar Jan Relf adds that utopian fiction
narrates and stages imaginary, fantastic solutions to an unassimilable contra-
diction in the human condition; it strives to reconcile the knowledge that we
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inhabit an irretrievably fallen and divided world in which the ideal state is
unattainable, with the irresistible and mysteriously present idea of unified per-
fection (the good object) which we continue to desire. (Relf 1993: 110)
Building upon Jacques Lacan’s ideas about the manifestation of desire, Relf here
points to the notion that utopias stand for a state of otherness that we long for
continuously without ever attaining it, and that they thus inherently confront us
with the question with what methodology they are ever going to be achieved.27
The focus on paradoxes in utopias at this point is therefore prompted by the sup-
position that an analysis of their nature and of the struggles to resolve them will
provide the means to further understand the discursive strategies that are
employed by myths that tell of reaching the unreachable communication sublime.
In order to conduct such an analysis, I will highlight three mutually nonexclusive
ways in which paradoxes reveal themselves: first, as regulative principles for
understanding life itself in general and its myths in particular; second, as solu-
tions for blending unavoidable contradictory opposites in utopian myths; and
third, as centres of unstable balancing acts that bring forward anti-utopian and
dystopian views, which both complement and reaffirm the tantalising power of
ideas of progress and utopian narratives.
Understanding life through paradoxes
The nature of paradoxes is such that they first and foremost inspire debates on
conceptual notions of how we see the world. Often presenting more questions
than answers in a continuous test of what is true, these debates traditionally cen-
tre around age-old philosophical puzzles that concern themselves with investiga-
tions of purpose and meaning. Instructive in this respect is the work of Roy
Sorensen, who in A brief history of the paradox writes that paradoxes are the ‘atoms
of philosophy because they constitute the basic points of departure for disciplined
speculation’ (Sorensen 2003: xi). When proposing to use an analysis of paradoxes
as a means to describe the history and focal points of philosophy, Sorenson holds
that these ‘[b]odies of conflicting evidence’ have fascinated us from the moment
we began to ask ourselves where we come from and where we are heading to,
thus stressing their prominent role in necessary fictions (ibid.: 1, 4). Most impor-
tant to note here is that in every example of paradoxical thinking that Sorenson
subsequently explores in his book, he identifies characteristics of paradoxes that
are fundamental to an understanding of both our existence and its purpose-giving
mechanisms, and therefore should be seen as elemental aspects of necessary fic-
tions that aim to explain the inexplicable.28 In other words, every utopian myth
will contain these characteristics, and by describing any of them, the paradoxes in
future-oriented blueprints can be uncovered.
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On the level of making sense of our existence through telling necessary fic-
tions, paradoxes are thus inevitable. A very compelling argument for this human
inclination towards paradox can be traced in existentialist theories, especially in
Martin Heidegger’s treatment of Gelassenheit (‘releasement’) and Jean-Paul Sartre’s
description of its conceptual opposite mauvaise foi (‘bad faith’). Whereas Gelassen-
heit deals with fully accepting one’s existence as something that has no intrinsic
goal or pre-given content, as something that can only receive its significance
through the meaning one chooses to give to it, mauvaise foi is the result of not
accepting the open-ended nature of our existence, of continuously asking for rea-
sons and trying to find the answers outside of one’s own will. Clearly, such a
denial of things-as-they-are and of things-as-they-happen actively feeds and sus-
tains a dual-pole system, in which paradoxes reside: there can be no coincidence
when everything happens for a reason, and there can be no sense in it all when
everything is contingent. People who live in bad faith – and there is ‘a very great
number’ of them, according to Sartre (1956: 90) – often face and cannot accept
the most obvious paradox: sometimes things are just what they are, even when
they are not.
All this shows the double role of the paradox: it presents itself as a necessary
element in understanding and coping with the mysteries of life (‘Why are we
here? What is our purpose?’), and it arises as the only way in which problems
stemming from the desire to unite antinomies can be resolved, becoming visible
in fantasies, fictions, myths, and daydreams of wholeness and completeness. In
this sense, the paradox thus defines the utopian genre: the ultimate collection of
definitive solutions to worldly conflicts can only exist, as Philip E. Wegner con-
curs, ‘as a formal rather than a concrete spatial possibility, a figural space holder
for something else that [is] finally unrepresentable’ (Wegner 2002: 200). Wegner
provides a well-crafted analysis of the relationship between utopian literature and
the way it has both commented on and shaped the ways in which we view our
world, and he notes as well that the utopian narrative typically functions as a
cognitive space in which real world crises are finally dealt with. This classification
alone could suggest that the main goal of studying utopian myths is to under-
stand them as merely fantastic contemporary projections of a possible ideal
future; however, like Wegner, I find that analyses of utopian texts can disclose
them as ‘rhetorical machine[s]’ that ‘participate in a significant way in the mak-
ing of their social and cultural realities’ while they strategically incorporate para-
doxical constructions to highlight (and dissolve) opposites in those realities
(ibid.: 37, 40).
Dissolving opposites in utopian myths
This brings us to the second way in which the paradox manifests itself in utopian
narratives, which is in the ability to seemingly dissolve opposites into a homoge-
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nous whole. The emphasis here lies on ‘seemingly’, because the search for homo-
geneity is, again, a common structural theme in utopian myths that lays bare an
inherent inevitability of creating unsolvable problems at the same time as they are
solved. Universal answers invariably lead to new questions. As philosophers Hans
Crombag and Frank Van Dun show in their book De utopische verleiding [The utopian
seduction] (1997),29 there are four basic and interdependent causes of conflicts that
all utopian stories try to provide an answer to, and all of those answers prove
problematic in finding an overarching logic that is designed to be valid for every-
one. The four causes of conflicts that Crombag and Van Dun name are plurality,
diversity, scarcity, and unrestricted access; the solutions are found in their oppo-
sites by providing unity, consensus, abundance, and ‘righteousness’30 (Crombag
& Van Dun 1997: 27-28). While the authors see the establishment of a righteous
society as the least imaginative of the four solutions – as this would merely need
‘an external force of control’ (ibid.: 28) – they find that the biggest problem lies in
the idea that a well-functioning and all-encompassing consensus can be reached.
Pointing to the human tendency to judge, value, decide, and act from one’s own
limited worldview, they note that ‘even the most servile followers and rabid con-
formists are no match for the devastating powers of the cumulative misunder-
standings, multifarious interpretations and wild guesses that make up the bulk of
human communication’ (ibid.: 30).
Solving scarcity by creating an abundance of goods is equally problematic
according to Crombag and Van Dun; they note that to make sure there is enough
for everyone, there either has to be a drastic restriction imposed upon all desires,
yearnings, and needs, or that a great increase in productive power has to be
achieved (ibid.: 32). The contrast is enormous: while in the first solution people
find happiness in a return to a serene paradisiacal state where nature itself is a
horn of plenty (a utopia that Crombag and Van Dun call ‘ascetic’), in the second
solution man conquers nature and literally manufactures his own happiness by
producing everything he desires (what Crombag and Van Dun call a ‘utopia of
freedom’) (ibid.: 32-33). Both solutions, however, ask for a wholly unrealistic
organisational structure in order to either contain or satisfy all of a society’s
desires, and both fail to see that what is one person’s serenity or freedom is
another person’s nightmare or enslavement.
In other words, there can be no utopia without what Bronislaw Baczko calls
‘une représentation totalisante et disruptive de l’alterité sociale’ (Baczko 1978: 30, empha-
sis in original). This necessity of a regulative but paradoxical totalitarian praxis in
order for utopias to work is identified by Wegner as well. In his analysis of
Thomas More’s description of the social and spatial organisation of Utopia,
Wegner sees a continuous need for ‘abstraction and homogenisation’ in the way
people dress and build identical cities in which everyone speaks the same lan-
guage, follows the same customs, and abides by the same laws (Wegner 2002:
48). When showing that this application of universalising mechanisms automati-
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cally leads to the problems arising out of opposites described earlier, Wegner
adds that ‘universalizing tendencies themselves produce antagonisms […] that
threaten to tear the social structure to pieces’; the only way in which these
unstable relationships can be countered is through the creation of ‘an imagined
set of particular allegiances and common grounds’, what he calls an imaginary
unity (ibid.: 48-49). In chapter 2, where I will analyse universalising patterns in
idealised ideas of communication, we will again see how an imaginary unity (as
embodied by the communication sublime) engenders processes in which, the
moment that levelling solutions are used to combat certain problems, other prob-
lems are raised.
Moving away from utopia… to return again
Finally, we come to the third way in which paradoxes manifest themselves, which
is through dystopian and anti-utopian narratives.31 The observation that the
inherent paradoxical nature of utopian narratives causes the creation of problems
while simultaneously trying to solve them is one of the most prominent reasons
that there have been many critical responses to utopian projects throughout time.
As has been noted earlier, especially after the rise and fall of utopian socialism,
with its tendency to propagate hypothetical visions of perfect societies without
offering concrete and substantial mechanisms to create and sustain them, a con-
temptuous attitude towards the utopian mindset began to become commonplace,
in which responses eventually took the form of outright condemnations of any-
thing utopian as being unrealistic.32 So, although scepticism is found in every era
and there are earlier examples of literary works satirising the incessant search for
utopia (Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s travels comes to mind), dystopian and anti-uto-
pian narratives are typically found at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning
of the twentieth centuries. Because dystopian and anti-utopian texts are written as
a counterpoint to utopian narrative, and therefore define the utopian mindset by
presenting themselves as logical opposites, it is important to focus on how these
texts relate to the paradoxical character of utopia.
Dystopian and anti-utopian narratives typically exploit one or more fatal flaws
in utopian designs, often by introducing an extrapolation of the supposedly ideal
preconditions for utopias to exist and then extending them to their radical con-
clusions. As has been pointed out before, utopian flaws have to do with how uni-
versalising organisational schemas such as homogenising work, play, and
housing, tend to leave out or stigmatise the particular. Subsequently, there is the
problem of how the utopian hierarchy is to be established and maintained. If one
thing has been made evident from the analysis of utopian thought, it is that an
ideal societal structure will not be found in the wild, and therefore has to be
imposed on an alleged non-ideal system.33 This inevitably raises questions on
who decides what is ideal, and who takes control to enforce the changes that are
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needed to reform society. As behaviourist B.F. Skinner, writer of the utopian
novel Walden two, aptly remarked, ‘[d]esign implies control, and there are many
reasons why we fear it’ (Skinner 1981: 37). Common themes running through
dystopian and anti-utopian narratives thus include a totalitarian control by an
(unseen) elite or entity, the abolishment of identity, an outright loss of privacy,
the complete submission to mechanised or otherwise technologised systems, and
the inability to escape from a rigidly imposed social hierarchy. A brief analysis of
two influential dystopian and anti-utopian narratives will serve to illuminate this
point.
Probably the best-known dystopian novel today is George Orwell’s ominous
Nineteen eighty-four. In this work, we read that the lives of the citizens of Oceania
are controlled by the Party and its omnipresent leader, Big Brother. Telescreens
both broadcast Party opinion and monitor every citizen’s activity, so that not only
speech and behaviour but even thought can be kept within the prescribed Party
regulations. Sexual desire is repressed, children are encouraged to spy on their
parents, and cities lie in ruins as a result of never-ending wars between Oceania,
Eurasia, and Eastasia. From these descriptions it becomes poignantly clear how
Orwell thinks a totalitarian doom scenario can – or even has to – emerge when the
necessity to keep everyone and everything in a supposedly (and subjective) ideal
configuration is extrapolated towards its radical vanishing point.34 Equally appar-
ent is Orwell’s focus on the paradoxical mechanisms that have to be employed by
the Party in order to maintain its power. The Party is never wrong: in part because
it continuously alters history,35 but more importantly because it makes excessive
use of ‘doublethink’, which is described by one of the Party’s opponents as ‘the
power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and
accepting both of them’ (Orwell 1951: 220). Through the central role that Orwell
gives to the Party’s reliance on doublethink, exemplified most visibly in the Party’s
maxims ‘War is Peace’, ‘Freedom is Slavery’, and ‘Ignorance is Strength’, he
shows how self-contradictory and impossible dogmas both automatically arise
and have to be actively deployed when universalising projects fuse oppositional
worldviews into a single tenable perspective.
A similar focus on totalitarian themes, struggles between collectivism and indi-
vidualism, and finding ways to escape from it all is found in Yevgeny Zamyatin’s
lesser-known Мы [We] (1920), the book that can be credited as having influenced
Orwell’s Nineteen eighty-four and is seen as the twentieth century’s first anti-uto-
pian novel. In Zamyatin’s fictional future world, 80 percent of the global popula-
tion has died because of a two-hundred-year-long war that could be described as
an archetypical clash between the modern technology-driven mindset and the
prehistoric untouched wilderness of nature. Modernity prevailed, and the survi-
vors gathered in a single city (the ‘One State’) that has shut out nature by means
of a great ‘Green Wall’. Zamyatin carefully employs common utopian mechan-
isms for the construction of an ideal society: everything in the One State is per-
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fectly planned, balanced, and controlled through an intricate system of regula-
tions, which, overseen by the ‘great Benefactor’, governs labour, free time, social
and sexual relations, education, and justice. The ‘Table of Hours’ schedules and
harmonises all activities of the city’s inhabitants – who are not called citizens but
‘numbers’ – up to the precise second, and through the diary entries of protagonist
D-503 the reader learns that (in contrast to Orwell’s Oceania) this rational and
mathematically structured life is considered good. But, and this is what makes
We work as a counterpoint to classic utopian themes, underneath this narrative
structure Zamyatin questions why the good life has to be paid for by removing
every notion of individualism, creativity, and ‘out-of-the-ordinary-ness’. Just as in
More’s Utopia, people in the One State dress the same, the city’s architectural
make-up is without any frivolity and the social hierarchy is strictly adhered to, but
in We, D-503 slowly comes to realise that this is actually not perfection; rather, it
works as a straitjacket for what he learns is his ‘soul’. While at first he is of the
opinion that the imposed rules of collectivism present him with true freedom
because they relieve him from the burden of having to make difficult choices and
take charge of his life himself, he gradually cannot help but notice a growing and
deeply rooted desire to express his individuality. Diagnosed as having the ‘soul-
disease’, he tries to resist the revelation that perfection is in fact unattainable, but
he fails miserably. In the end, after having seen the chaotic and colourful world of
the Mephi people behind the Green Wall, D-503’s psychic state is in such turmoil
that he decides he cannot leave his old world, and undergoes a ‘fantasectomy’
which cures him from having any sense of an autonomous self.
While this ending is of course a bleak one, one that enforces the assumption
that We is essentially an anti-utopian novel because there seemingly is no resolu-
tion to the oppression of individuality in highly organised utopian societies,
Zamyatin actually does present us with a possible way out of thinking of utopias
as perfected but dreadful places. The answer lies not so much in persevering
where D-503 had turned back, and choosing a Rousseauian return to the pure
authenticity of nature, but more in an acceptance of contradictory worldviews
and paradoxes as necessary structural elements of life. The irrational world of
nature is no more utopian than the rational world of the city, but it needs to exist
to establish a highly unstable but nevertheless persisting and necessary balance.
Number I-330, the girl that made D-503 doubt the perfection of the One State in
the first place and wants him to join her in overthrowing the status quo, makes
this point clear when she tells D-503 there is always a next revolution: ‘There is
no final one; revolutions are infinite. The final one is for children: children are
frightened by infinity, and it’s important that children sleep peacefully at night…’
(Zamyatin 1972: 174). Thus, Zamyatin tells us, as long as utopias are pictured as
final, stable, and unchanging societal configurations, they will fall victim to their
inherent flaws; the tricky solution to the problems of wanting to design an ulti-
mate utopian place is to accept that the only possible ‘ultimate’ rests in embracing
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the presence of paradoxes. In Blochian terms, then, the dialectical infinite revolu-
tion described in We ‘critically illuminates that which is “not yet” available to any
of us’ (Wegner 2002: 170), and as such serves as a useful – or even necessary –
tool to help guide our desire to hope and imagine in a more productive way.36
Seen as such, utopian thought regains some of the value it lost during the twen-
tieth century, and comes to stand for a continuous receptiveness to change, albeit
an absent-present one.
The utopian paradox thus comes full circle: on the one hand, we desire stable
configurations that do not exist and cannot be reached (and even if we could
realise utopia it would undermine the essence of what it means to be human); on
the other hand, the escape from this desire in the form of an infinite revolution is
in effect unimaginable itself, and holds within it the prospect of evolving anyway
towards a different understanding of what it is to be human, leaving behind our
present hopes and dreams of what constitutes a better future. Criticism of the
flaws in utopian thought, when viewed from the perspective of the human ten-
dency to look for purpose and meaning, quickly leads towards the equally utopian
question ‘If not envisioned like that, how then should we think of what constitutes
an improvement upon what we have now?’ Thus, dystopian and anti-utopian nar-
ratives may reinforce the notion that utopian thinking is something to be scorned,
but in the end there is no escape from it; at least embracing the dialectical ver-
sion, one that acknowledges the ‘concerns of natural law and human dignity’ as
Wegner (ibid.: 171) notes, may provide us with outlooks that are less bleak than
those often associated with radically developed utopias.
In the following chapter, the complex functioning and roles of these paradoxes
in structuring and guiding the discourses of hope, purpose, progress, and utopia
will be revisited as we look at how myths of improvement and fulfilment play
their part in idealised ideas of communication. Problems similar to those
described above arise when communication is thought of as something that lies
at the heart of what needs to be improved in order to progress towards an ulti-
mate and final better place. The price that is always paid for these kinds of con-
verging solutions is a repression of antinomies, which are necessary to
understand the longing desire per se. As Crombag and Van Dun note, realised
utopia is a ‘happiness machine’ in which there can actually be no conscious
knowledge of what happiness is, because its counterpart does not exist and there-
fore cannot help to construct a scale to judge the degree of happiness on
(Crombag & Van Dun 1997: 49-51). The banishment of unhappiness and the
accompanying search for a serene ideal may reflect psychological desires that are
understandable, but what is wilfully forgotten is that the ultimate fulfilment of
those desires will radically transform human existence, along with all notions of
what constitutes happiness, individuality, society, or, as will become clear in the
next chapter, communication.




What [the] eschatological belief in the ‘information society’ hides is the fact that, as the
ideal of the universalism of values promoted by the great social utopias drifted into the
corporate techno-utopia of globalization, the emancipatory dream of a project of world
integration, characterized by the desire to abolish inequalities and injustices in the name
of the imperative of social solidarity, was swept away by the cult of a project-less moder-
nity that has submitted to a technological determinism in the guise of refounding the
social bond. The ideology of limitless ‘communication’ – but without social actors – thus
takes over from the older ideology of limitless progress. (Armand Mattelart 2000: 120)
Echoing the central question that communication theorist John Durham Peters
critically assesses in his book Speaking into the air (1999), what exactly do we think
is so wrong with communication that it needs to be fixed all the time? Why is it
that, while the general experience of communication in everyday life can reveal
itself to be a complex but also a rewarding process of self-affirmation, knowledge
gathering, or social bonding, there remains a poignant longing for an overall
improvement of communication – one that underlies communication theories,
managerial efficiency recommendations, marriage counsellors’ advice, anecdotes
of communication gone wrong, and, last but not least, advertisements for and
predictions about mobile communication technologies? And what remains of our
attitude towards this so-called communication problem if we follow the paths of
utopian communication ideals to their radical conclusions and find that, as sug-
gested at the end of the previous chapter, they paradoxically lead to a place where
there is no longer a conception of that which we desired? Surely, there is a reason
why ideas of progress and utopia recurrently pervade the thinking about commu-
nication?
This chapter aims to provide answers to these queries by turning its attention
to the power of the communication sublime and its integral function in engender-
ing discourses of progress and utopia in the evolution of communication technol-
ogies. In order to uncover the ways in which the myth of ‘ideal communication’
expresses its questionable discursive role as ‘solver of all problems’, the observa-
tions made on necessary fictions in the previous chapter will therefore be used as
a framework for the analysis of various forms of idealised ideas of communica-
tion. We will see that, although there are many approaches to describing what
communication is and in what configurations it can be understood as being
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improved, they all, explicitly or implicitly, relate to the idea of removing conflicts
and misunderstanding from the process, and thereby set up a paradoxical rela-
tionship between the practice of communication and its projected ideals. As will
be argued further in chapters 3 and 4, this strained correlation is recurrently visi-
ble in discourses of media evolution, and especially those of mobile communica-
tion technologies.
First, I describe where and how idealised ideas of communication reside in
theoretical discourses and models of communication. In order to sift through
and categorise the vast body of work in this field, I will step away from using a
chronologically ordered overview, and instead draw from Peters’ work and con-
centrate on a collection of specific and exemplary theories and conceptions of
one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many communication. As will become
clear, what is considered to be ideal in idealised ideas of communication differs
from model to model, but the common characteristic is the proposition that there
is an ideal to begin with, and that this ideal can be reached by improving existing
models of communication through the elimination of communicative noise (often
by technological means) and thus by bridging the gap to the mind of the other.
Next, I question both the nature and the theoretical productiveness of the
ideals found in the analysis of communication models. It will be demonstrated
how visions of communication as a lossless transferral of information – the
immediate and direct connection of minds – may seem to promise the banish-
ment of miscommunication, but when these visions are taken to their extreme,
they do not turn out as ideal as is supposed. We can even say that the ideal human
act of communication depends on the possibility for miscommunication, that
dreams of pure communication inevitably clash with the actual social experience
of being with others. Nevertheless, these dreams play an important role in the
discursive constructions surrounding every new medium, and therefore it is nec-
essary to look at the motives behind the production and use of these dreamlike
ideals. Placing media marketing strategies and industry decisions that use myths
of improved communication within Rein de Wilde’s (2000) models of future-
making, this chapter ends by making clear that, again, there are many ideals of
communication, and they are not merely reflections of imaginary desires in the
human collective unconscious but are actively used, engaged, and re-enacted to
serve very specific goals.
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Tracing communication ideals
Models of communication are never neutral; each implies an ideal scenario.
(George Myerson 2001: 43)
Both following and extending Peters’ classification of ‘dialogue and dissemina-
tion’ as ‘two Grundbegriffe in communication theory’ (1999: 35, emphasis in origi-
nal), the communication theories and models discussed here are presented in
three categories: one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many communication.
The theories and models selected for scrutiny here are in part those identified by
Peters as examples of how we can understand both idealised and problematic
conceptions of dialogue and dissemination. These examples are then supplemen-
ted with theories and models that reflect typical present-day thinking about the
presumed effects and future of networked communication media. In each cate-
gory, the following questions will provide the basis for investigating the theories
and models involved: what problems in communication are identified; which
ideal communication situations are therefore implied; with what means are those
ideal situations to be achieved; and what problematic consequences automatically
arise out of the use of those means, which then set up another quest for improve-
ment?
One-to-one communication
Keeping it together – Socratic dialogue: The Greek philosopher Socrates is argu-
ably one of the most important figures in the history of Western thought. His
tutoring on eros, politics, and knowledge, available to us mostly through the writ-
ings of his most ardent student, Plato, still echo in many of today’s debates on
love, ethics, democracy, and education. Most interesting in this respect are his
ideas about how all that knowledge should be ‘birthed’,1 or communicated, to
use an anachronistic term. For Socrates, this birthing process had to have an
appropriate structure, one that he based on the ideal of dialectic inquiry through
the use of dialogue. It is no wonder that Peters, in his foray to construct a com-
prehensive view on the nature of dialogue, chooses to approach Socrates as if the
philosopher were a communication scholar avant la lettre: as Peters observes, the
notion of dialogue as an ideal means of true communication is still present in
current communication theories, giving dialogue ‘something of a holy status’
and making it ‘the summit of human encounter, […] superior to the one-way
communiqués of mass media and mass culture’ (Peters 1999: 33).
There are two connected and very intuitive reasons for dialogue, or face-to-face
conversation, to serve as a blueprint for the ideal transferral of ideas, knowledge,
and information. Firstly, and richly described by Plato,2 Socrates saw the virtues
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of dialogue in its interactive and reciprocal nature. Every question can be
answered with another question, every ambiguous utterance can be followed by a
request to explain, every non-verbal sign can be picked up and acted upon. The
presence of two equal individuals in the same space, questioning and debating
without obstacles, is for Socrates a prerequisite for the true bonding of souls;
there needs to be a close relationship between the communicating parties for
them to actually connect.3 This leads us to the second reason why dialogue can
be seen as the preferred and ideal communication model: media such as writing
physically separate the communicating parties and thus enlarge the danger of
scattered messages and misunderstandings. Socrates was not so much opposed
to the act of writing per se, but he lamented the distance it creates between the
writer and the reader, which emphasises the impossibility to give feedback to or
question the indiscriminately dispersed text. Dialogue is ideal in its staging of a
physical and live encounter, and therefore – at least for Socrates – preferable as a
communication model to ones where the conversing parties are separated in dis-
tance, and technological means need to be used to establish contact.
Dialogue is thus framed in contrast to mediated communication, or rather,
dialogue comes to serve as the presumed ‘natural’ form of communication that is
compromised when it is mediated. As such, its myths hold that one should strive
for dialogue as the primary means to exchange knowledge. According to sociolo-
gist Michael Schudson (1978), this notion that we need a model of communica-
tion to which all communication processes should adhere, even if such a model is
fictional, is implicitly present in our culture. Dialogue as ‘conversational ideal’, as
he calls it, is ‘not one concocted by social scientists [but rather] a widely shared
ideal in contemporary American culture which social science has uncritically
adopted’ (Schudson 1978: 323), and it would be reasonable to add that this is not
only so in American but in Western cultures in general. Although there are many
arguments against promoting dialogue as the ultimate and universal form of
communication – and we will encounter some of those arguments later on in this
chapter – culturally grounded ideals such as those of face-to-face communication
have had and continue to have a sizeable influence on the direction of media
evolution. Moreover, they stand at the base of the classic and ongoing debate
whether media are bad because they contaminate ‘real’ interaction, or good
because they provide continuously improved simulated face-to-face conversation
at a distance, bringing people together even when they are physically apart.
In short, the myth of dialogue tells us that ‘true communication [is] personal,
free, live, and interactive’ (Peters 1999: 50). The implied ideal is that only in an
environment where there is the opportunity for direct verbal and non-verbal con-
tact is it possible to truly connect, and even when two people in conversation
freely decide to agree to disagree, there has to be no misunderstanding of what
both parties agreed upon. If any of these conditions is not met, for instance when
dialogue becomes mediated, we are facing communication breakdown.4 What
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this means for the use of words, themselves a medium, is dealt with in the follow-
ing subsection.
Reducing semantic fog – Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards’ The meaning of
meaning: The idea that language is the necessary vehicle for our thoughts – if they
are to be conveyed to the mind of the person we talk to – has been explored by
many, but, as Peters puts forward, when it comes to entertaining the notion that
the use of language should be streamlined, none have done so with more convic-
tion than literary theorist Ivor Armstrong Richards and literary critic and writer
Charles Kay Ogden (Peters 1999: 12-14). In the first quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury, both Ogden and Richards realised that they were concurrently engulfed in
attempts to understand the functions of language, and especially how misunder-
standings in the use of language could be remedied. To tackle this challenge, they
went on to write The meaning of meaning, in which they established a ‘science of
Symbolism’ and devised a model describing the functioning of linguistic symbols
(Ogden & Richards 1956: 8, 11). This model, known as the semantic triangle,
consists of a diagram in which all the possible relationships between thought or
reference, symbol, and referent are drawn.
The most important observation that Ogden and Richards made was that the
relationship between symbol (or word) and referent (or thing) is an imputed rela-
tion; echoing the semiotic work of Charles Sanders Peirce, they held that only
through conceptual thoughts in the mind can words refer to things. This imme-
diately lays bare the crux of the communication problem Ogden and Richards
wanted to address: too often, they noted, symbols are used as if their reference is
inherently attached to a single referent, stemming from a ‘once equally universal’
belief that words ‘meant’ something by themselves (ibid.: 9-10). The problem was
that the same words were used in multiple instances by a multitude of people
with different perspectives, resulting in these words pointing to all kinds of refer-
ents and thus creating ‘almost all the difficulties which thought encounters’
(ibid.: 12). So, even if two people would have been able to construct the ideal
conversational structure in the form of a face-to-face dialogue, they would still
encounter misunderstandings because of differences in interpretation.
Here it should be plain to see how a fundamental human feature, that of being
able to interpret language in multiple ways, is approached as if it were a problem,
one that needs solving for the benefit of humankind. To Ogden and Richards, the
use of words is a necessary but often crude and error-prone way of expressing
thoughts, a process based on causal yet arbitrary and unstable rules, which,
unless improved by employing a system of universal semantics, stand in the way
of clear and unconfused communication. In this stance we recognise a concern
over looming mental isolation: without a common descriptive framework of
words and their meanings, thoughts cannot cross and human communication
necessarily fails. Thus moving forward from their theoretical analysis, Ogden and
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Richards proposed a solution to remove all this ‘semantic fog’. The solution was
to be found foremost in educating the public in the unambiguous use of words,
with the underlying thought that familiarity with a ‘Theory of Definition […] not
only conduces to ease of deportment in reasoning and argument, but offers a
means of escape from the maze of verbal cross-classifications’ (ibid.: 15, 247). In
other words, learning to strictly adhere to a fixed set of sign definitions would
solve most interpretation problems.
Expanding on this positivist solution in later years, Ogden adopted a pragmatic
approach and went on to construct a new language system that inherently would
suffer less from ambiguity. His ‘Basic English’5 was to be a universal language, a
‘solution of the problem of Debabelization’, consisting of only 850 words that
had the effective expressive power of 5000 words and ‘could do all the work of
20,000’ (Ogden 1935: 7, 14).6 Reducing the amount of words in a language might
seem a slightly odd solution for the problem of misunderstanding, but according
to Ogden this would force people to be exact in their wording and sentence build-
ing, and thus promote clearness. He found that there was still much merit in
learning strict rules and grammar, and held that the ‘idea at the back of the[se]
old rules [is that] because our thought is based on language, and because it is impor-
tant for our thought to be clear, a great respect for form might be a help in the devel-
opment of our minds’ (Ogden 1935: 1, emphasis added).
What can be recognised here is a yearning for clarity in the meeting of minds,
which in Ogden’s view is to be achieved by simplifying the semantic structures of
language and so by facilitating progress through shared understanding. In this
attempt, he joined a wide array of people who also searched for a universal lan-
guage, worked on creating artificial ones, or claimed that their mother tongue
was the only one that could rejoin all the people of the world in harmony. As
semiotician Umberto Eco has shown in The search for the perfect language (1995),
many such endeavours can be found in European history, all in one way or
another invoking the tragic story of the Tower of Babel and interpreting it as tell-
ing of ‘how a real wound had been inflicted on humanity, a wound that might, in
some way, be healed once more’ (Eco 1995: 17). Pointing out that the proposed
healing processes are invariably aimed at finding or (re)creating the pre-Babelian
‘one language, a perfect language, a language spoken by Adam with God and by
his posterity’ (ibid.: 34), Eco notes that this divine unity has been and continues
to be a powerful source of inspiration when thinking about solving problems of
coexistence (ibid.: 18-19). Therefore, and echoing the utopian impulse described
in the previous chapter, we can uncover in Ogden’s Basic English the underlying
idea that through communication improvement a harmonious and unified grand
togetherness can be brought about, where there is nothing but a blissful state of
being.
To summarise, the myth of removing semantic fog holds that although people
can freely engage in dialogue, their communication will still be hampered by dif-
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fering interpretative frameworks unless these frameworks are perfectly synchro-
nised. The success of Ogden and Richard’s quest – a search for a ‘utopia of a
concourse of consciousness’ as Peters (1999: 14) calls it – thus depends on an
unambiguous and clear transfer of information. In the next subsection, we will
see how this problematic desire for a clear transfer of information has, in the
present day, come to dominate much more than just attempts to improve the
functioning of language, and has taken on a more technological dimension.
Noise reduction – Claude E. Shannon’s ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communica-
tion’: Notions of purifying communication, like those of Ogden and Richards,
were popular amongst early twentieth-century thinkers,7 and gained an extra
boost in the middle of the twentieth century with an increasing demand for
improvements in efficiency in communication technology systems. Exemplary for
this quest for improvement was the work of mathematician Claude E. Shannon,
who in 1948 wrote a paper on a new way to measure the dispersion of informa-
tion – or, as he coined it, to measure ‘information entropy’. His ideas, which were
first published as ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’ in two issues of the
Bell System Technical Journal and were popularised later in 1949 in book form with a
foreword by fellow mathematician Warren Weaver, revolved around proving that
it was possible to transmit digital data error-free across a channel, no matter how
much noise interference there was in that channel.8 As it turned out, Shannon’s
paper and subsequent book marked the start of a whole new field of scientific
research later called information theory – first known as communication theory –
geared predominantly towards the optimisation of technological data transfer and
compression. Over the years, information theory gave birth to and became closely
associated with many other applied informational disciplines, such as cybernetics
and the study of artificial intelligence.
What is important to note here is that, originally, information theory and its
related academic fields dealt with the quantity of data, not quality: having defined
‘information’ as a measure of uncertainty in received signals, Shannon was less
concerned with the meaning of those signals than with finding ways to success-
fully receive them exactly as they were sent. In other words, it was technological
perfection that Shannon was after.9 However, quickly after its inception, informa-
tion theory lost its exclusively mathematical and technological character and
became something much more in popular and collective consciousness; by illus-
trating his proof with a schematic ‘general communication system’ (Shannon
1948: 380), Shannon inadvertently presented the world with a model of commu-
nication that did not decidedly stress its quantitative nature. Bearing a slight
resemblance in its linearity to Harold D. Lasswell’s model of communications,10
which was completed shortly before Shannon wrote his Bell paper, Shannon’s
model effectively became a one-size-fits-all blueprint that seemed applicable to
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both quantitative and qualitative acts of communication, including the perfect
transfer of thoughts and meaning.
As a consequence of this generalisation of the model’s applicability, it was
readily employed in a multitude of academic fields, engendering a significant
cognitive shift. As Peters notes of this shift, things were increasingly seen as types
of ‘information’ which were then cast in ‘communicative structures’: DNA
became known as ‘genetic information’, the brain turned into an ‘information
processor’, and people (even whole nations) could begin to truly understand each
other if they ‘shared information’ and communicated better (Peters 1999: 23).
This ‘informationalisation of our perspective on the world’, as Dutch philosopher
Jos de Mul (2002: 129) calls it,11 has increasingly led to the view that we can see
things as bits of information in a communicative system like that of Shannon’s
model, moving unaltered and unaffected by noise from source to destination.
The ideals of communication that are visible in this model echo those found in
the attempts of Ogden and Richards to minimise and ultimately eradicate seman-
tic fog. Whereas in Ogden and Richards’ case thoughts and meanings faced the
danger of never coming across unaltered (because multiple interpretations of
words themselves create semantic noise), Shannon’s schematic diagram invites
us to transpose that semantic problem into a technological (that is, a computa-
tional) process, in which the application of the right mathematical formula seems
to promise to do the trick. When captured in Shannon’s model, all that stands in
the way of people, institutions, or nations connecting their minds and really
understanding each other, it seems, is simply a question of perfecting the channel
and filtering out the noise.
In the observations of these three theories and models relating to one-to-one
communication, we can see the perceived problems reflected in a distrust of
remoteness, a suspicion of language, and an aversion to noise; the underlying
ideals and proposed solutions point to a common desire for closeness, unison,
and a banishment of obstacles that stand in the way of error-free connecting. The
solutions themselves, however, are all problematic in the sense that they con-
strain the process of one-to-one communication to that of an ideal type that has
no real world counterpart, either because language can never be perfect or
because too much expectation is invested in technology. These problems will be
given more attention later in this chapter; now it is time to look at how idealised
ideas of communication are expressed in situations where there is just one source
but many receivers.
One-to-many communication
Sowing the seeds – Christian dissemination: There is a long history of examples
of how those in power usually have the best means to make themselves heard,
and how they make good use of mass communications to send their messages.
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This is especially visible in the frameworks of religious belief systems. Chapter 1
already showed how key elements of the Christian tradition have had a significant
impact on the philosophical and collective consciousness of Western societies,
ranging from propagating the notion that the Garden of Eden represents human-
kind in all its sublime bliss, to the eventual adoption of a sense of progress that
intended to (re)construct a paradisiacal state. The means with which such ideas
were expressed and have been presented through time – often resurrected and
appropriated, in different guises, to suit specific socio-political or economic goals
– have been identified as the telling of necessary fictions. According to Peters, the
rhetoric of the parable can be seen as the best representative example of how
necessary fictions take on their shape in Christian sources, and the best way para-
bles are told is by dissemination (Peters 1999: 51). It is in these dispersed religious
narrative structures that myths are typically used to pass on certain values, which
are derived from an interpretative reading of what constitutes the religious or
transcendental highest good.
Dissemination, then, is the opposite of dialogue: instead of a one-to-one, inter-
active, and reciprocal exchange of minds, dissemination deals with the indiscri-
minate, one-way, and asymmetrical spreading of messages. It wants to do away
with having to put a lot of dedicated effort into communicating with many peo-
ple. There is not so much a distrust of dialogue to be observed in using dissemi-
nation for communicating a message, but a preference for not wanting to single
out individuals as having more right than others to hear that message, and for
creating the opportunity for many people to feel they can relate to it (ibid.: 53-
54). Indeed, central to the Christian doctrine is the responsibility to treat everyone
the same, no matter their background and deeds.12 Illustrated best in the parable
of the Good Samaritan, Christian neighbourly love extends to love of the stranger,
even the enemy, and aims to include all people in kinship with each other and
with God. For this reason, dissemination is an ideal way to communicate: it cir-
cumvents the problem of continuously having to talk to individual people by mak-
ing sure that whole groups are reached at once, or, inversely, by making available
a ubiquitously accessible message.
There is a catch to this approach, though. Even if dissemination might be the
best way to ensure that no one is left out during the communication process, only
those who know how to listen will receive the message as it was intended. This is
especially so when speaking in parables, something the parable of the sower
exemplifies.13 Dissemination is thus predominantly receiver-oriented, and
because the onus is on the receiver to decode the information she has acquired,
this leaves all the more room for multiple interpretations. This does not neces-
sarily mean that messages do not come across, because compared to dialogue
more people will concurrently receive a message (which virtually guarantees that
someone will understand what that message entails), and it might not even be
imperative to derive a single meaning from what was communicated. And yet,
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dissemination needs to be aimed at reaching a large audience in order to secure a
sizeable ‘yield’. Moreover, when we take into account that religious doctrines are
often conceived as tending to declare one truth, it should not be surprising to see
that in notions of dissemination a tacit underlying assumption can be pointed
out, namely that while it may be that only those who have ears to hear will hear
the message, it ought to be just a matter of time and repetition of that message
before everyone has developed the right ears to hear.
The idealised characteristics that the act of dissemination possesses, in short,
are an inherent tendency to celebrate standardised communication approaches,
and the ability to spread messages across a wide range of people, which makes
sure that those messages will be heard and understood by more than just one
person. These characteristics also make clear, however, that there is a fine line
between communicating the one truth and hoping that some will hear it, and
manipulating the masses. The consequences of making assumptions about the
suspected effects of repeatedly disseminating the same messages, prominently
visible in twentieth-century mass communication models, is discussed in the
next subsection.
Mass models – propaganda and hypodermic needles: The power of dissemina-
tion, especially when coupled to large-scale communication technologies, was to
find a disconcerting expression in the first half of the twentieth century. In the
decades when more and more people came to own radio and television sets, from
the Great War up to and extending after the Second World War, it became
increasingly evident that media were crucial components in strategies to sway
public opinion. In Germany, as part of National Socialist propaganda efforts,
radio was monopolised by the state and put under the control of Reichsminister
Joseph Goebbels. Successful German experiments with mechanical and electrical
television were touted as the results of ‘a great achievement of technology and the
natural sciences’, creating a ‘national technological myth’ (Elsner, Müller &
Spangenberg 1994: 129). In England, multiple fake radio stations were set up to
mislead and demoralise German soldiers and civilians (Rowen 2003), and in the
US, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s memorable fireside chats created an inti-
mate atmosphere in which he tried to reassure the American people and gain
support for the involvement in the war. Idealised ideas of communication here
take a far more economic form: as long as messages come across as intended
and reach many people, their transfer has been successful.
These experiences of media use in wartime, along with the emergence of a
powerful advertisement industry that also employed radio and television to the
fullest, gave rise to one of the first major theoretical schools concerned with the
functioning of mass media, which subsequently developed the hypodermic needle
(or magic bullet) theory. Its main proponents, Walter Lippmann (1922) and
Harold Lasswell (1938), both argued that the general public was intrinsically
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unable to form an educated opinion on important matters such as politics, and
both called for the employment of directive and corrective propaganda that had to
be carefully composed by a governing class. The assumption that Lippmann and
Lasswell made was that there is a linear relationship between media causes and
effects, between the intention of the sender’s message and the interpretation by
the receiver. Hence the theory’s names: both a hypodermic needle and a magic
bullet metaphorically conjure up images of an unstoppable flow of messages,
injected in or shot at a passive receiver, who can do nothing but digest these
messages exactly as they were intended. In these views, the sower has super seed,
and uses it only for what is perceived as the good cause.
Although not everyone believed that the good cause was actually good, the
notion that media inject ideas into the minds of unsuspecting people was not
uncommon. In the early academic critique on mass media, found most notably in
the Marxist work of scholars of the Frankfurter Schule, we see a mistrust of the
effects of radio and television that is based on a premise similar to that of
Lippmann and Lasswell: audiences are passive victims, and are manipulated into
becoming part of the culture industries’ attempts to sustain capitalist societies by
having them consume mass-produced goods.14 Expressed most vehemently in the
works of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1947) and that of Herbert
Marcuse (1964), the criticism was that we would see a homogenisation of culture,
an increasing inability of the public sphere to critically comment on society’s
values, and ultimately an indoctrination of the people by totalitarian politics. This
fear of the power of mass media is deeply rooted in the popular mind; even today,
in a time where theorists have long been determined to attribute audiences with
far more agency than the Frankfurt scholars did,15 large-scale events, converging
desires, and rampant consumerism, all produced by global industries, still make
the Frankfurt School’s assessments of the effects of mass media very relevant.16
There is another reason why the hypodermic needle theory remains valuable as
an example of key theories describing communication as a process in which mes-
sages follow a linear and undisturbed path from one source to multiple receivers.
Although it was abandoned after the 1950s as an accurate way to model mass
media effects, the appeal of the hypodermic needle theory’s linearity is still intui-
tively tempting enough to be invoked for use in strategic argumentation. Partly an
expression of folk wisdom and often the result of hasty assumptions about the
effect of media on humans, the basic linear principle of the theory continues to
rear its head today, for instance in debates induced by moral panic. Typical moral
panics concerned with media effects use arguments in the form of ‘A causes B’,
and are often seen in discussions on the ‘alleged harmful effects of exposure to
popular media and cultural forms – comics and cartoons, popular theatre,
cinema, rock music, video nasties, computer games, internet porn’ (Cohen 2002:
xvii). What matters here is not that these discussions are too superficial, but that
their argumentative structures are based on the belief that communication media
2. communication ideals, communication woes 67
serve to spread messages, and directly influence the minds of the people that
receive those messages.
The underlying myth of communication in the hypodermic needle theory is one
that connects the Christian method of dissemination with the intention or desire
to have all listening ears tuned to the same fork. In this respect it also resonates
with Ogden and Richards’ belief that it is possible to minimise the amount of
interpretations of communicated messages, and Shannon’s desire to ban noise
from the communication channel: in the optimal situation there is to be a direct
and undistorted mediated transfer of meaning. In the criticism levelled at the
supposed effects of mass media, as exemplified by the Frankfurt School and
found in moral panics, we read the presence of a media pessimism comparable
to the one implicit in the positioning of Socratic dialogue as facilitating ideal
communication; mass media are believed to disrupt an authentic state of being
together, and to manipulate receivers because of a lack of reciprocity. This criti-
cism, too, however, acknowledges the force with which mass media are suppos-
edly able to supplant the contents of sane minds with foreign thoughts.
The next subsection will turn to idealised ideas of communication that, in
some sense, counter these fears of totalitarianism by virtue of seeing everyone as
senders and receivers on a global scale, and thus as constituting a grand, inter-
connected web of knowledge exchange.
Many-to-many communication
Meeting of minds – Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s The phenomenon of man: One of
the most original thinkers to theorise about ‘global connectedness’ and its bene-
ficial characteristics was undoubtedly Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, who believed
that a continuing convergence of every matter and entity on Earth would even-
tually lead to planetary peace and unity. His stance was highly controversial at the
time of its first reception in the second quarter of the twentieth century, and still
is in some respect: as a Jesuit priest and paleontologist, he sought to combine two
seemingly contradictory viewpoints on the origin and direction of humankind,
namely that of Christian religion (which relies on biblical testimony) and that of
evolutionary theory (which relies on paleontological facts). In his quest, Teilhard
de Chardin was looking for a way of thinking that could support his conviction
that ‘the stuff of which all stuff is made [is] reducible in the end to some simple
and unique kind of substance’ (Teilhard de Chardin 1959: 41).
He found his answer, extensively described in his posthumously published
book Le phénomene humaine (translated as The phenomenon of man in 1959), in the
idea that God was not in the heavens above, watching us, but actually inside every
organism and object on Earth, including humans. It was this divine essence, he
thought, that was steering evolution, and not a secular Darwinian struggle made
up by a survival of the fittest and random gene mutations. Moreover, whereas
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classic Darwinian evolution knows no direction or endpoint, Teilhard de Chardin
postulated that the divine essence of life meant that there was a direction to evolu-
tion, inevitably culminating in what he called the ‘Omega Point’, a final unity
equivalent to ‘the new spirit; the new god’ (ibid.: 258). The way this zenith of
evolution was to be reached lay in a natural succession and transcendent unfold-
ing of Earth’s self-consciousness. Elaborating on a categorisation originally pro-
posed by geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky, Teilhard de Chardin saw three stages in
the development of the Earth: first, there was the geosphere (the solid crust of the
Earth), then the biosphere (the life zone of the Earth), and finally he saw the
coming of a noosphere17 (Earth itself become conscious). The seeds of this noo-
sphere, he thought, were carried by humankind, because ‘since the birth of
thought man has been the leading shoot of the tree of life’, and therefore ‘the
hopes for the future of the noosphere […] are concentrated exclusively upon him
as such’ (ibid.: 276). The continuous growth of interactions between human
minds would then ultimately lead to a mega-synthesis in which ‘all together can
join and find completion in a spiritual renovation of the earth’ (ibid.: 245, empha-
sis in original).
Teilhard de Chardin’s ideas on an emerging noosphere do not so much consti-
tute a theory of communication, as present us with the bold observation that
human minds become more sophisticated and connected through time, bringing
about a unified consciousness. That this process was both expressed in and was a
result of expanding global communication networks was nonetheless very much
clear to Teilhard de Chardin; writing in an era when electronic media had started
to open up windows to the world, he identified ‘the machine’ (with which he
designated technology in general) as fundamental in bringing about the structure
of the noosphere, and pointed especially to
the extraordinary network of radio and television communications which, per-
haps anticipating the direct syntonization of brains through the mysterious
power of telepathy, already link us all in a sort of ‘etherized’ universal con-
sciousness. But, I am also thinking of the insidious growth of those astonish-
ing electronic computers which, pulsating with signals at the rate of hundreds
of thousands a second, not only relieve our brains of tedious and exhausting
work but, because they enhance the essential (and too little noted) factor of
‘speed of thought’, are also paving the way for a revolution in the sphere of
research. (Teilhard de Chardin 1964: 167)
Thus, for the noosphere to truly come into existence, time, space, and knowledge
would have to be linked, and the technological advancements in the fields of
communication in the first half of the twentieth century provided just that. For
Teilhard de Chardin, the fact that the globe was in a process of becoming
encircled with communication cables and radio waves was enough proof that
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under divine guidance human consciousness had indeed started to expand to glo-
bal proportions, and in the ultimate end would know only an ideal and blissful
state of being.
Another aspect that connects the noosphere with communication theories is
that its emergence relied heavily on the direct and unobstructed transfer of
thoughts. Emphasising the effects of mass media in a very similar vein as done
by the Frankfurt School – but seeing this as a positive, instead of a negative, pro-
cess – Teilhard de Chardin stated that through communication all thought would
eventually be harmonised into a ‘single thinking envelope’, in which the individ-
ual mind would be subsumed by the collective mind (ibid.: 251). Also in contrast
with the Frankfurt School he contended that this subsummation would not be the
result of one-to-many communication; because everything would be connected to
everything, all possible thoughts would be broadcasted to all possible listeners
and, once internalised undistorted, would form a singular and complete body of
knowledge.
Both the noosphere philosophy and the requirements it needs in terms of sup-
portive communication technologies have become very relevant again since the
boom of the Internet at the end of the twentieth century. Mainly following up on
the work of Marshall McLuhan, who is arguably indebted to Teilhard de Chardin
for his identification of electronic communication media as the prime movers of
Earth’s civilisations towards a global village,18 contemporary scholars have begun
to ask questions regarding the nature of the Internet in terms of creating a ‘tele-
pathic society’ (Levinson 2004: 57), or becoming an all-encompassing ‘sentient
environment’ (Rheingold 2002: 86). Whether or not the Internet indeed makes
up the present-day structural foundation for the noosphere, what remains notice-
ably visible is that many cyberspace myths recount religious and teleological tra-
vels towards a final endpoint.19
The communication ideals found in Teilhard de Chardin’s vision can thus be
summarised in a single mantra: together is good. Divine forces will guide human-
ity in a converging fashion towards the ultimate transcendent and sublime
togetherness, a singularity equal with God. The role of communication networks
here is predominantly to facilitate the necessary channels; the mere act of con-
necting beings and things is considered to provide enough leverage to construct
a global consciousness. The content of communication, although not completely
irrelevant, gets to play an inferior role. What has rendered Teilhard de Chardin’s
evolutionary arguments for the creation of a singular super-mind somewhat chal-
lenging to follow is that they are heavily influenced by his religious beliefs, but as
the next subsection will show, there are secular versions of his arguments to be
found as well.
Rising out of chaos – The emergence of a ‘Global Brain’: The urban anthropolo-
gist and self-appointed ‘omnologist’20 Howard Bloom is a prominent candidate
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for providing an academically informed view on communication and cooperation
in biological evolution. As a neo-Darwinist, Bloom’s interests lie in explaining
virtually everything he encounters in what he calls ‘society’s myth-making
machinery’, and while doing so he is able to make grand and sweeping connec-
tions between evolutionary phenomena and social behaviour. This is especially
visible in his book Global brain: The evolution of mass mind from the Big Bang to the
21st century (2000), in which Bloom specifically engages a question that is closely
related to the observation made previously: why is it that, while enough evolution-
ary evidence is at hand to make the claim that a collective mind has already been
around for millions of years, only now, with the advent of the Internet, ‘an army
of equally august specialists’ is beginning to warm up to the idea of ‘a planet
pulsing with a more-than-massive data-sharing mind’? (Bloom 2000: 3). Bloom
posits that networked communication has always already been present in evolu-
tion, and that it necessarily is the single most important paradigm with which we
can understand communication per se.
The keys to Bloom’s lengthy and heavily annotated justification for his claim
can be found in two propositions. Firstly, according to Bloom, ‘[f]rom the begin-
ning, we living beings have been modules of something current evolutionary the-
ory fails to see, a collective thinking and invention machine’ (ibid.: 2). Here,
Bloom follows the point made by Teilhard de Chardin that the seeds of a net-
worked global brain have long been visible in biological evolution. Moreover, he
holds that ‘[n]etworking has been a key to evolution since this universe first
flared into existence’ (ibid.: 14). Bloom nonetheless distinguishes himself from
Teilhard de Chardin – and from contemporary techno-advocates of the global
brain philosophy – because he does not think that ‘microchips or mystic interven-
tion’ are necessary ingredients to ultimately establish a global brain (Bloom 2000:
2). He admits that present-day myths of improved communication in cyberspace
will surely heighten our awareness of what global interconnectedness entails, but
he argues that in the process of connecting things that has already been going on
for millions of years, neither cyberspace nor divine essence is constitutive. In
other words, new communication technologies merely open our eyes to what has
been happening all along.
Secondly, he argues, group selection is more important to successful evolution
than individual selection.21 It is in every organism’s biological make-up to work
together and protect the group’s interests; connected cooperation wins in the
end. The ways in which this networked, connected cooperation sustains itself
can, according to Bloom, be grouped into five mechanisms: 1) conformity enfor-
cers (which give the group a shared identity); 2) diversity generators (which do
the opposite of conformity enforcers by spawning variety); 3) inner-judges (which
judge the actions of their host organisms and give positive or negative feedback);
4) resource shifters (which give to the organisms that contribute to the whole,
and take from the ones that do not); and 5) intergroup tournaments (which force
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each ‘group brain’ to improve itself in order to survive) (ibid.: 42-44). When
viewed as a whole, we can see how these mechanisms form a cluster of elemen-
tary evolutionary rules that set up a dialectical motion towards ever-growing inter-
dependency: too much conformity and diversity will kick in; too much apathy and
a battle will sort out the weak from the strong. Communication in this process is
found at every point where a network of cells, bacteria, ants, cats, apes, humans,
societies, or civilisations reshapes itself according to basic rules; the ideal is in its
ongoing existence and expansion.
The idea that many small but relatively simple entities can, when combined,
form a higher-order intelligence is a principle very much acknowledged in evolu-
tionary biology, where it is called ‘emergence’. More specifically, writes Steven
Johnson, these sets of rules form ‘bottom-up systems’, or ‘complex adaptive sys-
tems that display emergent behavior’ (Johnson 2001: 18). Johnson explains that
the process of self-organisation among lower-scale agents is a recurrent phenom-
enon, visible in the beginnings of life as well as in brain-simulating software.
Here, Johnson shares the argument put forward by Bloom that networking and
therefore intercommunicating capabilities have always been part of biological
make-up, and as such are not specifically a consequence of modern communica-
tion and computer technology. However, Johnson does want to investigate the
particular role of those technologies, and engages the myths that cyberspace itself
shows signs of developing a global consciousness in a less dismissive way than
Bloom does. Referring to Robert Wright’s NonZero: The logic of human destiny (2000)
– in which Wright presents a view on the transhistorical nature of self-organising
and emergent principles similar to that of Bloom and Johnson himself – Johnson
writes that today it is not as strange as Bloom makes it out to be to argue with
Wright that ‘[m]acrointelligence emerged out of the bottom-up organization of
city life […] and it will do the same on the Web’ (Johnson 2001: 116).
Despite its ability to connect things like never before, says Johnson, there is
also a very important reason why the Web itself will not automatically morph into
a conscious global brain: ‘intelligent systems depend on structure and organiza-
tion as much as they do on pure connectedness’ (ibid.: 118). He proceeds by
demonstrating that the Web knows no structure similar to that of a city or a brain;
it merely connects, and in contrast to Teilhard de Chardin’s view, this is not suffi-
cient. What is needed to obtain an orderly structure is, according to Johnson, a
feedback mechanism, and ‘given the Web’s feedback-intolerant, one way linking’
(ibid.: 121), a global brain will not spring out of merely interlinked channels of
communication. Only if artificial adaptive systems adhere to the basic rules of
emergent behaviour will there be a chance for a higher-order intelligence to arise.
Looking at the communication ideals found in their work, we can see that
Bloom and Johnson emphasise that the communicative processes that form,
maintain, and grow networks are ‘quasi-natural’ processes, ones that have been
with us from the beginning of time. The idealness of these processes is already
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implied in their functioning; there is nothing that can fundamentally disrupt
them, because they constitute an adaptive system that will automatically sort out
problems to find its new and improved synthesis. This vision of how an ideal state
of being is already part of nature echoes Teilhard de Chardin’s views: just let the
simple, basic rules do their work, and communication will inevitably improve
itself so to accommodate ever-growing connectedness. The problem with both
Bloom’s and Johnson’s accounts, however, is that they tend to discard human
agency in giving a particular shape to that connectedness. Humankind’s contribu-
tion in bringing about a global consciousness is nil if we follow Bloom, and mar-
ginal at the most if we follow Johnson. The next subsection will look at how a
more dedicated perspective on human agency is presented in Pierre Lévy’s view
on global interconnectedness.
Reinterpreting the Internet – Pierre Lévy’s Collective intelligence: The wrapping of
the Earth in multiple layers of interconnected electronic communication net-
works, which started in the eighteenth and continues into the twenty-first cen-
tury, has given validity to the question whether we have indeed become part of
the establishment of a higher order of intelligence, as Teilhard de Chardin
believed. Although an increase in connectedness, seen from the views of both
Bloom and Johnson, is nothing new in evolutionary biology, it was only when
people started to surf the World Wide Web and contribute to its informational
growth that the question of the emergence of a global brain truly began to regis-
ter among media theorists.22 By dismissing cyberspace as simply a footnote in the
history of connecting things (as Bloom does) or by focusing on how the Web itself
can become conscious (as Johnson does), there is a risk of decreased attention for
how particular and increased human interactions, mediated by communication
technologies, might harmonise into something like a universal understanding. It
is at this point that philosopher Pierre Lévy’s (1997) imaginative notion of ‘collec-
tive intelligence’, located in what he calls the ‘knowledge space’, presents a solu-
tion.
Lévy describes the evolution of earth-bound living as a process that has known
a succession of four types of space, in which the organisation of knowledge and
information is determined by the tools and symbols predominantly available in
those spaces. The first three spaces Lévy defines as the nomadic, the territorial,
and the commodity spaces. Here, respectively, Lévy sees humankind tell myths
and perform rites; develop writing, geometry, and cartography; and build a global
economy of ‘material and statistical goods’. The knowledge space is the fourth
space, the one we are now starting to inhabit. This space constitutes an ‘informa-
tional cloud’, a ‘space of living-in-knowledge and collective thought’ (Lévy 1997:
140-141). It is in this cloud that Lévy locates cyberspace, and in which he identifies
the possibility for the emergence of an ‘economy of knowledge’ (ibid.). An impor-
tant premise for the existence, growth, and preservation of the informational
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cloud is that all people interact with it by adding, changing, and retrieving data in
whatever way possible. As such, and very much resonating with Teilhard de
Chardin’s notions of the noosphere, this activity of global communication will
‘unfold and grow to cover an increasingly vast and diverse world’ (ibid.: 111-112),
ultimately creating a universally accessible information realm.
Lévy’s hierarchical description of the evolution of knowledge storage and trans-
mission reverberates with Albert Borgmann’s (1999) historical analysis of the na-
ture of information, in which he makes a distinction between propositional
knowledge (information about reality), procedural knowledge (information for
producing and realising reality), and virtual knowledge (information as reality).
Both Lévy and Borgmann present us with historical shifts in the dominant forms
of information, in which that information is being ever-more dematerialised
through the use of new communication technologies. They differ, however, in
their opinion on whether this is good or bad; while Borgmann warns of a poten-
tially dangerous split between information about/for reality and information as
reality,23 Lévy does not seem to believe there is any risk of leaving material reality
behind. He frames the knowledge space firmly within the other three spaces: ‘[It
is n]ot exactly an earthly paradise, since the other spaces, with their limitations,
will continue to exist. The intention of collective intellect is not to destroy the
earth, or the territory, or the market economy’ (Lévy 1997: 141). For Lévy, it is
clear that a collective intelligence, virtually established in the informational cloud
that is cyberspace, presents us with a progressive, and not a regressive, reality.
Because the first three spaces are not obliterated by the arrival of the knowl-
edge space, in a circular movement – ‘a return of the earth to itself’ (ibid.), as Lévy
calls it – the knowledge space connects back to the other spaces. As such, a spiral
pattern emerges: old habits and identities remain present in the structure of life,
but as a whole this structure is raised to a harmonious state in which more and
more people will come together, all through the sharing of knowledge. Traces of
the search for a perfect language can be seen again as well: central to the success
of the constitution of a knowledge space, according to Lévy, is the creation of a
set of signs and symbols that is contributed to by anyone and accessible to every-
one. Indeed, Lévy sees that these languages ‘become ever more interconnected’
and that as such they present us with what he calls the ‘surrealist mirror-image
of the collective intelligence’ (ibid.: 197).
Whether it constitutes an earthly paradise or not, Lévy cannot help but describe
the knowledge space in terms of a utopia ‘waiting to be born’, ‘a cosmopolitan
and borderless space’, ‘an electronic storm’, and ‘a sphere of artifice shot through
with streaks of light and mutating signs’ (ibid.: 138-141).24 There is undeniably a
transcendental element visible in the way Lévy writes about the knowledge space,
in which information is to be uncoupled from its static bases. This dematerialis-
ing movement fits perfectly with the religious undertones found in other myths of
networked communication: liberating things by releasing them from their car-
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riers promises more opportunities to interconnect those liberated entities, as they
have become free-floating nodes in a dynamic network. Thus, in the end, in its
most radical form, the idea behind a collective intelligence – one that is brought
forward by people’s creative and straightforward use of cyberspace’s connections
and freedom of expression – is that each node can be directly or indirectly con-
nected to all others, providing instant and complete transferral of whatever form
of information. Lévy stresses that this information always constitutes meaning,
for all users of cyberspace will gather knowledge of all existing signs and sym-
bols, simply by their online presence. The idealised idea of communication found
in Lévy’s collective intelligence is thus that mere participation in a network will
eventually result in a global and shared production and transferral of knowledge.
The conceptions of many-to-many communication, as visible in the works of
Teilhard de Chardin, Bloom, Johnson, and Lévy, display a range of various per-
spectives on what the driving forces behind the processes of interconnection are
(be they divine powers, quasi-natural evolutionary forces, or the combined actions
of people collecting knowledge and handling information). What all of these per-
spectives have in common is the premise that the formation of networks, in
which multiple and dynamic connections ensure the spread of information and
knowledge to multiple nodes, is generally a good thing. Their underlying idea-
lised ideas of communication aim to bring about and maintain those networks,
so as to establish in the end an ultimate network of networks in which all nodes
are interconnected.
Taking the analyses of all three forms of communication outlined in this section
together, we can distinguish different basic notions of what communication is,
and different strategies that describe to what extent it can, should, or will be
improved in order to eventually arrive at a communication utopia. There is the
idea that true communication is about unifying channels, or about synchronising
thoughts. Another approach to improve communication is to have everyone speak
a shared language, and yet another is to just have everything connected to every-
thing in a quasi-naturally evolved all-encompassing network. While there are
many nuances in these ideas of communication improvement, as well as in the
underlying dissatisfactions from which the ideas originate, they share distinct
similarities with the reasoning behind the utopian projects analysed in chapter 1.
What they have in common is a desire to mend conflicts – any conflict – by trying
to establish an ideal situation in which there can hardly be a conflict at all. As was
the case for utopian societies, the implication is that if every act of communica-
tion is to be a seamless and conflict-free process, this then calls for a universalis-
ing approach to the organisation and functioning of communication. We saw that
this type of reasoning is not only impossible without running into paradoxical
situations, it actually ignores the contents of communication processes by mostly
stressing their phatic function only, and denies the humanness of not being con-
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tinuously in rapport. Remove the cause of conflict, and what is left is a serene but
zombie-like bliss (Crombag & Van Dun 1997: 49). So why even ponder this tragic
desire to remove communicative noise?
The importance of noise – and its repression
[N]oise is the interference that is simultaneously disruptive and creative. There can be no
information without noise and vice versa. Noise can no more be silenced in the world
than parasites can be exterminated; life depends on parasites as much as information
depends on noise. (Mark C. Taylor 2001: 121)
The focus so far in this chapter has been on how regularly returning discursive
elements in the search for optimised communication invariably contain the idea
that there exists a communicative framework that encompasses all ideals. We saw
that, although the ideals which were discussed allowed for various degrees of
interpretation of their ontological status and differed in the way they could be
fulfilled, their common denominator was that they were there, linked as interre-
lated family members born out of the communication sublime. Each exudes a
sense of fulfilment, of complete togetherness, of utter understanding and of con-
flict-free being-as-one. In this sense, myths of ideal communication share many
utopian narrative strategies; moreover, there is a lot to suggest that utopian stor-
ies that depict a perfect society by default presuppose that there can be no misun-
derstanding, not of the ground rules which constitute and uphold that society nor
between its inhabitants in their day-to-day encounters. Perfectionism, after all,
does not tolerate deviant behaviour or ambiguous interpretation.
It is therefore both fascinating and troubling at the same time to see that uni-
versalising communicative blueprints have, for so long, held a firm grip on the
human imagination – and judging from the recurrent mantra in ads for mobile
communication technologies, still continue to do so. While there is clearly a posi-
tive psychological function to be found in the promise of never again having to
experience frustration in understanding one another, the ultimate fusing of
minds at the same time requires the playing field of communication to be evened
out to such an extent that the communicating subject loses its ‘self’, and becomes
subsumed by an anonymous cloud of pure and continuous understanding.25
Referenced in dystopian and anti-utopian narratives and echoed in the critique of
idealised models of communication, the price paid for the human wish to eradi-
cate disruptive noise from universalising processes is a loss of personhood, and
hence a negation of that which makes us human in the first place.26 A paradox!
Thus, in order to provide a better understanding of what communication is when
it is not being idealised (and why people think or say it should be), we need to
examine the role and function of communicative noise.
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Celebrating noise
Although a large portion of attention so far has been given to the overwhelming
power and pertinence of myths that tell of overcoming obstacles and reaching a
final and fulfilled state, this does not mean that these myths dominate the field of
communication theories. The notion that communication loses its meaning when
there are no hindrances in the communicative act has not been lost upon commu-
nication scholars – let alone the platitude that what is ideal for one person can be
a nightmare for the other. To communicate is to struggle, to acknowledge the
differences between the communicating parties, even to misunderstand. Failing
to recognise the fundamental role of noise, the ‘messiness of life’, is to see com-
munication from a particularly unproblematic and instrumentalist perspective, as
Kaustuv Roy notes: ‘It is when we take this messiness of lived life seriously, the
“noise” that techno-rationality seeks to brush aside, communication appears
much more problematic than previously imagined’ (Roy 2004: 299). When the
constitutive function of noise is taken into account, communication thus becomes
something quite different from the perfect transparent transmission of meanings-
in-themselves, and stops being the mythically envisioned tool to bring about a
sublime togetherness.
Communication theorists generally distinguish four types of noise: mechanical
(or physical), psychological, cultural, and semantic noise (DeVito 1976). The first
type, mechanical noise, is present at the physical level and manifests itself as
breakups of a signal: hisses on a telephone line or any other interruption or dis-
tortion of a flow of data. This is the type of noise that Shannon was primarily
concerned with, and he succeeded in filtering it out of the communicative pro-
cess. The second type, psychological noise, occurs when the psychological state
of a person is such that it influences the interpretation of a received message in an
unexpected, skewed, or biased way, for instance when a recent widow is inadver-
tently told that the hearse carrying her late husband will arrive ‘dead on time’. The
third type, cultural noise, is in some respect similar to psychological noise, in that
it, too, involves biases and as such is visible in situations where culturally deter-
mined messages are understood differently by people who are not familiar with
that culture or have a certain bias against it. Both psychological and cultural noise
appear as nemeses in the therapeutic and global brain discourses in idealised
communication, like those of Ogden and Richards or Teilhard de Chardin: if
both types of noise are transcended, the argumentation goes, there is nothing
that stands in the way of truly understanding each other, irrespective of one’s
culture, and letting us glide into a perfectly peaceful world. The reality is of course
that both psychological and cultural noise are hardwired into our being and
upbringing. The fourth and final type, semantic noise, is the type that is con-
nected to ambiguities present in language, stemming from the ways in which
multiple meanings can be attached to the same signs and vice versa. Again,
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Ogden and Richards give a good example of wanting to tackle this type of noise,
and also Lévy is known to have tried to extensively map all semantic codes in
cyberspace;27 tragically so, however, because semantic noise not only produces
ambiguities but also lies at the root of irony and paradox, both of which, since
Gödel, have been acknowledged as inherent to any symbolic system, and cannot
be ironed out.28
So of the four types of noise mentioned above, only the first, mechanical noise,
can said to be actually suitable for elimination by technical means.29 What is
striking, however, is that in myths of ideal communication, the other three types
are often approached as if they were merely disguised versions of the first type,
which opens up the idea that ‘the imperfections of human interchange can be
redressed by improved technology or techniques’ (Peters 1999: 29). Chapter 3
will give a more extended historical overview of such discourses of communica-
tive improvement through technological means, but for now it suffices to note
that the reason the communication sublime has continued to perpetuate myths of
ideal communication over time is to be found in the eternal presence of noise in
general. Noise engenders the longing for a communicative utopia, it is the neces-
sary opposite, anti-perfect form of communication; more specifically, and recall-
ing the language of Bloch, communication can only be defined in relation to non-
communication, as it expresses a longing that can only exist when there is some-
thing not-yet-existing. As a complex system of signs, language, and meaning,
communication is inherently dependent on noise in order to exist and survive at
all; like an oyster produces pearls when its shell is infiltrated by irritants, people
produce communication when their life is confronted by disorder.
In understanding this notion of communication as a process fundamentally
revolving around the presence of noise, a useful perspective comes from the
work of Sören Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher who is well known for his
attacks on ideas of direct, transparent, and unmediated communication. Living at
a time when Hegel’s writings on the attainment of absolute knowledge domi-
nated philosophical debates in Europe, Kierkegaard sought to debunk the claim
that pure thoughts could be dialectically made available.30 The key to this firm
stance against communication as the neutral vehicle of objectively shared mes-
sages is found in Frygt og bæven [Fear and trembling], in which he presents his criti-
cal reading of the story of Abraham’s offering of his son Isaac. Here, Kierkegaard
– or rather his pseudonym Johannes de Silentio – highlights Abraham’s act as
utterly incomprehensible, and asks how it could ever be understood when it is
precisely the point of the story that some things are simply incomprehensible. If
every witness would have known of God’s command to Abraham, the act would
have immediately lost all its demonstrative power. Abraham cannot communicate
his thoughts, because that would undermine the essence of his faithful deed,
Kierkegaard/Silentio writes: ‘The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that
he intended to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he intended to sacri-
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fice Isaac. But in this contradiction lies precisely the anxiety that indeed can make
a person sleepless, and yet Abraham is not who he is without this anxiety’
(Kierkegaard 2006: 24).
Kierkegaard argues that Abraham is who he is, exactly because his thoughts and
acts are not understood; they are supposed to be fundamentally out of reach, for
that is what marks him as a man of flesh and blood, a particular instead of a
generic person. Kierkegaard provides us with a very useful way to think about
communication as a private undertaking that can engender mixed interpretations,
as opposed to it being an open and public process that should be readily under-
standable by anyone. This distinction between the private and the public runs
through many of Kierkegaard’s writings, and it not only underlines his critique
of Hegelian philosophy; according to Peters it also emphasises ‘[h]is insistence
on singularity rather than generality as the ruling principle of our relations with
each other’ (Peters 1999: 134). What we should take from this, is that the tension
between what is good for the individual and what is beneficial for the group is at
the root of many of the problems that arise when forging idealised ideas of com-
munication. There is a notorious danger in thinking that communication is ideal
when it has become generalised and universal, a danger that has been identified
earlier in the analysis of utopian narratives and one that Kierkegaard as well
warned us about: we can think the universal ideal, but we exist in a particular,
lived moment, and there is no way that those opposite polarities can be recon-
ciled. Easy communication with others does not exist, and it is a mistake to think
it can or should be made easy by trying to eliminate what is perceived as
unwanted noise.
Communication from this perspective is an activity that, while trying to bridge
the gaps between minds, continuously has to deal with facing the otherness of
‘the other’, without ever coinciding with it. This understanding of communica-
tion spans the broad existentialist movement following Kierkegaard,31 and has
informed a range of philosophical enquiries into the nature of communication in
the twentieth century. We see Martin Heidegger (1927) stress that expressing the
differences in being-with-others is precisely what makes us human, and Karl
Jaspers (1935) argue that it is only by continuously reinterpreting the world that
we experience our authentic existence. Also in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s
poststructuralist explorations of language we find similar non-instrumentalist
notions that celebrate communicative noise and shun the idea that communica-
tion should or could lead to a perfect one-to-one understanding or even a grand
unified togetherness. In analysing language as indirect discourse in Mille plateaux
[A thousand plateaus], they define noise as a necessary element of language, break-
ing down the dialectical opposition between meaningful information and mean-
ingless noise (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 87-88). Thus, in multiple approaches
towards understanding communication, the notion can be observed that in the
act of facing others and trying to convey meaning, there can be no single measure
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of the trueness or purity of a transmission, as all utterances are equally part of
everything that can be said.
To sum up, myths of ideal communication fly in the face of lived experience,
that is, they tend to ignore the fact that to struggle is to communicate; transfer-
ring or sharing things takes effort. While the notions of improved communica-
tion described earlier focus on how individuals or groups of individuals can be
unified in a single understanding, the more experiential view on communication
reminds us that we are individuals precisely because there is misunderstanding.
Imposing a totalitarian scheme upon communication will result in the same prob-
lems as those found in attempts to realise utopian projections. The remarkable
thing about this is, of course, that ideas of idealised communication retain their
seductive powers of promise – even when we are aware of the grave consequences
of fulfilling those promises. We have seen this paradox again and again in his-
tory, and we continue to see it, especially in contemporary discourse on commu-
nication media in general, and on wireless technology in particular. This then
calls for an investigation of the ways in which the promise is upheld, by whom
and for what purpose.
The art of repressing noise
It should now be clear that idealised ideas of communication share the same
double-edged relationship to paradoxes as utopian narratives do. They arise from
a central paradox in our eternal hopeful quest for purpose, while simultaneously,
when pursued, they create and sustain further paradoxes. The communication
paradox is that, in the desire to ban noise from communication and create an all-
encompassing sea of understanding, there is at the same time a push for losing
that very element that makes communication what it is. Realised utopias and pure
understanding end up being experienced as either nightmares or seas of ignorant
and zombie-like bliss; in both cases we cease to be human in the sense of what
we currently experience humanness to be, including the act of desiring pure com-
munication. So, as was the question with utopian narrative, why desire such a
state at all? Why advocate the idea that communication inherently suffers from
noise, and that it should be improved by eliminating noise altogether?
To answer these questions, we only need look at the ways in which myths of
the communication sublime are translated into concrete motives for communica-
tive strategies in everyday life, and how these are used by social actors in various
(cultural, commercial, political) settings. The motives that arise from bodies of
fiction and myth, after all, are not neutral. People have all kinds of goals in their
lives, and the ways in which communication can be used to achieve those goals
will more often than not collide with how others understand what communica-
tion is for. Following literary critic Fredric Jameson’s description of shared ideas
of progress as a ‘vaster narrative movement in which the groups of a given collec-
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tivity at a certain historical conjuncture anxiously interrogate their fate, and
explore it with hope or dread’ (2005: 282), motives for interpreting myths of the
sublime in specific ways are informed by a multitude of social and historical fac-
tors. In gauging how master narratives of communication bliss are appropriated
to steer both individual and public expectations towards hope or dread, therefore,
it is vital to recognise that attempts to isolate key elements for improvement also
strategically set agendas for reinforcing underlying ideologies.
In the case of communication, ideologies of hope and dread revolve around the
issue of noise, whether it should either be abolished or upheld to improve com-
munication. In both cases, the right action clearly depends on what images of the
future are entertained, and, more importantly, by whom these images are pro-
duced. If the future of communication is presented as a world consisting of unin-
hibited understanding, noise is what should be taken out of the equation; if it
depicts human uniqueness as the highest good, noise is what makes that unique-
ness possible. What often tips the balance in favour of cancelling out noise in
communication ideals is that the two visions of the future have, over time, not
received equal attention. As the previous chapter showed, especially since the
Enlightenment and during the development of communication technologies in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there has been an ever-increasing empha-
sis on working towards futures that would be efficient, would know no wars or
violence, would provide ample goods for everyone, would promise equality and,
above all, would realise a Universal Brotherhood of Man. What becomes apparent
when dissecting these futures is that clear communication is invariably seen as a
key in manufacturing their success; only through true and complete understand-
ing can universality be attained. This idea is so powerful that it continuously sus-
tains itself, even when lived experience favours images of a future that
incorporates noise. As Peters writes of the deceiving lure of the idea of clear com-
munication: ‘It invites us into a world of unions without politics, understandings
without language, and souls without bodies, only to make politics, language, and
bodies reappear as obstacles rather than blessings’ (Peters 1999: 30-31). Thus, in
a now-familiar paradoxical fashion, plans to reduce communicative noise in
visions of ideal futures always inadvertently generate new obstacles, for which
improved communication again seems to be the answer.
This power of the notion of communication as something that, when it is
noiseless, is capable of finally bringing about an earthly paradise, has not been
lost on social actors involved in the act of future-making. It has proven to be a
very effectual strategy to stress that, precisely through obstacle-free communica-
tion, all kinds of doors will open that were previously locked because of inade-
quate understanding. In this view, communication works like a metaphysical
crowbar, bestowed with no particular function other than to catalyse improve-
ment, and as such it carries what historian Leo Marx would call a ‘hospitality to
mystification’ (Marx 1994: 249). Writing about the word ‘technology’, Marx
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shows that its relative abstractness has ‘a kind of refining, idealizing, or purifying
effect’ so that it ‘invites endless reification’(ibid.: 248), and it is clear that the
word ‘communication’ also fits this characterisation very well. Communication
works as an ‘ideograph’, a discursive building block that rhetorician Michael
McGee defined as
a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal [that] warrants the use of power,
excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric
or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized
by a community as acceptable and laudable. (McGee 1980: 15)
People who produce predictions about the future make very good use of the fact
that the lure of a better tomorrow, be it through the so-called improvement of
communication or technology (or both), thrives on the powerful grip that these
particular ideographs have on our imagination. Future images that do not incor-
porate other ideographs such as ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, or ‘equality’ are not attrac-
tive, and in contemporary culture they are even less so when they omit
communication technology as the primary means with which they are to be rea-
lised. For this reason, we can see that most of the concrete motives to improve
things are used by social actors who are active in the field of producing and mar-
keting communication technology.
Invariably, these social actors employ ideographs in two specific strategies,
aimed at portraying the future in such a way that it stimulates an urge to improve
things. Philosopher Rein de Wilde (2000) identified these strategies as invoking
either a ‘beckoning future’ or an ‘onrushing future’. The beckoning future pre-
sents us with the promise that anything is possible, owing to the prospect of
radical new beginnings. It is often cosmopolitan, De Wilde observes, in that it
advocates breaking down boundaries between countries and cultures and pro-
motes the building of a tolerant world society (Wilde 2000: 88). This is an image
we recognise in the revolutionary aspects of utopian narratives: a desired break
from the present is projected upon the existence of a radically new and different
place or time, which is glorious and knows only happiness. The gist of beckoning
future stories is that it might not be straightforward to reach that place or time,
but it can be done; De Wilde points out that most prophets of the beckoning
future do acknowledge that the road to the promised land can be full of risks, but
by reframing these dangers as ‘challenges’ that can be overcome, the prophets are
able to brush aside any obstacles (ibid.: 82). The catch is, of course, that in the
present time we need to establish the conditions under which the beckoning
future can become reality, and this is the point where ideologies and ideographs
come into play: improve technology, improve communication and use it effi-
ciently, and the future will then unfold itself as promised.
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The second form of future-making can be traced in stories of what De Wilde
calls the onrushing future. As its adjective suggests, compared to the beckoning
future, this type is at the opposite end of the spectrum of the not-yet-become,
telling us that it will inevitably engulf us. There is no escape, no chosen road
towards the promised land, the future itself will have arrived before we know it.
De Wilde notes that onrushing futures always present themselves as already fully
shaped, highlighting problematical differences with the present and therefore
urging us to prepare ourselves now or run the risk of being ‘wiped out’ (ibid.: 86-
87). A typical example of how this logic works is found in the prophesied coming
of the ‘knowledge economy’, which on a global scale imposes the need to invest
in information and communication technologies. Instead of working on the con-
ditions that will make possible the future as we would like it to be, we are
panicked into thinking that it might be too late for making certain choices, if any
at all. Thus, De Wilde adds, stories of an onrushing future are often framed as a
contest in which there can be only winners and losers; the mantra tells us to keep
on doing what needs to be done, ‘or else...’ (ibid.). And again, it is evident that
the right courses of action in these cases are in no sense neutral. They are con-
structed by those who have invested in certain future scenarios, by industry lob-
bies or special interest groups, by various political forces, and by science and
technology policy programmes. The resulting agendas, conditions, and priorities
typically leave out alternative or unwanted views, thereby emphasising that the
future is of a singular and unobstructed nature.32 Reiterating the example of the
knowledge economy, an ideograph such as communication subsequently plays a
large role in these singular and unobstructed futures, as its attractiveness as an
umbrella term for anything that has to do with ‘removing obstacles’ automatically
places a great sense of urgency on the need to extend and improve it.
To recapitulate, the art of repressing noise thus works on three levels. First, on
the level of speech acts, communicative noise (be it technical, psychological, cul-
tural, or semantic) is experienced as disturbing the transmission of the very ideas,
mindsets, regulations, and actions that make it possible to bring about a better
future in the first place. Ergo, the instrumental thinking goes, the less communi-
cative noise there is, the closer we get to an improvement of communication.
Second, projections of the future work because they either stress the importance
of removing obstacles on the road to an earthly paradise, or warn us that if we do
not prepare ourselves by removing obstacles from the scene where the future will
land, we will be cut off from partaking in that future. In both cases, whatever is
represented as an obstacle is seen as the noise that needs to be eliminated in the
channel that links the present with the future. Third, and in its most general
sense, repressing noise is part of the intrinsic logic of future-making. As De
Wilde demonstrates, both beckoning and onrushing images of the future func-
tion in a similar way, because although they each might have a different point to
make, they both typically pay no attention to the extremely varied (noisy) conse-
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quences of their respective programmes, and instead focus on clear-cut and sin-
gular (noiseless) outcomes (ibid.: 95).
Finalising the analysis of the function of noise in communication, the conclu-
sion must be that it has an ambiguous role. On the one hand, noise is placed at
the root of communicational problems, which subsequently fuels the urge to
translate idealised ideas of communication into strategies that suppress noise
and, as such, promise to bring forward a better future or prepare us for its arrival.
On the other hand, noise can be regarded as the fundamental reason why com-
munication exists at all; just as happiness in an achieved utopia will have lost its
meaning, communication without noise would cease to be the characteristic that
defines us as part of a globally interconnected web of unique human beings.
Noise is the quirk, the necessary paradox in communication, and any amount of
trying to eliminate this noise will just ensure that the attempt remains an impos-
sible dream.
And yet, we continue to try. It is like the wish to communicate as angels, who
‘either understand the thoughts of others, or […] can read them in the divine
mind’ (Eco 1995: 37), and it is a wish that continues to haunt us. As Peters notes,
angels
provide us a lasting vision of the ideal speech situation, one without distortion
or interference. Angels – a term that comes from the Greek angelos, messen-
ger – are unhindered by distance, are exempt from the supposed limitations of
embodiment, and effortlessly couple the psychical and the physical, the signif-
ied and the signifier, the divine and the human. They are pure bodies of mean-
ing. (Peters 1999: 74-75)
The next part of this book will therefore turn towards the role of communication
technologies in the many expressions of such dreams of angelic communication
and investigate the numerous technologically driven endeavours in history that
have tried to solve the perceived problems of communication, from the telegraph
to the present-day mobile communication device. Again, we will encounter the






3. The rise… and rise of media
technology
Someone had to observe that tapping with an electric finger would stir vibrations over a
far-flung range beyond the orbit of the moon. Genius had to discover in the Creator’s plan
a mysterious medium hidden until the twentieth century approached, when mankind’s
accelerated pace needed communication on a world-wide scale; more rapid than the mail
carried by an ocean liner, faster than an airplane dispatch, quicker than the telegraph of
Morse or the telephone of Bell. (Orrin E. Dunlap 1937: 38)
So far in this book, the focus has been on how the search for hope and purpose
and its accompanying narratives create progressive and utopian agendas, which
subsequently inform the creation and preservation of idealised yet paradoxical
ideas of communication. It is now time to see how this all relates to technology,
and how we can understand it as a myth-oriented domain in its own right. That
is, we will tap into the fantastic discourses that have continuously surrounded
communication technologies, regenerating and maintaining the idea that new
media bring us closer to truly coming together and understanding each other.
This chapter is about our fascination with the transcending experiences that new
communication technologies continuously seem to promise, or in the words of
media historian Jeffrey Sconce, about why it is that ‘after 150 years of electronic
communication, we still so often ascribe mystical powers to what are ultimately
very material technologies’ (Sconce 2000: 6).
First, since myths of ideal communication have been proposed to be regulative
principles, it is necessary to question which theoretical and conceptual tools are
best suited to study how myths can be considered as ‘guiding forces’ in technol-
ogy development. After contrasting the viewpoints of technological determinism
with those of social constructivism, I will suggest that both perspectives only lim-
itedly support opportunities to investigate the agency of myths, and that this is
more or less also the case with alternative views like those from actor-network
theory and ‘symptomatic’ approaches. Next, I present the approach to describing
media history with which I consider it to be possible to acknowledge the contin-
gency of the development of communication technologies, while at the same time
recognising the regulative function of idealised ideas of communication. This
approach is based on an evolutionary model of technology development, in which
directive principles are assumed to be present without having to accept teleologi-
cal explanations, and with which a multitude of environmental factors can be
87
described that play a role in constructing technologies, including forceful fanta-
sies and moving myths. This approach also provides a valuable way to stress the
important difference between the desire to see progress in media development,
and describing this desire as a recurrent element in media history.
Finally, I give an overview of myths of ideal communication, contextualised by
the heterogeneous environments in which they manifested themselves in media
evolution, and show that their manifestations are intrinsically linked with the
often strategic need to endow new technologies with the most fantastic qualities.
Grouping the multiform communication technologies into five ‘constellations’ –
the telegraphic, telephonic, radiographic, televisual, and Internet constellations –
I aim to demonstrate that, while communication media are regularly placed in a
rigid and sequential progressive line, in reality they know no such clear-cut
boundaries, and are all products of often simultaneous and evolutionary pro-
cesses in which ideas of communication utopia are abound.
Valuing myths
Myths are the most powerful moving forces behind technology.
(Lee Worth Bailey 2005: 32)
A common element in the theorising of the idea of progress is that its birth is
intricately linked with technological advancement from the eighteenth century
onwards. Although this view has considerable merit, it needs to be refined; as
was demonstrated in chapter 1, perceptions of linear time, and thus of ways to
place events along a path towards a certain goal, can be distinguished as early as
in ancient Greece. Even so, we also know that, at that time, linearity was enclosed
by a dominant circular mindset, and that, while we might be tempted to retro-
spectively locate current understandings of ideas of progress in classical times, it
is a mistake to think that there could be a single, univocal, and a-historical per-
ception of what progress entails. Myths of progress, seen as an upward move-
ment feeding on ever-present notions of ‘newness’, have gone through many
transformations, especially regarding the nature of foreseen goals.
What we can say is that the idea of progress in its now-familiar version enjoyed
its most dominant phase during the Enlightenment. In that period, a shift took
place towards seeing reason as the primary means to bring about progress,
mostly under the influence of what can be called the ‘new science’, a way of
thinking progressively whereby ‘each generation start[s] with the best of the last
generation, and [is] bound to add to it’ (Pollard 1968: 6-7). But not only those
working in science laboratories came to know of new developments, as discov-
eries were moved more and more into practical everyday use. As Leo Marx writes,
‘[n]othing provided more tangible, vivid, compelling icons for representing the
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forward course of history than recent mechanical improvements like the steam
engine’ (Marx 1994: 240). By their growing visible presence, technological arte-
facts gave rise to the idea that nature could be conquered, and that man could
gain control over his destiny. Especially the advent of industrialism had a huge
impact on the social and cultural lives of many people, fuelling progressive myths
that standards of living would be raised universally.1 Increasingly, new technolo-
gies manifested themselves in the collective consciousness as the single-most
notable sign that humanity was moving in the right direction, thus strengthening
the myth that they, and they alone, would bring about the long-awaited earthly
paradisiacal state (Noble 1997: 4).
Hence, ideas of progress have often been intimately tied with a deterministic
take on technology’s influence.2 Stock examples of how this intertwined relation
is perceived tell of how ‘technology X changed the world for the better’, or that
‘technology Y finally solved problem Z’. In each case, a direct link is established
between a technological innovation and a positive effect, suggesting that there
were no other factors involved. Such myths are still with us today, and remarkably
so, considering that the notions that technology is the prime mover of change
and that improvements in technology automatically entail progress have, mainly
in the twentieth century, received a fair share of criticism. World wars, atomic
bombs, technological disasters, and global warming may have tempered the
widespread belief in progress through technological means, but its momentum
appears not to have faded significantly, especially if we look at how new commu-
nication technologies are still presented and perceived as able to provide solu-
tions to everyday and complex problems. The question here, then, is how we
should value the functioning of myths in our perception of the relation between
technological development and social change. We have seen earlier in this book
that myths are not simply ornamental stories, but what exactly is their status
when technology is concerned? Should we conclude that, because they are ever-
present, myths greatly inform – perhaps even determine – the development of
technology, or is their presence more of arbitrary influence? How can we concep-
tualise their role? To answer these questions, I will briefly discuss the set of
approaches with which technology is generally studied, and then assess to what
extent these approaches provide the necessary tools and opportunities to ascer-
tain how myths of idealised communication play a part in shaping communica-
tion technologies.
When analysing the relation between technological developments on the one
hand and social change on the other, most scholars generally distinguish two
distinct views, that of technological determinism and social constructivism. Sociologist
Claude Fischer provides a useful illustration of the broad contours of these two
views, and, as will become clear, the means with which to locate the position of
myths in them as well. First, Fischer discusses the notion of technological deter-
minism – or what he calls the impact analysis approach – and from the outset it is
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clear that determinism is a controversial subject. Fischer shows that the idea
behind impact analysis is often explained with the metaphor of a billiard ball
effectuating a force upon other balls on a billiard table, scattering them according
to natural laws and generating a cascade of ‘impacts’ until the strength of the
initial force has subsided (Fischer 1992: 8). Technology in this model is entirely
external to society, and, when it at some point enters that society, it does so
autonomously, and with predetermined consequences. As an example, Fischer
presents historian Lynn White’s argument that ‘the invention of the stirrup led,
by a series of intermediate steps, to feudalism’ (ibid.). This view on technology
can be characterised as making use of a macro-scale perspective on history, rely-
ing on assumptions of linear monocausality, and ignoring technological side
effects and coincidences. The ‘softer’ version of technological determinism,
which Fischer calls the impact-imprint approach, does recognise the contingency
of technological developments, but also finds causal effects in how new technol-
ogies culturally and psychologically ‘imprint’ their essential qualities on their
users (ibid.: 10). Here, Fischer refers to scholars such as Stephen Kern and Joshua
Meyrowitz, who argue that time- or space-transcending technologies necessarily
engender widely held senses of ‘timeless-ness’ or ‘placeless-ness’ (ibid.: 10-11).
The second approach to studying the relationship between technology and
society is one that Fischer identifies as social constructivism. Following the founding
work of Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch, this approach sees technology as an
undetermined heterogeneous field, in which struggles and negotiations between
diverse social groups shape particular structures and definitions of particular
technological devices. Such a perspective would be best suited to give an adequate
explanation of, as Fischer writes, why ‘the same devices may have different his-
tories and uses in different nations’ (ibid.: 16). It would also take into account the
role of end-users in co-shaping technologies. Fischer places a great deal of
emphasis on the need to study people’s agency and the limits of that agency in
dealing with technology, and rightly so; it would be nonsensical to claim that
humans are subservient creatures, all volitionally manipulated into using technol-
ogies the same way and exactly as was intended. To attribute primary agency to
technology is to ignore socio-political struggles, economic factors, and empiri-
cally grounded evidence that technology rarely has a single use or effect, all of
which are acknowledged by a social constructivist approach (ibid.: 17-18). Studies
that zoom in on the micro-scale of technology development, Fischer contends,
are far better at avoiding familiar deterministic traps, such as focusing on suc-
cesses only, or wanting to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false’ origins of certain
artefacts.
Of the two approaches, technological determinism is clearly not favoured by
Fischer, and he voices a widely held view.3 He dismisses it for being too reduc-
tionist, and for ignoring evidence that many technological artefacts are produced
by particular social groups for particular purposes; as he subsequently notes,
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often technological developments could have ‘unfolded otherwise were it not for
social, political, or cultural circumstances’ (ibid.: 9). These are important objec-
tions, as they also largely hold true for the project of determining which approach
provides the best opportunities to study the role of myths in orienting technologi-
cal development. If technological determinism portrays technologies purely as
rationally derived tools that, in their value-free neutrality, develop autonomously
and are impartial to social, ethical, or psychological factors, it leaves very little, if
any, room for studies of how non-rational hopes and dreams might influence that
development. The macro-scale perspective on history provided by technological
determinism can be useful for gaining insights into general patterns of technolo-
gical development, but if such insights are not substantiated with more detailed
accounts of how those patterns are given shape, what remains is a short-sighted
interpretation of what are in fact heterogeneous and complex processes.
However, social constructivism also has some limitations that impact its use
for analysing the functioning of myths. Most notably, by dismissing the signifi-
cance of the macro-scale, social constructivists risk becoming myopic, focusing
only on the minute details of a process of technological development and then
stating the truism that all these details played a part in constructing it. In other
words, there would be no clear room for determining whether there are larger-
scale underlying forces at work in framing those details at the micro-scale.
Furthermore, there is a problem with the fairly common social constructivist
practice of seeing technology as a type of text that is ‘written’ by producers and
then ‘read’ by consumers. This viewpoint holds that social groups that produce
technologies aim to ‘configure the user’ (Woolgar 1991) by converting specific
preconceptions about users and their needs into specific technological artefacts,
and that users subsequently do not necessarily perceive these the way they were
intended. Ultimately, this would imply that technological artefacts have no objec-
tive characteristics and that their functioning is always open to radical redefini-
tion.4 This is problematic because, as media sociologist Ian Hutchby notes, it
assumes technology is ‘a tabula rasa which is only given meaning and structure
through actors’ interpretations and negotiations’, which would ignore that ‘the
range of possibilities of interpretation and action is nowhere near as open for
either “writers” or “readers” as the technology-as-text metaphor implies’
(Hutchby 2001: 29). When studying myths of idealised communication, a social
constructivist approach is difficult to use for adequately considering the notion
that both inscriptions and interpretations of technology are informed and con-
strained by long-held myths, and that such myths thus limit the range of possible
developments and uses of communication technologies.
On their own, neither technological determinism nor social constructivism
satisfactorily provides the means to find an answer to the question how myths of
progress shape communication technologies. Combining the two, however,
might work. On the one hand, tracing recurrent myths in a broad historical range
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of technological developments can tell us a great deal about the ways in which
deeply ingrained concepts of hope and purpose are projected upon deterministic,
teleological, and similar higher-level forces.5 On the other hand, myths work
because they conceal the failures, the social struggles, and the unreachability of a
sublime state; they are extremely adept at setting agendas and letting people for-
get that they are repeating themselves in proclaiming the gospel of the new. A
myth-focused inquiry into the technological condition would shift back and forth
from unravelling its complex social construction on the micro-scale, to finding
the common strategies that are used to cover up this construction on the macro-
scale. It would, in fact, reframe the struggles in the social sphere as the prime
realm where myths are upheld. This idea is enforced when we look at a similar
argument made by Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx in their edited volume Does
technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism. The authors point out
as well that, despite the validity of the critique of technological determinism,
there is still a poignantly robust feeling in the public imagination that ‘technolo-
gical innovation is a major driving force of contemporary history, if not the pri-
mary driving force’ (Smith & Marx 1994: xiv). Seeking to explain this apparent
contradiction, Smith and Marx defuse the objections made by social constructi-
vism by arguing that these objections merely shift the origin of technology’s
power to social and cultural spheres, and ultimately do not negate the effective-
ness of that power. Thus, they write, technological determinism could well be
redefined as referring to ‘the human tendency to create the kind of society that
invests technologies with enough power to drive history’ (ibid.). This observation
should not be understood as a call for a return to the study of technology’s
‘impacts’, but as a recognition of how powerful the human need is to think of the
flow of technological developments in terms of causality.
In order to pay proper attention to myths of idealised communication in the
study of how technology constitutes our environment and vice versa, it is there-
fore useful to consider a perspective that either transcends or combines the
macro- and micro-scale. In the past few decades, several possible theoretical per-
spectives that do this have emerged, each with their own strengths and weak-
nesses. There is actor-network theory (ANT), which sees events and actions as
constituting heterogeneous networks that link together human and non-human
actors. In ANT, as sociologist Bruno Latour has argued, the whole notion of
scales actually disappears: there are simply networks with strong and weak links
between actors, and studying these networks – or, rather, ‘reassembling’ them
(Latour 2005) – is aimed primarily at revealing how and with what purpose parti-
cular actors are connected to each other, and not so much at determining ‘order
relations’ that lead from the micro-scale to the macro-scale or vice versa (Latour
1996: 371). However, while this approach can be advantageous when one wants to
get rid of a-priori assumptions about the locus of agency in technological devel-
opment, it commonly focuses on network interactions over a delineated and con-
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tinuous period of time, and it can therefore become quite difficult and tedious to
diachronically trace recurrent myths that have oriented actors in their mutual con-
figurations. Furthermore, ANT shuns the idea of underlying frameworks; as me-
dia sociologist Patrice Flichy has also pointed out, ANT research generally does
not consider that technologies are in part the product of ‘a collective vision or
imaginaire’ (Flichy 2007: 4). The ANT approach, then, like technological deter-
minism and social constructivism, would seem to offer only limited opportunities
to study the functioning of myths when used exclusively.
Fischer also discusses an alternative approach to technological determinism
and social constructivism, one he calls the symptomatic approach. In this approach,
technology is seen as an expression of deeper forces embedded in social and
cultural behaviour, and studying those forces is aimed at uncovering the systemic
nature of technology, its Geist, as Fischer explains. This approach might provide
ample opportunity to study myths, although according to Fischer it risks discard-
ing the diversified ways in which technology can manifest itself, and so could
wrongly assume ‘that modern technologies form a coherent, consistent whole’
(ibid.: 13). Yet, while he is right in arguing that uses and effects of technologies
are not homogeneous, his assertion that it is difficult to assess how underlying
rationales of technology might work misses the point that describing these ratio-
nales can illuminate expected uses and perceived effects, which do have a powerful
converging influence on technology developments. A concrete example might
clarify this. Looking at how Fischer presents his argument, it is very ironic that,
when he points out the dangers of extrapolating future developments along a
path informed and determined by an assumed technology Geist, he chooses the
proliferation of video games and the computerisation of the home as two prime
examples of failed ‘grand directions’. At the beginning of the 1990s, when he
wrote his book, this might have been a sound observation, but today we know
that both the video game and the home computer industries have thrived enor-
mously. Of course, with hindsight it is always easy to ridicule wrong predictions,
and I certainly do not want to imply here that every projected future development
will come true if we wait long enough, but in this particular instance a macro-
scale study of what we could call the video game or computerisation Geist could
have revealed powerful and higher-level processes at work, which were fuelled by
forceful necessary fictions that rendered it very unlikely that they would lose criti-
cal momentum any time soon. Blind belief in determinism is problematic indeed,
but it is not at all impossible to make educated guesses based on knowledge and
understanding of psycho-cultural forces active in the socio-technological realm.
So could a reconceptualised notion of Geist help us to study myths of idealised
communication in the development of communication technology?
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Tracing technology’s Geist
Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive
forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in
changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The
hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the indus-
trial capitalist. (Karl Marx 1936: 92)
When critically engaging the various historical notions of the relationship
between technology development and its guiding influences, it is quite conceiv-
able that at some point Karl Marx’s well-known passage about historical materi-
alism, found in Das Elend der Philosophie (translated as The poverty of philosophy in
1936), will be encountered. It is famous for the sweeping claim it makes, linking
supposedly fixed identities of specific machines, namely those of the hand-mill
and the steam-mill, to the direct societal consequences of their mere presence.
Although Marx’s statement has been revealed as factually erroneous, its rhetorical
force remains visible in debates on whether it is insightful or even possible to
describe systemic structures in history.6 Marx was convinced that such a structure
could be disclosed; like Hegel, he posited the inevitability of historical progress
along a dialectical pattern, a process formed and informed by Geist.7 As we have
seen previously, positioning Geist as a directive principle in the history of techno-
logical development is controversial, to say the least, and not without reason, as it
can lead to a reductionist view of why things happen. Yet, equally, dismissing it
out of hand for being too deterministic is also not convincing. Postulating the
presence of underlying structures is not the same as having a determinist attitude
towards how history unfolds. Admittedly, and again taking Marx’s notorious
statement as an example, a quick glance might indeed give the impression that
he describes necessary causal links between modes of production and societal
configurations, and, as some scholars suggest, to think that Marx meant other-
wise is a mistake.8 However, as economist Robert Heilbroner suggested in his
classic essay on the implications of Marx’s claim, Geist-engendered relationships
in the technological realm can actually be far more complex than what they are
when presumed being highly determined; what we should take from presuppos-
ing the presence of a technology Geist is that it at most positions technology more
precisely as ‘a mediating factor, both acted upon by and acting on the body of
society’ (Heilbroner 1994: 63). Outlining and investigating underlying, systemic
structures in technology development thus does not necessarily imply that a
deterministic or teleological approach is being pursued.9
The current challenge is to circumvent the looming criticism of postulating the
presence of Geist, and to give an overview of recurrent myths in technological
developments without falling into the trap of presenting them as if they fixed
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technology’s histories on a single track and left no room for alternative directions
or diversions. Such a balanced overview would create a perspective on technology
that, on the one hand, takes into account the social, cultural, political, and eco-
nomic factors that co-construct specific uses of specific technological artefacts,
but on the other hand also recognises the psycho-cultural processes that have
been present in various guises during technological development, as an under-
current influencing the ways we think about, develop, promote, use, and value
communication technology. This, then, following science and technology scholar
Paul N. Edwards, could be called a ‘multiscalar approach’ to studying technology
development, one that tries to describe the ‘mutual orientation’ of social actors,
institutions, and large-scale solutions to persistent ‘problems of material produc-
tion, communication, information, and control’ (Edwards 2003: 221-222).10
In constructing such a multiscalar approach, I want to draw upon the same
insight that informed the theory of Apparatgeist, which James E. Katz and Mark
Aakhus proposed to define as referring to ‘the common set of strategies or prin-
ciples of reasoning about technology evident in the identifiable, consistent, and
generalized patterns of technological advancement throughout history’ (Katz &
Aakhus 2002: 307). Katz and Aakhus, too, see the inadequateness of constructi-
vist approaches in explaining the persistence of technological myths, and they,
too, are wary of taking an alternative but seemingly determinist standpoint: while
the authors explicitly incorporate the Hegelian notion of Geist in their theory, they
are quick to add that although they wish to acknowledge a directive principle in
their perspective on technological development, they do not want to include the
notion of a teleological goal. They see no given final end; rather, the type of
movement they perceive finds its expression both in a sense of continuous
becoming – instead of being static and pre-determined – and, in a broader his-
torical sense, in that there are ‘latent urges’ that can suddenly manifest them-
selves. Geist, according to Katz and Aakhus, implies ‘incremental change followed
by occasional, unpredictable bursts of drastic change in history’ (ibid.). So, there
is a directive principle present, but its manifestations and conceptualisations are
historically contextualised.
Having formulated the main aim with all the aforementioned prerequisites in
mind – to create a non-teleological view on the development of communication
technologies that acknowledges both incremental and sudden changes oriented
by certain directive principles – I propose that a multiscalar approach to under-
standing myths of idealised communication in technology is derived best from
what we could call an evolutionary account of technological history. Before I will
explain in more detail why and how I think the evolution metaphor is useful, let
me first stress that I recognise that its application can be a precarious undertak-
ing, because, as I already wrote in chapter 1, the understanding of the theory of
evolution is anything but uncontested and its foundations are often misused to
prove the existence of linear progress. This, of course, is not my intention; I do
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not want to claim that progress itself is a directive principle in biological or tech-
nological evolution. However, I do believe that myths (such as those of progress)
play an important role in favouring certain technological solutions over others,
similar to how in biological-evolution selection mechanisms enable some organ-
isms to survive while others become extinct. There is no determinism or goal
here; neither biological nor technological environments are stable, and processes
of generational reproduction regularly mutate through aberrations or are sud-
denly and violently disrupted by unforeseen events.
Therefore, in my understanding of the evolution of technology, I want to selec-
tively use analogies from the theory of biological evolution, and distinguish the
following characteristics: first, a non-teleological view on history that resists the
temptation to only concentrate on ‘big breakthroughs’ or ‘brilliant inventors’,
while still acknowledging the occurrence of chance discoveries or sudden events
that quickly surpass paradigmatic boundaries; second, a focus on the importance
of environmental factors that can account for the diversity of different uses and
appropriations of technology; and finally, a recognition of forceful fantasies,
moving myths and seductions of the sublime that work as recurrent selection
mechanisms within the evolutionary processes. What follows is a closer look at
these characteristics, along with a more detailed explanation of why they fit the
evolutionary paradigm.
Non-teleological view on history
A reappearing complexity in writing histories of technologies is that, inevitably,
past events are looked at in light of the present. Too often this disposition results
in finding – or, rather, constructing – causal links between what has happened
and what constitutes our here and now, thereby creating artificial lineages ‘char-
acterized by a latent or explicit technological determinism’ that suits the needs of
whatever interests the historian has or ideologies she believes in (Crary 1990: 8).
Within this tendency, the potent idea of discovering the origin of things grabs
hold of the historian’s imagination, and in the wake of this idea of an origin
comes the notion of a telos, a final goal that predefines the direction that history
had to take. Especially in the realm of technology, where the idea of purposeful
design reigns supreme, progress has often been presented as a teleological pro-
cess: all steps taken along the road form a necessary path between a primitive
beginning and a final, ideal destination. In such accounts of progress, origins are
mostly found in so-called revolutionary discoveries by individual geniuses, who
subsequently have tried at all costs to have their inventions mature into their full-
grown selves. As a result of these forms of historiography, artefacts that do not fit
the traced trajectory are marginalised as failures and are left for forgotten.
The issue with such teleological histories is not so much that they are linear
(although linearity poses its own problems as well), but that they tend to focus
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solely on successful stories that are lifted out of a continuous and heterogeneous
stream of events. In The evolution of technology, George Basalla asserts that this
notion of discontinuous technological change, which supposes that revolutionary
discoveries are miraculously spawned in contextual isolation, clearly needs revi-
sion (Basalla 1988: 26-30). Squashing the assumption that humans respond to a
universal urge to create technologies out of necessity or to have them suit funda-
mental needs,11 Basalla holds that our lifeworld plays host to a diversified abun-
dance of superfluous technological artefacts, all of which can be placed relative to
each other in an ongoing evolutionary flow of development. He supports his view
by extensively showing that even artefacts ‘such as the steam engine, the cotton
gin, or the transistor’ that ‘appear to be excellent candidates for use in supporting
the contrary discontinuous explanation’, have ‘emerged in an evolutionary fash-
ion from their antecedents’ (ibid.: 30). This does not imply that those antecedents
are all necessary determinants; Basalla rightly adds that within an evolutionary
perspective many variants of artefacts can be distinguished in the flow of develop-
ment, of which ‘[s]ome are simply inoperable; some are ineffective; and some are
effective but have little technological and social influence’ (ibid.: 34).
Basalla thus gives us the evolutionary vocabulary to describe and explain con-
tinuous processes of technological development without having to resort to
accepting necessity, determinism, or progress as instigators and movers of those
processes. He also stresses that the continuity argument does not imply that cer-
tain inventions are inevitable, or that the paths of development are not subject to
alteration by social, economic, cultural, technical, or other forces. Evolutionary
processes mutate, or are either accelerated or stopped in their tracks due to coin-
cidences and unforeseen events: ‘[If] evolutionary change is to occur, then novelty
must find a way to assert itself in the midst of the continuous’ (Basalla 1988: 63).
Novelty is the counterpart of continuity in the general pattern of evolution, gener-
ating prosperous deviations, sure dead ends, and with them a myriad of non-
determined effects. In technology development, a similar pattern can be distin-
guished; if there was no occurrence of novelty, Basalla writes, ‘strict imitation
would be the rule, and every newly made thing would be an exact replica of some
existing artefact’ (ibid.: 64). New technologies can fundamentally change the sta-
tus quo, die untimely deaths and certainly have unintended consequences.12 An
evolutionary perspective on technology, when applied in its original Darwinian
non-progressive version, is therefore very useful for avoiding teleological notions
of development.
Environmental factors
If we are to take an evolutionary perspective on technology and want to consider
the role of environmental factors, the next thing that needs to be clarified is to
what extent we can push the analogy.13 In biological evolution, environmental
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characteristics form the territorial demands imposed on a population to survive,
hence acting as a preserver of profitable variations within that population. When
the environment changes, either gradually (for instance due to geographical mod-
ification) or dramatically (for instance due to meteor impact), the survival
demands change as well, disturbing the existing variational balance and shifting
it in a new direction. The environment thus ‘selects’ (albeit not actively) rather
than produces variations within an organism’s population because these varia-
tions are already present, as a result of random natural processes occurring in
generational reproduction. The process is random as there is no intentional direc-
tion towards a set goal; if there is one thing that we might consider an inherent
characteristic of evolution, it is that its course can be typified by constant ‘diversi-
fication, expansion, and exploration’ (Buskes 2006: 426).
In technological development, we can say that there are demands as well, and
that their arrangement is highly dependent on the specific environments they are
formulated in. We can think of social demands, political demands, cultural
demands, and so forth,14 which all favour different or overlapping types of tech-
nology while disfavouring other types. In addition, the environments in which the
many variants of technology exist are, just as in biological evolution, multifarious
and unstable, and thus we will find major differences in the places, ways, and
times in which specific technological artefacts are developed and used – if they
are developed or used at all. Media scholar Brian Winston provides a useful way
of describing how technological change incorporates these notions of environ-
mental factors. Always grounded in what he designates as the ‘social sphere’,
Winston sees that in the transformation process from idea to prototype to inven-
tion to production there are environmental forces at work such as ‘supervening
social necessities’ and ‘the “law” of the suppression of radical potential’, both
determining which ideas, prototypes, inventions, and eventually produced arte-
facts are suited to survive, and which become redundant (Winston 1998: 3-14).
This view does lead us to recognise that we must be careful not to extend the
environmental analogy too radically. The most important difference between bio-
logical and technological evolution is that changes in organic variation are the
result of random processes, whereas technological variation is, for a large part,
actively and paradigmatically produced in response to perceived environmental
demands and changes. This does not mean, however, that we can take an instru-
mental view and assume that environmental factors always induce the right tech-
nology to be invented in a rigid problem/solution pattern; moreover, the fact that
technology development is encapsulated in a direct feedback loop from heteroge-
neous knowledge to intentional action, incorporating many levels where all kinds
of variation, selection, and responses are to be found, makes it a much more
complex process to study.15 Additionally, in what sociologist Eric Hirsch calls the
upholding of ‘domestic self-sufficiency’, dominant environmental forces (such as
the manufacturing industry’s inertia and the needs of consumers) co-evolve with
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technological innovations, strengthening their mutual dependency and legitimis-
ing their existence (Hirsch 1998: 159). In other words, it is prudent not to confuse
different levels of analysis. By using the environmental analogy I primarily want to
stress that technology development is an adaptive process, and as such will con-
tinue to uphold a great diversity within its ‘population’.
Forceful fantasies and moving myths
Having established that an evolutionary account of technology enables us, to a
certain degree, to place technological development in a continuous scheme that,
at the same time, possesses no inherent teleology or other forms of linearity
because of the many environmental factors that guarantee diversity, we now
come to the third and final element of the proposed perspective, which is the
focus on recurrent myths that underlie movements in that evolutionary scheme.
Why is it that we continue to find very similar projections of and reactions to new
communication technologies? Do these projections and reactions somehow pre-
figure a limited set of conceptions of what constitutes the ideal state of those
technologies? An appropriate answer to these questions can be obtained by briefly
returning to the evolutionary biology debate in chapter 1 between Daniel C.
Dennett and Stephen J. Gould, who differed in opinion regarding the contingency
of evolution. Dennett, in response to Gould’s opinion that every ‘replay of the
tape of life’ would result in a radically different outcome, argued that the nature
of evolution is actually such that it would come up with the same ‘Good Tricks’
each time (Dennett 1995: 304-308). In other words, according to Dennett the
same patterns emerge again and again in evolution, in different times and places
and in different guises, because they – somehow – apparently work. This phe-
nomenon is also called ‘convergence’ – the idea that organisms can differ in their
development but will have similar roles when they adapt to comparable ecological
niches (Buskes 2006: 427).
In the technological realm it is possible to say that we can see a similar thing
happening. Technological artefacts evolve in many ways and are used for multi-
farious purposes, but not limitlessly so; there are convergent constraints on what
does and does not work. In communication technologies, these constraints are
what Ian Hutchby calls communicative affordances, the ‘social and technological
rules’ that determine ‘the relevant “slots” which delimit the possibilities for
actions’ (Hutchby 2001: 28). To focus on affordances, Hutchby argues, is to
‘accept that technological artefacts both promote certain forms of interaction
between participants and constrain the possibilities for other forms of interac-
tion’ (ibid.: 32). With Hutchby it is possible to note the important difference with
biological evolution, which, as highlighted before, is that constraints of technolo-
gies do not randomly originate in the wild; rather, because of the predominantly
intentional nature of technological innovation, they are actively, discursively, and
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materially produced. Hence, notions of ‘what works’ in communication technol-
ogy are highly dependent on psychological and culturally cultivated ideas of what
communication should be.16 The power of such ideas has been described earlier
in this book: in the search for novelty amidst the continuous stream of technolo-
gical evolution, we are lured by mental representations of an ideal goal whose
expression in turn is rooted in perceptions of both the technological and the com-
munication sublime.
Deeply ingrained mental habits to grasp the ‘not-yet-become’ of technology are
therefore a constituent part of technology evolution, acting as selection processes
that both discard and set in motion evolutionary processes. Winston, for instance,
sees technologies as the ‘utterances’ of a certain scientific competence, whereby
the transformation from competence to utterance is instigated by ‘mysterious
mental forces [such as] creativity, intuition, imagination, “the will to think”’
(Winston 1998: 3, 5). What is more, Winston appears to hint that these forces
automatically manifest themselves according to an internalised and shared set of
rules. There is no need for the technologist to be a scientist herself in order to
envision what a transformation might look like, Winston writes, because she will,
at some level, already have ‘absorbed’ the ‘grammar’ of technological competence
(ibid.: 5). Basalla as well notes that, for a large part, technological innovation
follows the rules of ‘the game of invention’ which lie ‘at the heart of Western
technology’; he writes that, next to rational and utilitarian motives, myths such as
‘technological dreams, impossible machines, and popular fantasies’, which are
often coupled with the idea of progress, continuously underlie technologists’
decisions and justifications (Basalla 1988: 66-67, 131-132).
Reappearing myths can thus be said to inform and constitute the ‘good tricks’
of technological evolution. That is, they supply the discursive foundations of
‘what works’, or rather, of how we perceive ‘how it should work’. This in turn
sets agendas for further action. Hence, in the development of communication
technology we should be able to locate traces of myths of the communication
sublime, that over and over again tell us that better communication is possible, if
only the technology were perfected and people would learn how to use it effec-
tively. Such myths work like memes, the term that evolution theorist Richard
Dawkins uses to describe gene-like replicators of information that live in ‘the
soup of human culture’ (Dawkins 1976: 192), or like topoi, the term with which
Huhtamo defines ‘cyclically recurring elements and motives underlying and guid-
ing the development of media culture’ that provide ‘“pre-fabricated” moulds for
experience’ (Huhtamo 1994).17 The recurrent nature of myths of the communica-
tion sublime implies that they are always potentially there, but that they can be
actively deployed or ignored, or as Mosco observes, they can be temporarily alive
or dead (Mosco 2004: 29). It also means that, even when myths inform concep-
tions of technological artefacts that do not fit contemporary paradigms of the
environmental constraints in force, they can still tell us something about the
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reconfigurations within the discourses and material expressions of the communi-
cation sublime.18 Moreover, because there can be many interpretations of how to
realise forceful fantasies, we can be certain that large parts of the evolution of
technology will be marked by tension and conflict over which direction to take.
The observant reader will have noticed a potential danger in my approach, and
it is one that I would like to defuse before continuing with the excavation of
myths of the communication sublime that are located in the evolution of media
technology. By focusing on the persistent nature of necessary fictions and their
power to guide technologists in the direction of what is perceived as ‘that which
works’, the reader might object, there is a risk of reintroducing a teleologically
constructed view on technological development. This risk looms large because,
as film historian Frank Kessler argued in ‘Het idee van vooruitgang in de media-
geschiedschrijving’ [‘The idea of progress in media historiography’] (2002),
describing similarities in different technological artefacts (both diachronically
and synchronically) raises the problem of assuming the existence of transhistori-
cally preserved ‘true’ identities of media technologies that ultimately emerge.19
Such a view, Kessler contends, would render invisible the vastly heterogeneous
pragmatic conditions and functioning of those technologies, and would retroac-
tively reconstruct a new teleology (Kessler 2002: 19, 22). To counter the tendency
to find a goal-oriented purpose in media development, Kessler proposes to use
the concept of the dispositif 20 to describe the ‘differences that hide behind the
apparent identity of separate media’, which in turn reveal themselves in the speci-
fic constellations of a technology, its modes of addressing its users, and its tex-
tual form (ibid.: 21). Using such a perspective, Kessler writes, we would be able to
see that, for instance, the dispositif of mobile telephony (despite overlapping
characteristics) is very much dissimilar to that of ‘traditional telephony’, mainly
because of differences in mobility and in the nature of sent messages (ibid.: 21-
22). In other words, it would be quite inattentive to postulate that mobile tele-
phony is naturally a newer (and hence better) form of older telephonic technol-
ogy, and shares the same basic identity.
While I wholeheartedly agree that looking for similarities between media, even
when their differences are stressed, runs the risk of foregrounding induced media
identities, I would contend that this is not what I do. My object of study is not the
similarities or identities themselves, but the desire to see similarities and identities.
By using an evolutionary perspective on the development of communication tech-
nology while focusing on myths of ideal communication, I intend to expose tele-
ological thinking rather than practice it myself. Moreover, the principles of
evolution allow me to highlight the histories of technological artefacts that in
some way illuminate how the discursive formation of communication improve-
ment is constructed, but that at the same time are considered to be ‘dead media’
within the dominant teleological mindset (Sterling 2006a: 57). This does not
mean that the conceptual framework of the dispositif should be dismissed. With-
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out describing dispositifs in too much detail, in what follows I will at irregular
intervals stress that these serve well as descriptive concepts with which the struc-
tural boundaries of the many branches in the evolution of communication tech-
nology can be distinguished.
Myths of ideal communication in media evolution
We might say that, inasmuch as ‘media’ are media of communication, the emergence of a
new medium is always the occasion for the shaping of a new community or set of com-
munities, a new equilibrium. (Lisa Gitelman & Geoffrey B. Pingree 2003: xv)
I am now in the position to give an account of the media environments and myths
of ideal communication that have continuously oriented and pervaded the process
of media evolution. Although I will travel through media history roughly chrono-
logically, I am working from the premise that many media dispositifs form con-
stellations whose boundaries are fluid, extending beyond rigid sequential
structures. Following Zielinski’s later work on media archaeology, my intention
here is to understand these media constellations as ‘spaces of action for con-
structed attempts to connect what is separated’ (Zielinski 2006a: 7). In other
words, I see them as embodiments of the numerous material manifestations of
myths of ideal communication. Unlike Zielinski, however, whose expeditions are
primarily aimed at uncovering the new in the old and not at exposing media topoi,
I will make my primary analytical cuts at points where the boundaries of media
constellations are typically represented as clear-cut, as stable conceptions of me-
dia that are aimed at preserving the perception that each new medium constitutes
a particular phase in the process of ever-improving communication technology.
Each cut will therefore focus on dominant media manifestations, in which myths
of ideal communication are located in the imaginative prefiguring, development,
marketing, adoption, and use of specific technologies.
For comparative purposes, the analytical cuts are concise and directed at unco-
vering hopeful expectations and predictions. This means that I will not describe
in detail the many anxieties and fears that also accompanied the advent of new
media, although at times I will show that such negative reactions themselves have
functioned as a backdrop against which newer (and thus ‘even better’) technolo-
gies were being positioned. The focus lies on five media constellations, respec-
tively: the telegraphic, the telephonic, the radiographic, the televisual, and the
Internet constellation. In each constellation I will describe the various actors,
technologies, motives, and myths of ideal communication that played their parts
in orienting media evolution, and show that these myths moved dynamically
across constellations. As we will see, recurrent discursive elements in the neces-
sary fictions of communication improvement consist of topoi of world peace, ulti-
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mate understanding, cultural and social unification, unlimited progress, a return
to a pre-Babel existence, the sharing of a universal language, a relief of all anxiety,
the realisation of utopia, and so forth; these are all very much recognisable from
the analysis of notions of progress and idealised ideas of communication in chap-
ters 1 and 2. Despite the fact that these hopes and dreams have all been denied by
reality, they keep resurfacing and keep setting agendas for further development.
The telegraphic constellation: building the network paradigm
In the semantic field of communication, locating the starting point of mediated
communication is arbitrary. From an evolutionary perspective, there can actually
be no single beginning at all: there are always antecedents. We could suggest that
the lineage of communication technology can be traced back to the time when
people started to send messengers (human or animal) across distances farther
than a human voice could carry. Or, taking the need for a physical carrier out of
the equation, to the moment that beacon fires, clouds of smoke, flags, or other
materials were used for the very first time to instantaneously transmit signals to
distant observers. Whatever the means, though, the goal or desire was always to
bridge space and time. It is the most powerful myth of communication: no dis-
tance should be an obstacle for communication to take place.
Up until the beginning of the seventeenth century, the distance over which
optical communication systems could reasonably be expected to function was
limited by what a (sharp) human eye could see; after the arrival of Galileo’s tele-
scope, this limit increased to about 30 kilometres. Around the same time, theories
were being explored around the theme of instant and unlimited communication
at a distance which involved ‘magnetic forces’ to construct a signalling system.
Inspired by the writings of Giambattista della Porta, the Italian Famianus Strada,
for instance, wrote in 1617 that by magnetising two compass needles it would be
possible to have them move in rapport, thus establishing a channel over which
one could ‘express all the sentiments of your mind’ to a ‘friend who is far distant’
(Strada 1617 cited in Holzmann & Pehrson 1994: 41). Although such musings
were primarily imaginative concoctions that arguably belong to the realm of
‘non-inventions’ (ibid.: 40), they do vividly convey how ideas of idealised commu-
nication tell of eliminating distance, and of opening up a media space where
there can be an almost telepathic and uninhibited exchange of thoughts or feel-
ings. Moreover, writes Zielinksi, such fantastical narrative constellations always
‘signify something’ about the twilight realm that is the world of media: ‘the rela-
tionship between what is imagined and what in fact exists, between (mere) fan-
tasy and (actual) reality is fluid, unstable’ (Zielinski 2006b: 29).
While media conceptualisations like those of Della Porta and Strada charac-
terised the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century socio-cultural imagination of
what communication could be like if it were freed from its carrier, their suggested
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use of long-distance communication technologies was primarily of a romantic
nature. This perception of communication did not correspond with the strategic
functionality that had typified the use of optical devices up to that time. In Win-
ston’s terminology, for a long time there were no supervening social necessities
that asked for a functional transformation of the ad-hoc and utilitarian make-up
of existing long-distance communication systems. Necessities, however, changed
significantly at the end of the eighteenth century in France, stirred by the Revolu-
tion. At the heart of these necessities lay the desire for increased speed of com-
munication: the French Enlightenment ideal to implement a unified and national
identity called for a unification of language as well as for the means to quickly
organise and consolidate that unity. This project was perfectly in tune with the
creation of the semaphore telegraph by Claude Chappe. With help from his
brother Ignace, who had been elected to the French Legislative Assembly and had
arranged for Claude to have his idea approved and subsidised, Chappe set out to
devise ‘a simple method for rapidly communicating over great distances, anything
that could be the subject of a correspondence’ (Chappe 1792 cited in Holzmann &
Pehrson 1994: 56). While emphasising the gain in speed that the new communi-
cations system would bring, Chappe also stressed the advantages of near simulta-
neous communication: ‘It offers a reliable way of establishing a correspondence
by which the legislative branch of the government could send its orders to our
frontiers, and receive a response from there while still in session’ (ibid.). A long-
ing and need for real-time communication is clearly visible in Chappe’s line of
thinking, propagated by both military and scientific motives. His system, which
consisted of towers that were placed at regular intervals and that supported a set
of rotating arms with which hundreds of symbols could be encoded, was subse-
quently built and appropriated to explicitly support the Republic’s cause: use swift
and standardised communication to defend the borders and to write a shared
‘Republican language’ onto the mental landscape of the French people (Flichy
1995: 14).
Even though in regular use the Chappe telegraph system was mostly assigned a
military and political function, and ordinary citizens had very little access
(Headrick 2000: 197-198), it contributed greatly to the popular idea of the possi-
bility of instant communication, which characterised the European utopianism of
that time. The notion that new technologies could play an important role in rea-
lising that idea was widespread; Chappe was most certainly not the only one
occupied with enhancing technological devices that could quickly transmit sig-
nals. Many amateur inventors in many countries did the same, either in fiction or
with concrete experimentation (Lardner & Bright 1867: 39-44). Out of these
experimentations, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, came another
possibility of speeding up communications. Magnetism and dynamic electricity
re-emerged as means to transmit information over a distance, but this time in
scientifically much more viable ways than described by Della Porta and Strada. A
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new paradigm for swift and simultaneous communication appeared at the hori-
zon in the form of the electric telegraph, which, according to communications
theorist James W. Carey, ‘permitted for the first time the effective separation of
communication from transportation’ (Carey 1989: 203). Although this observa-
tion is, in light of Chappe’s semaphore telegraph, not quite true, the instanta-
neous character of electricity and electrical communication technologies did
spark a feverish belief in the seemingly limitless possibilities of ‘communication
without embodiment, contact achieved by the sharing of spiritual (electrical)
fluids’ (Peters 1999: 139). The rhetoric of the ‘electrical sublime’ was filled with
notions of communication utopias; as Carolyn Marvin writes, ‘[t]he power of new
electrical technologies to effect effortless intimacy between friends was perhaps
the commonest of all prophetic themes about communication’ (Marvin 1988:
154). The advantages to be gained by using electric instead of optical telegraphy
were stated quite clearly in familiar obstacle-removing and thus communication-
improving language: less costly to build, greatly enhanced speed, and no more
‘liability to interruption from misty weather’ (Lardner & Bright 1867: 40).
It did not take long for all kinds of variations of electromagnetic telegraph
systems to evolve from the newly fertilised ground of scientific competence; there
were systems that used galvanometers, ones that worked with electro-chemical
parts, and ones that were powered by electromagnets (Highton 1852; Sabine
1867). Emphasising the idea of ‘good tricks’ in media evolution, these variations
sprang from a diverse group of inventors, all of which were, to a certain degree,
aware of the range of possibilities of electricity. So, while history books often
name Samuel F.B. Morse as the sole inventor of the electric telegraph, from an
evolutionary and historically correct point of view he was but one of many. What
does make Morse, as well as his British contemporaries William Cooke and
Charles Wheatstone, stand out from other experimenters, is that in the 1840s
they were the first to successfully commercially exploit a fully functional telegraph
system. Whereas the optical telegraph was invariably under exclusive state control
and the first electric telegraphs barely left the laboratory, Cooke and Wheatstone
in England and Morse (and his forgotten assistant Alfred Vail) in the United
States made their telegraph systems readily available for paying customers, and
sought to quickly expand their networks. In both countries, the relation with rail-
way companies was strong; not only did the electric telegraph provide a solution
to the supervening social necessity of railway safety, but both technologies also
complemented each other in conspicuously portraying ongoing technological
progress. Especially in the Unites States, where frontier mythology already drew
heavily from railroad symbology (Schivelbusch 1986), electric telegraphy was
hailed as ‘the nerve of international life, transmitting knowledge of events,
removing causes of misunderstanding, and promoting peace and harmony
throughout the world’ (Anonymous 1868 cited in Standage 1998: 91).
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The perceived mystical characteristics of instantaneous communication
through electric telegraphy influenced popular imagination so strongly that they
seeped into the preferred metaphors that spoke of making contact with any dis-
tant body, including the dead. This is poignantly visible, for instance, in late nine-
teenth-century Spiritualism. As Jeffrey Sconce writes, for the Spiritualist
movement, ‘the bodiless communication of telegraphy heralded the existence of
a land without material substance, an always unseen origin point of transmission
for disembodied souls in an electromagnetic utopia’ (Sconce 2000: 57). Sconce
demonstrates how idealised ideas of communication conjure up visions of an ulti-
mate togetherness, facilitated by a technology that in practice merely established
Morse-encoded point-to-point contacts, but in the social imagination carried with
it the unifying promises of hope, purpose, progress, and the new. Such expectant
ideas were not confined to semi-religious circles, however; in regular everyday use
the electric telegraph also strengthened the notion that it caused a revolution in
the enhancement of social organisation. News poured in more quickly than
before and from ever-more remote locations, thus reinforcing the notion of ‘inter-
nationality’ (Mattelart 2000: 17). Sophisticated ‘telegraph exchanges’ in the 1860s
made the switching of private lines possible and facilitated real-time telegraphic
conversations between banks or lawyers (Standage 1998: 172-173). Businesses
discovered the electric telegraph as a way to track the latest developments of the
stock market on an equal basis, reducing the chances of monopolies (Du Boff
1984: 571-572). Travellers informed their family and friends of their journeys.
People declared their love to each other. The motives for using the telegraph
were, in the end, very similar; they revolved around speeding up communication
and conquering space, for whatever reasons. As long as the obstacles of distance
were seemingly removed and people were connected, the technology was per-
ceived as answering the long-held call for improvement in communication.21
Looking back, telegraphy, both optical and electric, established the basic char-
acteristics of telecommunications technologies: it constituted a growing and
(eventually) permanent network, operated by a specialised technical body, that
facilitated fast communication, encoded in a universal language (Flichy 1995: 31-
32). In this sense, many current telecommunications systems are ‘telegraphic’ in
some respect, and we can point to several nineteenth-century telegraphic equiva-
lents of what are generally perceived as more modern-day technologies.22 It is
furthermore obvious that, despite all the optimistic outlooks, telegraphy did not
bring world peace; perhaps on the contrary, it proved to be a very efficient tool for
those in power to coordinate war efforts and to rule colonies.23 Telegraphy also
did not spread to the masses as quickly as many believed or hoped it would, nor
did it have the inherent capacity to always bring people closer together in blissful
harmony. Because of state monopolies, the requirement of expert knowledge to
operate the technology, and the notion that telegraphic messages should primar-
ily serve non-frivolous purposes, in the early years it was mostly governments, big
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companies, businessmen, and rich individuals that used and had immediate
access to the telegraphic service. Over the course of several decades this had lar-
gely changed, as many post offices had started to offer telegraphic services to the
general public, but competition from the rising telephone system at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century meant that telegraphy remained a technology that
was not used on a day-to-day basis by ordinary people. Today, telegraphy has
become almost extinct, and has only survived as a nostalgic and often expensive
way to communicate.24 Its myths, however, remained very much alive, and
quickly resurfaced during the development of telephony.
The telephonic constellation: getting personal
While electric telegraphy gained momentum in the second half of the nineteenth
century, experimentation with electricity and magnetism continued. Because the
true nature of the power of these natural forces was still very much unknown –
which made them daunting and tempting at the same time – there were many
wonderful dreams of what their application could be. It is not surprising to see
that among them was the idea to use electricity to transmit speech, a notion
clearly informed by the age-old desire to communicate from afar; as telephony’s
first historian Herbert Casson determinedly writes, the invention of electric
speech ‘was the result of a persistent and deliberate search’ (Casson 1910: 13).
Just as optical mechanisms had been used for some time to artificially extend the
eye, techniques like yelling or technologies such as speaking tubes or string tele-
phones25 had been well-known ways to extend the voice; unsurprisingly, electri-
city and the success of the electric telegraph caused new and heightened levels of
expectation that these extensions could be improved. The environment to which
the idea of transmitting speech by electricity sought to adapt itself was not
entirely favourable, though. Many experts in the field of telegraphy, for instance,
thought it was impossible and rather sought to improve the transmitting capacity
of telegraph wires instead. The history of the invention of the telephone is there-
fore one that is often charged with anecdotes that tell of persistence in the face of
great hardship and of accidental discoveries that proved to be fundamental break-
throughs. The reality is that telephonic devices slowly evolved through technolo-
gical tinkering by many experimenters, and from the 1850s onwards appeared in
many ways and forms.
The person who is credited as the first to have constructed a working telepho-
nic system is the Italian inventor Antonio Meucci, who is believed to have done so
as early as 1849 (Catania 2003: 111). His work, however, did not gain much public
nor scientific attention, mostly because of his financial troubles.26 Then there is
Charles Bourseul, a Belgian-born French telegraphist and inventor, who is often
mentioned as being among the first to describe a feasible mechanism for convert-
ing sound waves into electrical signals (Du Moncel 1879: 13-14). Although he
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himself did not work on an actual machine, Bourseul’s 1854 proposal was read by
numerous scientists, propagating the electric speech meme like pollen grains in
the wind. One of the responsive receptors was professor of physics Johann
Philipp Reis, who built several prototypes of what he called the ‘Telephon’ during
1858 to 1864 (Aitken 1939: 17-18). His inventions were not quite suitable for elec-
trically transmitting speech,27 but they did lend scientific credence to the actual
possibility of doing so. It is also highly conceivable that Elisha Gray, Alexander
Graham Bell, and Thomas Edison, the inventor-entrepreneurs usually associated
with the ‘true’ invention of the telephone, all knew of Reis’ devices, and had
started to build upon his or similar findings (Coe 1995). We could therefore say
that, by the 1870s, the coming of the telephone was in the air, even though there
was no particular demand from the general public, let alone from the growing
telegraph business. Applying newly gathered electromagnetic knowledge to build
a telephonic device was an ambiguous quest, one in which experimenters had to
divide their focus between advancing science on the one hand, and meeting the
needs of the growing telegraphic market on the other hand by improving already
existing telegraphic solutions.
It is worth pointing out here the motives of Gray and Bell, the two adversaries
whose caveat and patent application for a telephonic device were both filed on 14
February 1876, separated by only a few hours.28 Gray, who was an expert in tele-
graphic technology and worked most of his time on perfecting the ‘harmonic
telegraph’ (with which multiple messages could be sent through the same wire),
had discovered a way to transmit speech, but he was rather reserved about what
its profitable application could be. Bell, on the other hand, while pressed by his
sponsors to also work on multiplex telegraphy, did have a clear idea of the advan-
tages of telephony, and secretly dreamt of and worked on improving the telegraph
by replacing it with a ‘voice-carrying machine’ (Casson 1910: 25; Watson 1926:
62-63). So, while the invention of the telephone is often portrayed as a purely
accidental event that occurred while Gray and Bell were working on something
else, this apparent contingency is misplaced; both men were very much aware of
what they were doing, and it was Bell who was most captivated by the dream of
improving communication through technological means. A year after Bell (and
his ever-faithful assistant Watson) had managed to capitalise on his patent and
construct a working telephone, he advertised its advantages as such:
1) No skilled operator is required, but direct communication may be had by
speech without the intervention of a third person.
2) The communication is much more rapid, the average number of words
transmitted in a minute by the Morse sounder being from fifteen to twenty, by
telephone from one to two hundred.
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3) No expense is required, either for its operation or repair. It needs no battery
and has no complicated machinery. It is unsurpassed for economy and simpli-
city. (Bell 1877 cited in Casson 1910: 53)
Bell here clearly appealed to the susceptible sentiment for unifying closeness
through improved communication. The emphasis on the ease and directness of
telephonic communication is evident, as is the positioning of the new medium as
being superior to older technology. The impact that this act of idealising commu-
nication has on the human psyche is not to be underestimated; as Colin Cherry
writes, by offering the availability of a true conversation – which according to
Cherry is ‘an essential human relationship’ – Bell’s telephone promised to help
‘resolve uncertainties, doubts, or anxieties and give greater assurance’ (Cherry 1971:
49, emphasis in original). This does not mean that social bonding was the logical
object of its primary use; the telephone first became a business tool once it had
overcome the inevitable growing pains that are typical of all fledgling network
technologies, and even when it had entered the homes of tens of thousands of
ordinary people, it was for a long time thought of as for serious use only (Fischer
1992: 66). Nevertheless, the telephone’s inherent capacity to bridge space virtually
instantaneously and connect people in a natural conversation was strategically
used in advertisements for strengthening the idea that communication had
indeed improved.29 Whether it was for business, groceries, or social cohesion, a
telephone call signalled communicative progress. This was achieved not so much
by inherently reducing misunderstanding, but by offering a sense of what I would
call ‘assurance within reach’: the conviction that the ever-expanding telephone
network would be at hand to come to the rescue, quicker than ever before, in
case someone wanted to be heard or get informed. Spoken dialogue from afar
was now finally possible; maybe not as ideal as in a Socratic face-to-face config-
uration,30 but nevertheless providing an improvement over telegraphic conversa-
tions.
It should be noted that this affordance of connecting people in dialogue was
not yet visible in Bell’s early demonstrations of his device. Although his intention
had been to make two-way conversation possible over long distances, his first
experimental telephones in 1876 were technically limited to transmission in one
way only (Aronson 1977: 20). This forced Bell and Watson, in their probing of
supervening social necessities, to give what we now would call broadcasting per-
formances, in which they sent music, news, and dramatic plays over the wires.
They continued to stage these entertaining demonstrations even after they had
perfected two-way communication, mainly because it earned them a lot of easy
money (ibid.: 20-23). The upshot of this was that in the popular mind an addi-
tional dispositif of telephony was envisioned, one in which its use became asso-
ciated with the ability to call in on operas or to subscribe to regularly scheduled
news or entertainment programmes – services that were indeed available in cities
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such as London and Budapest from the early 1890s until the 1920s (Marvin 1988:
209-216; Briggs 1977).31 Quicker than the newspaper and more readily available
than a private telegraph, such telephonic systems prefigured the idea of radio
broadcasting, carrying with it a sense of communally connecting to others.
Eventually, the conversational model of the telephone prevailed. With further
improvements implemented (most notably the exchange switchboard and Pupin
loading coils, which greatly increased the connectivity and dimension of the net-
work) and steady expansions taking place in many countries,32 the telephone sys-
tem evolved into the universal service that Bell and his company’s president
Theodore Newton Vail had envisaged, connecting even the most rural locations
to the growing global network (Pool et al. 1977: 130-132). Advertisements for the
service evolved with it, strengthening myths of improved communication that
held that universality in connectedness is a ‘good trick’. Until the mid-1920s, tele-
phony was praised most for its practicality in situations of housekeeping, emer-
gencies, and business deals, thus stressing the improvement of instrumental
communication as the telephone’s ‘natural’ purpose (Fischer 1992: 65-69). It was
only after telephone executives had decided that social use of the telephone,
which had soared ever since the beginning of the twentieth century, was not tri-
vial and actually represented a valuable market, that ads began to focus on pre-
senting non-instrumental reasons for having a telephone. The underlying gist of
the message of these telephonic ads, however, remained the same: connect to the
growing network, enhance your communication possibilities, make sure that you
can reach out or can be reached when necessary, for whatever reason. As explic-
itly visible in the work of Casson, the idea that new technologies could further
promote harmony was strongly present; at the end of his book on the history of
the telephone, he writes: ‘Who could have foreseen what the telephone bells have
done to ring out the old ways and to ring in the new; to ring out delay and isola-
tion and to ring in the efficiency and the friendliness of a truly united people?’
(Casson 1910: 298).33 Much more than telegraphy had done, telephony and its
myths signified a slice of modernity available to the masses, promising to trans-
form its users into earthbound angels that could be in electrical contact with any-
one else.
Today, it would strike us as odd to think of the fixed telephone as a device that
provides an extraordinary, transcendental experience of communication. Because
of its ubiquity, ease of use, and capacity to connect people in dialogue, it has
become a mundane, almost taken-for-granted way of connecting to other people;
so much so, in fact, that it is easily forgotten, for instance, that the global infra-
structure of this ‘old’ technology made possible – and still supports – large por-
tions of the infrastructure of the Internet, that other global telecommunications
system that is surrounded by myths of improved communication. Practically gone
are the claims that international telephony would bring about world peace by
making us all equals, aided by the development of a ‘common language, or com-
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mon understanding of languages’ (Pool et al. 1977: 128-129). Telephone users did
not suddenly want to reach unknown others purely because there was a potential
connection; instead, the telephone became a great tool for maintaining existent
networks, even if these had expanded greatly under the influence of, for instance,
urbanisation. Misunderstandings also did not subside; moreover, while people
can enjoy the bliss of talking to each other while physically separated, they will at
times also feel the ‘frustrating immateriality of telephonic communication’, which
does not annihilate space but stresses it, and which prevents the conversation
from ever attaining the argumentative closeness of a face-to-face dialogue (Young
2003: 230). However, myths of improved communication remained present in the
evolution of media technologies, especially so with the advent of radio communi-
cation.
The radiographic constellation: magic in the air
In the second half of the nineteenth century, surfing on the waves of triumphantly
hailed achievements in harnessing magnetism and electricity for the benefit of
improving living conditions, there were two separate but soon to be linked prob-
lems that inspired physicists, experimenters, and inventors alike to further inves-
tigate those puzzling electromagnetic powers. The first challenge, which had
already occupied Newton when he studied the characteristics of light, was to
understand how natural forces actually propagated through space, and how they
connected or affected distant physical objects without touching them. The
answer, so it seemed, lay in postulating the existence of the æther, which was
believed to merge together and make possible the forces of light and electromag-
netism.34 Even though the plausibility of the theory of the æther was questioned
and disproved at the turn of the twentieth century,35 its mythical attractiveness
was strong enough to spur metaphysical speculations about universal communi-
cation. Conceived of as an invisible, omnipresent ‘fluid’ or force field that could
carry waves and vibrations across endless distances, the æther promised tele-
pathic-like connections to anyone, anywhere (Czitrom 1982: 65).
Apart from these scientific agendas that were set by myths of unlimited com-
munication, there was a second incentive for engaging in experiments with the
electromagnetic spectrum, one that was informed by the very pragmatic desire to
improve electric telegraphy by removing its dependency on poles and wires.
Already at its inception it was clear that the electric telegraph network could only
grow as much as its physical linkages would allow, and that its connective poten-
tial would increase almost infinitely if material constraints were to be taken away.
In the years following the successful commercial exploitation of telegraphy,
therefore, attempts were made to establish reliable telegraphic contact by natural
conduction, either through water or the air. Just as Bell had deliberately sought to
improve telegraphy by making the transmission of human speech possible, so did
3. the rise… and rise of media technology 111
the prospect of improving telegraphy yet again prompt further experimentation. It
was a matter of time before the memes of this technological project would meet
up with those of research on the æther. Considering its suspected omnipresence
and unlimited power to carry signals to anywhere in the universe, it is no wonder
that – especially in popular imagination – the æther had acquired a mystical over-
tone that held within it all the promises of instantaneous and seamless commu-
nication. If the æther could be utilised for transferring waves of information, it
was thought, it would enable people to be in perfect rapport, without obstacles.
At this junction between scientific research and the age-old drive to improve
existing communication means, we find a constellation of well-known and les-
ser-known figures, all of which have in various ways attributed to the develop-
ment of wireless telegraphy, and later of wireless telephony or radio.36 On the
scientific side, it was James Clerk Maxwell, a Scottish mathematician and physi-
cist, who in 1864 unified the knowledge of his day on the behaviour of electricity
and magnetism into a single set of equations, forming a ‘crucial element in the
ground of scientific competence’ that lay at the base of ‘all post-telegraph tele-
communications technologies’ (Winston 1998: 33). It was not until 1887 that
German physicist Heinrich Hertz managed to demonstrate the validity of
Maxwell’s theory, after having improved the theory to make it account for his
own discoveries on the nature of electromagnetic waves. Hertz was not alone in
studying these waves; three years after Hertz’s experiments, French inventor
Edouard Branly built a basic device for detecting the alternating current of radio
signals that in later years proved to be a very useful tool for building radio sets. All
these developments took place in laboratory conditions, however, and were not
intended to be used in the creation of new and commercially viable technology
systems. Notice, however, how at this point the imaginative mindset, occupied by
the desire to capitalise on the advent of new technologies, revived old promises of
communication improvement by emphasising the latent possibilities of those new
radio technologies. In 1892, Sir William Crookes37 published a highly influential
article entitled ‘Some possibilities of electricity’, in which he foresaw ‘the bewil-
dering possibility of telegraphy without wires, posts, cables, or any of our present
costly appliances’ with which ‘two friends living within the radius of sensibility of
their receiving instruments […] could thus communicate as long and as often as
they pleased’ (Crookes 1892: 174-175). This, he claimed, was ‘no mere dream of a
visionary philosopher’ because
[a]ll the requisites needed to bring it within the grasp of daily life are well
within the possibilities of discovery, and are so reasonable and so clearly in
the path of researches which are now being actively prosecuted in every capital
of Europe that we may any day expect to hear that they have emerged from the
realms of speculation into those of sober fact. (Ibid.: 176)
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Crookes, then, by using his knowledge of existing scientific competence, and,
critically, by envisaging wireless telegraphy as a signalling technology, set the
agenda, and redirected the first generation of radio inventors in a teleological
manner to the familiar fertile breeding grounds that lie at the crossroads between
technological development and communication improvement. To be sure,
Crookes was not the only one at that time to ponder the future of wireless com-
munication, but his article provides a rich illustration of how popular imagination
of communication progress was stirred in a way that was entirely in tune with late
nineteenth-century technological triumphalism.
A few years after Crookes’ speculative vision, several inventors (Alexandre
Popov in Russia, Henry Jackson in England, and Guglielmo Marconi in Italy) con-
currently managed to arrive at working wireless telegraphic devices, using their
knowledge of Hertzian waves and Sir Oliver Lodge’s improvements of the Branly
receiver.38 It was by chance, perhaps, that Marconi was the first to do so (he con-
ducted his experiments in 1894 and 1895, whereas Popov and Jackson tested their
systems in 1896), but he was certainly the one most obsessed with increasing the
distance over which he could send and receive wireless signals,39 and with find-
ing a social use for his device (Aitken 1976: 191). Both these obstacles were over-
come when Marconi observed that ‘the higher the pole the greater would be the
mileage’ (Dunlap 1937: 48-49), and subsequently, with help from his English
mother, set up his own business and offered his wireless telegraphy services to
the British navy. Especially in maritime environments his technology was a suc-
cess, despite its perceived drawback that it could not provide the shielded point-
to-point connections that Marconi originally was after. The inherent affordances
of wireless telegraphy would become painfully evident with the Titanic disaster in
1912, which marked a dubious high point of what Marconi’s invention had
brought the world; the possibility of ubiquitous contact could save people from
death, take away anxiety for people at home, but also create a cacophony of radio
noise as many amateurs filled the æther with their messages. The development of
communication technologies, clearly, knows many rocky roads and setbacks, but
in myths of improved communication, these are often forgotten or made invisi-
ble.
All the while, the evolution of communications technology continued. Pro-
pelled by subsequent work by English electrical engineer John Ambrose Fleming
and American inventors Reginald Fessenden and Lee de Forest, wireless telegra-
phy at the beginning of the twentieth century had evolved a branch into the direc-
tion of transmitting wireless speech, emulating the two-step process from electric
telegraphy to wired telephony. Myths of improved communication received a new
boost, as components to build a radio became readily available in the 1910s, and
wireless technology was embraced by enthusiastic amateurs who were lured by
reinvigorated promises of instantaneous free communication. It was more than
just scientists and news reporters that hailed the æther as the all-connecting me-
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dium and wireless technology as its nervous system; now, anyone with a radio set
could enter an all-accessible communication space, where radio would spread
‘mutual understanding to all sections of the country, unifying our thoughts,
ideals, and purposes, making us a strong and well-knit people’ (Frost 1922: 18).
The wonder of instantaneously sending and receiving at a distance via invisible
and all-penetrating radio waves fuelled the desire to cross immense distances. To
many radio enthusiasts, it did not matter what they were listening to; the sheer
possibility of reaching out and touching someone was enough to spend countless
nights ‘DXing’, searching the radio spectrum for distant voices.40 The prospect of
stumbling upon alien signals sparked a true Mars-mania, for ‘contacting Mars
would be the high priority of the new radio future and the ultimate “catch” of DX
fishing’ (Sconce 2000: 102).
The properties of radio seemed to perfectly encapsulate the recurrent dream of
universal and direct communication, which had already been intensified by the
improved point-to-point communication of the telegraph and telephone. More-
over, whereas those latter two technologies predominantly provided individual
mediated closeness, radio added a new, more public communicative dimension.
It was not just telegraphy or telephony without wires; everyone with a receiver
could tune in and feel connected to a virtual community. Because of the messianic
character of live broadcasting, the popular idea took hold that radio could be a
tool to establish social cohesion and world peace, bringing direct democracy and
global harmony to the people. Universal enlightenment, as nineteenth century’s
‘ultimate visionary crank’ Nikola Tesla saw it, ‘could be incarnated in the all-per-
vading waves of the wireless’; for him, there finally was a technical solution to all
the problems of communication (Davis 1998: 69, 72). Early forecasts of and
experiences with radio broadcasting, in short, expanded the understanding of
improved communication to include the possibility of ubiquitous speech, and
with it the power to gather people into a single, harmonious, even utopian
society.
But, as with telegraphy and telephony, such idealised ideas of communication
were never truly realised; they primarily remained strategically used discursive
arguments to give radio technology its momentum. During the First World War
and in the following years, a new dispositif of radio emerged and gained in dom-
inance. While the dissemination of ‘we-ness’ at first had been the result of ad-hoc
networking by amateurs, in many countries around the world the power of
instantaneously reaching large audiences became the monopoly of governments,
the military, and media corporations, forcing amateurs into a small segment of
the radio spectrum. Two-way radio communication chiefly made way for one-way
entertainment, lectures, and news programmes, causing a disgruntled Bertolt
Brecht to remark that ‘the radio should step out of the supply business and orga-
nize its listeners as suppliers’ (Brecht 1964 [1932]: 52). Although what remained
in this new dispositif was radio’s gripping potency to deliver the feeling of absent
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presence, to capture the ‘there and now’ and bring it to the here and now, the
utopian image of radio communication slowly dwindled. It gave way for domesti-
cated electronic kinship, mingled with an acute awareness of distances, reaf-
firmed anonymity, and isolation (Sconce 2000: 62). Today, radio is still a very
powerful and widely used medium – especially in areas and countries where the
telecommunications infrastructure is not strong – but its aura of unhindered
communication potential has subsided. What did not subside, however, is the
recurrent process of the rise and fall of myths of improved communication, as we
will see with the development of television.
The televisual constellation: virtual presence
In his voluminous book Le vingtième siècle [The twentieth century] (1883), the first of a
trilogy on late nineteenth-century visions of the future, French novelist and illus-
trator Albert Robida explored the wonders of electricity and technology to come,
extrapolating many of the vibrant myths of communication of his time to their
supposedly logical outcomes. Writing in a period in which there seemed to be no
end to great discoveries by brilliant inventors, Robida gives us a rich account of
contemporary technological fantasies at work, describing what daily life in the
futuristic 1950s might look like. Among the abundant private ‘aerocars’, tele-
phones – which he predominantly frames within the radio-like dispositif – and
‘photo-paintings’, he also describes the ‘telephonoscope’, with which audio as
well as visual signals could be transmitted. Considering the name he gave to this
new medium, it is very likely that Robida had found inspiration in Punch’s Alma-
nack, a popular magazine that in 1878 had published an illustration by George Du
Maurier, depicting two parents audiovisually conversing with their daughter
through the use of ‘Edison’s telephonoscope’. For Robida, as film and television
historian William Uricchio has noted, the new medium was to be a communica-
tion tool that ‘could bring distant entertainment into the living room, that could
serve as a means of surveillance, and that could serve the mission of “la suppres-
sion de l’absence” by facilitating real-time face-to-face communication over vast
distances’ (Uricchio 2004: 129).
The telephonoscope did not exist at the end of the nineteenth century, but
audiovisual media were fully imagined and expected to be invented soon. Not
only Robida and those working at Punch’s Almanack, but many other people as
well were captured by the popular idea of using electricity to see farther, and they
effortlessly fused existing telecommunications technologies together into new
imaginative devices. These visions were fuelled by the apparent ongoing redemp-
tion of the dream of perfected communication; the transmission of still pictures
via the facsimile telegraph had been a reality since the 1850s, and with the arrival
of the telephone and the cinema the desire to come closer to communication
utopia by not only extending the ear but also the eye gained in force. Thus,
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[t]he discourse of technical knowledge and the discourse of popular utopian
fantasy produced a discourse symbiosis, in which the semantics of the old
utopia and the numerous projects for its technical realization, or technical
projects for picture transmission in general, were speculatively combined with
each other; ‘seeing by electricity’, ‘distant electric vision’ was viewed as
(another) technical miracle, whose realization seemed to have moved closer in
time. (Elsner, Müller & Spangenberg 1994: 110-111)
The histories of audiovisual technology therefore contain a continuous presence
of a familiar reasoning in the evolution of communication technology, through
what could be called a discursive remediation: with each new generation of me-
dia, whether it survives or is stillborn, the promise that communicative utopia is
near is resuscitated and fostered within technological, scientific, and popular dis-
course.
In the genealogy of recording, transmitting, and displaying moving images, we
can distinguish a loosely connected and two-tracked pattern of evolution that is
similar to those of the previous media constellations that have been discussed. On
one track, we find the ongoing scientific research into the characteristics of light,
magnetism, and electricity, in which discoveries were made that later proved to be
suitable for early televisual experiments, but which were not necessarily the result
of intentional attempts to construct such a thing as a ‘television’. Among these
discoveries, all made in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, were the photo-
emissive qualities of selenium, electrons (the parts of the sub-atomic world that
enabled this photoelectric emission to occur), and the cathode-ray tube, with
which those electrons could be made visible to the eye. Instrumental in this phase
as well was the work of Paul Nipkow, who from 1883 to 1885 devised a way to
mechanically scan an image with a spiral-perforated disk, and electronically send
its properties to another rotating disk with which the image could be recon-
structed. Nipkow himself did not pursue the possibilities of his ‘Elektrisches Tel-
eskop’ any further, but, as was the case with the telephone and wireless
signalling, the laboratory findings would eventually be appropriated by others.
This brings us to the second track along which television development evolved,
the one traversed by the visionaries and tinkerers who dreamt of improving exist-
ing means of communication and were trying to make a business out of it. Two of
those inventor-entrepreneurs, Charles Jenkins in the United States and John Logie
Baird in Britain, independently managed to construct working prototypes of elec-
tromechanical television in 1925, using the Nipkow disk design.41 Of the two,
Baird was the most outspoken in emphasising the linear progress he thought he
had made in telecommunications. Publically advertising his ‘televisor’ in 1926
with the theme ‘Television For All’, he referred to the forecast made in 1876 that
‘“seeing by telephone” would follow naturally from “hearing by telephone”’, and
said that now ‘the claim had been justified’ (Baird 1926 cited in Briggs 1977: 47).
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Clearly, Baird’s rhetoric is filled with the typical notion that mediated communi-
cation is improved by simulating face-to-face communication as accurately as
possible. By describing it as a natural process that mediated hearing would be
followed by mediated seeing, he uses the familiar strategic discursive pattern of
myths of progress. The storyline is that it was inevitable that television would
come to be, as it provided a better opportunity to be present where we are not, to
get to know things we could not know before, to finally communicate in the way
we are ‘naturally’ used to. For Baird and his enthusiastic contemporaries, new
technologies like television promised to let us take yet another seemingly logical
step along the path towards the fulfilment of our communicative potential.
As with earlier media constellations, this was a widely held belief. Stressing
the presence of ‘good tricks’ in technology evolution, Jenkins and Baird were not
the only ones taking on the quest to commercially exploit the desire and techno-
logical possibility for the transmission of audiovisual material, nor did their tech-
nical approach represent the only possible way to do so. Concurrently with the
attempts to find an electromechanical solution, there were experiments with all-
electronic methods to capture and display moving images. Proposals for such
electronic systems had been made in 1908 by the English physicist Campbell
Swinton, while, unbeknownst to Swinton, a year before that the Russian engineer
Boris Rosing had actually already constructed an electronic receiver (Abramson
1987: 26). The ground of scientific competence for making electronic television
work was thus well established in the 1920s. In 1923, the Russian Vladimir
Zworykin, one of Rosing’s former students who had fled to the United States,
showed his employers at Westinghouse Electric that electronic television was fea-
sible, and he improved the system at the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in
1933 by developing the iconoscope (Zielinski 1999: 140-142, 168). During the
1930s, direct comparisons between electromechanical and all-electronic solutions
showed that the former had become a non-viable evolutionary branch, delivering
Zworykin the title of inventor of television. Again, though, it must be noted, there
were many more scientists and technical enthusiasts who published or worked on
electrical television; the idea had for a long time been in the air, sustaining the
myths of communication and technology that had accompanied many of televi-
sion’s antecedents. Without Zworykin, televisual systems would undoubtedly have
still been developed.
Seen from a communication perspective, it may strike some as odd to include
television in this overview of media constellations, as today’s general experience
of the medium is predominantly dictated by unidirectional broadcasting of enter-
tainment, news reports, and the like. However, this conception of television as
‘radio with pictures’ is but one of several possible dispositifs that were contem-
plated during its various development phases. Robida’s stories and illustrations
show that the old desire to see at a distance did not only express itself in enter-
tainment or surveillance scenarios, but was also intimately connected to future
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visions of interpersonal communication. Especially in the years before the 1920s,
when the idea of broadcasting had not yet been fully institutionalised, perfecting
point-to-point communication was thought to be the logical route for media
development, and therefore enhancing the telephone with live and moving
images was seen as a useful addition to this medium’s ability to construct a feel-
ing of being present (Elsner, Müller & Spangenberg 1994: 112, 122). Once the first
working televisual devices were finally announced in the mid-1920s, the utopian
fantasies of being able to see as well as talk to someone far away were given a
renewed stimulus, both in popular imagination and in laboratory research. Some
of the well-known movies of the 1920s and 1930s, such as Up the ladder (Slo-
man 1925), Metropolis (Lang 1927) and Modern times (Chaplin 1936), con-
tain paradigmatic examples of how two-way televisual communication systems
were expected to develop and become commonplace in many areas (Koszarski
1998: 129-131).42 These fictional visions quickly engendered real-life counterparts;
both AT&T in the United States and the Reichspost in Germany introduced ‘Bild-
fernsprecher’ (or ‘picture phones’) from 1936 to 1940 (Reuter 1990: 210). After a
few years, however, these experiments were ended because of a general lack of
interest from the public (Elsner, Müller & Spangenberg 1994: 126).
The troubled track record of the picture phone dispositif provides an exception-
ally good case in point that myths of improved communication can linger on in
the course of media evolution, but do not automatically transform day-to-day tele-
communication practices once the necessary components for realising those
myths can be manufactured technically.43 Although up to today there have been
countless other attempts in many countries at launching vision-enhanced tele-
phony, and although future visions of communication continue to stress the topos,
videophoning continues to be used in niche markets only.44 Still, myths persist,
in dead, near-dead, and in living media. Instead of in the addition of moving
images to telephony, television found its strongest supervening social necessities
in the same domain as where radio had been operative since the end of the 1920s,
namely the broadcasting of news bulletins, entertainment, sports events, and edu-
cational programmes. As with radio, a ‘fantasy […] of imaginary unity with
“absent” others’ sprang from the use of television, based on the idea that millions
of people watched the same programme or were aware of the same events hap-
pening in the world (Spigel 1992: 116). The feeling of ‘we-ness’, which was
already being broadcast across countries and continents by radio, was now
visually beamed live into the living room on several channels. According to media
theorist Rudolf Arnheim, one of the early scholars to theorise the medium of tele-
vision, this visual extension of our social network could bring about the aware-
ness of ‘the place where we are located as one of many’, making us ‘more modest,
less egocentric’ (Arnheim 1957: 194). Arnheim was not the only one to voice such
expectations; in his book The outlook for television (1932), Orrin E. Dunlap refers to
television as a ‘new medium of friendship’, one that would obliterate suspicions
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and let ‘the inhabitants of the earth […] see how their fellow men live on the other
side of the globe’ (Dunlap 1932: 229). Here is the familiar adage that to get to
know the other is a good thing, and that technology provides the binding glue; it
is the belief that the harnessing of electricity, the conquest of the æther and the
use of the broadcasting properties of radio and television would eventually lead to
a society free from prejudice and misunderstanding, dissolving all barriers and
thus advancing utopian images of social harmony, democracy, and world peace.
It should not be a surprise to see that all these hopeful expectations eventually
subsided. Especially in the United States, where the leading radio networks
(which were predominantly in control of television’s development) did not want
to repeat the same mistake they had made in initially failing to recognise radio’s
commercial potential, television had been destined to broadcast entertainment,
not to function as a unifying communications tool (Boddy 1990: 16). Entertain-
ment is now one of the core businesses of television networks in many countries
all over the world and, despite globalisation trends, television often reproduces
and stresses national identities that are taken for granted (Desaulniers 1986). The
fantasies of being able to control whatever images were displayed on the screen
also turned out to be illusory; not only did television prove to be a much more
difficult device to build than the radio, restricting the scope of conceptual contri-
butions by amateurs, but commercial networks and state-related institutions
invariably took full governance of broadcasts, limiting free access to production
and distribution. Since the second half of the twentieth century, the television
viewer has been engulfed by a myriad of channels, which has reduced the chances
of sharing viewing experiences and maintaining a feeling of ‘we-ness’. Television
offers a global collection of views on local cultures instead of constructing a
McLuhanesque global culture,45 and today, with the growing popularity of digital
television and personal video recorders, the individual experience of television is
gaining even more momentum. Soon, though, television’s myths about the uni-
fication of humankind returned in another new communication technology: the
Internet.
The Internet constellation: all together now
With the advent of television in the 1920s and 1930s, the ongoing stream of inno-
vations in telecommunications seemed to have accomplished, for the greater part,
the age-old dream of being able to hear, speak, and see from great distances.
Accelerated by the creation of the electric telegraph, the evolutionary process of
media development – which over the decades had continued to engender new
knowledge, new technical components, and new receptive environments in which
further experimentation could take place – was now poised to extend the three
main communicative senses (hearing, speech, and sight) to a global scale.
Because audio and visual technologies transmitted live signals, and thus facili-
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tated instantaneous and simultaneous access to people and information, they
contributed greatly, in all their various dispositifs, to the momentum of myths of
unison through improved communication.
As part of this ongoing process, as we saw in the utopian expectations of espe-
cially radio and television, the positive outlook on the proximity of social unifica-
tion on a global scale was upheld, motivated by the positivist premise that the
more one knows of one’s place and language amongst many, the more humble
and cooperative one becomes; the ‘dream of re-establishing the pre-Babel “great
human family”’, as Armand Mattelart writes, ‘is present throughout the history of
the imaginary of communication networks’ (Mattelart 2000: 20). In the second
quarter of the twentieth century we can therefore point to a heightened expecta-
tion that the new electronic media could be used to enhance access to knowledge
resources, and improve the exchange of ideas, opinions, signs, and symbols.
Among the thinkers that advocated such positivist ideas was the Belgian Paul
Otlet, often seen as ‘a pioneer both of international organisation and of documen-
tation’ who laid the foundations of what we now would call information science
(Rayward 1975: 3). An idealist but by no means an otherworldly dreamer,46 in
1934 Otlet published his Traité de documentation [Treatise on documentation], a volumi-
nous work in which he proposed to create a documentation system that would be
‘1° universal in its scope; 2° reliable and correct; 3° complete; 4° quick; 5° updated;
6° easy to obtain; 7° compiled in advance and ready to be communicated; 8° acces-
sible to a great number of people’ (Otlet 1934: 6).47 Otlet envisioned that interac-
tion with the system would make use of a form of networked teleconferencing, in
which new media such as film, the gramophone, radio, and television would pro-
vide communication and information to a far better degree than a book could
offer. As he noted, these instruments would make us equal in perfectness and
fullness as to ‘God himself’ (ibid.: 431).
Although Otlet’s detailed technical description of his system would, even by
present-day standards of technological development, make it an unfeasible proj-
ect,48 it shows he was very much swayed by the potential of the new ‘ubiquitous,
universal and eternal’ media of his time to help advance humanity towards a
‘divine state’ of ‘being everywhere, seeing everything, hearing everything and
knowing everything’ (ibid.). He was not alone in harbouring this almost religious,
Teilhardian drive. The idea that proper education and information dissemination,
managed by the newest telecommunication systems, automatically engender a
better world was thriving, influencing many thinkers of the time. A similar tech-
nology-inspired belief in the need for a permanent world encyclopaedia as Otlet’s,
for instance, can be found with H.G. Wells, the English utopian social reformer
who in 1938 wrote that the creation of a universally accessible and ‘complete pla-
netary memory for all mankind’ would constitute ‘a real intellectual unification of
our race’ and ultimately ‘a way to world peace’ (Wells 1938: 86, 88). Around the
same time, and unaware of his European contemporaries, American engineer
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Vannevar Bush valued the importance of improving information management in
much the same way. In an article written in 1939, published in 1945, he proposed
to build a personal networked microfilm system with which scientists could con-
currently store and retrieve documents, and construct ‘associative trails’ between
those documents (Bush 1945).49 As he saw it, such a system might even evolve
into an all-electric version and directly link to the brain, elevating ‘man’s spirit’ by
augmenting his ‘limited memory’ (ibid.).
We thus see that the assumed unifying power of telecommunications technolo-
gies, which had already been touted at the inception of the telegraph and had
accompanied many subsequent technological paradigm shifts, remained to sha-
dow and seep through into the consciousness of a diverse field of scholars, wri-
ters, scientists, and engineers in the twentieth century. The development of the
transistor and of electronic digital computer technology after the Second World
War decidedly increased the awareness that linking people and information
through new media would be a good, even a necessary thing. This became ada-
mantly clear in the 1960s, when time-sharing systems made it possible for several
users to remotely work on the same computer, thus creating a configuration of
information management very similar to the one proposed by Otlet. In that per-
iod, American computer scientist Joseph Licklider, the director of computer
research at the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) who cited Bush as a
great influence on his thinking, wrote a number of illustrious papers in which he
proclaimed that computers would become personal devices (Licklider 1960),
which would be connected to a galactic resource network (Licklider 1965), and
would facilitate the meeting of many interacting minds (Licklider & Taylor 1968).
Licklider, together with his successor at ARPA Robert Taylor, was the funda-
mental initiating force behind the creation in 1969 of ARPANET, the intercon-
nected science community computer network that was predominantly funded by
the American military-industrial complex (Flichy 2007: 41-45). Concurrently,
three other computer networks had been constructed (a nameless network at the
National Physical Laboratory in England, ALOHANET at the University of Hawaii,
and CYCLADES in France), and with a growing number of computers being con-
nected, soon the idea of a network of networks was born. With the development
and large-scale tests of a set of standardised language protocols (known as TCP/
IP, designed by Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn), this super network, or Internet as
it later would be called, became fully operational in 1983. International commu-
nication, largely in the form of e-mail, thrived, as did the storage, retrieval, and
exchange of information. So, the visions of Otlet, Wells, Bush, and Licklider were
for a great part realised, but in a very particular way: because the designers of the
system were also the users, there was no need to cater to the wishes of an external
market; moreover, because there had been no governing body controlling the
direction of development, the technological and communication imaginaries
could simply run free, creating the scientific community’s ideal (ibid.: 35, 63ff).
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After access to the Internet had become commercialised in the middle of the
1980s, the number of host computers and users grew dramatically.50 This growth
could be observed first among the academic communities, and from the mid-
1990s onwards among the general public, with the advent of personal home com-
puters, Internet service providers, and the World Wide Web. The Internet is not
the first or only technological platform with which people can cooperate, share
electronic information or forge ad-hoc virtual communities,51 but ever since the
start of its exponential growth it has dominated the media agenda, becoming a
synonym for the single most effective means to make enlightened progress
towards a unified and better world (Mosco 2004: 91). The fact that anyone with a
connection could freely participate in the social sphere of cyberspace, for
instance, led some early observers to proclaim that the Internet could ‘perhaps
revitalize citizen-based democracy’ (Rheingold 1993: 14), or even create a world
in which ‘all the sentiments and expressions of humanity, from the debasing to
the angelic, are parts of a seamless whole, the global conversation of bits’ (Barlow
1996). The physical world was to be enhanced (or, for futurists like Ray Kurzweil
[1999], even replaced) by the virtual world, blending atoms and bits into a ubiqui-
tous and information-rich mixture, accessible and manageable on the fly, by any-
one, anywhere.52
In the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the unifying
aspect of the Internet became undoubtedly best and most visibly captured under
the heading of ‘Web 2.0’, a hugely popular metaphor which effectively put forth
the notion that the Web had been improved to a new version. The prevalent con-
ception was that there somehow was an ‘old’ version of the Web that had its bugs
and flaws,53 and that those bugs and flaws had now been taken care of. The
power of the Web 2.0 metaphor is such that it tends to blend the many percep-
tions of what kinds of improvements have been made into a single idea: despite
the fact that the term Web 2.0 is also used to designate a technological shift in
how Web pages are now increasingly being built in a dynamic way using pre-
stored data (Boomen 2007), what has come to the fore as its dominant meaning
is the idea that the Web has now become truly social, and that its users are now
participating and collaborating in creative and knowledge-building activities on
an unprecedented scale.54 Notwithstanding the critique that the amassing of per-
sonal information for the benefit of creating an all-encompassing web of knowl-
edge can lead to serious privacy intrusions,55 terms like ‘collective intelligence’
and ‘global brain’ keep resurfacing in present-day Internet myths, and continue
to emphasise that out of intensified cooperation and participation a more demo-
cratic and unified world will emerge (see O’Reilly 2005; Macy & Thompson 2011:
16).
Cooperate, unify, participate, blend. We can see telecommunication’s favourite
topoi at work. The Internet’s connotations of connecting and disclosing, rooted
in idealised ideas of communication that over centuries have co-evolved with me-
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dia technologies, cause well-known glorifications of new media to be reproduced.
They tout the coming of the ‘Omega Point of perfection’, as Mosco aptly remarks
(2004: 75). This allusion to Teilhard de Chardin’s vision of an all-encompassing
knowledge singularity is no surprise, considering that some of the most persis-
tent claims found in discourses of the Internet are that its liberating powers will
fuse all available intelligence (Lévy 1997; Shirky 2010), give everybody equal
opportunities to participate (Shirky 2009), and bring about the end of distance
(Cairncross 1997; Friedman 2005). We have seen very similar proclamations
when telegraphic, telephonic, radiographic, and televisual technologies were
envisioned, developed, advertised, and used. The important thing to note here is
not that these claims are far-fetched, but that they are part of a long tradition of
regarding new communication technologies as the latest step towards the utopian
unification of minds, of combining engineering, regulatory, corporate, and con-
sumer voices in a strategic deployment of utopian discourse. To be sure, this does
not mean that it has always been business as usual, that nothing really changes;
on the contrary, especially the Internet and its capacity to remediate other media
through the digitisation of media content shows that media have no stable iden-
tities, and that their dispositifs are continuously changed to suit new telecommu-
nication paradigms (see Wu 2010). What does not seem to change much, though,
is that new media are initially met with high hopes, before they become mundane
and create room for the expectation of the ‘next big thing’. The following chapter
will delve into the details of the next big thing of today: mobile communication
technology.
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4. Mobile communication dreams
It just makes sense. The more ways you have to connect with the people who matter to
you, the easier it is to stay close. (T-Mobile 2007)
Today, gathering from industry and user accounts, the utopian desire for
improved communication is fulfilled to the fullest yet by mobile communication
devices. Great expectations for what they can do to make our lives better than ever
before – palpably visible in advertisements and press releases but also disguised
in how users motivate their wireless communication behaviour – invariably rely
on the familiar adage that new technologies will finally solve old problems. The
devices have become extremely widespread in a very short time, and are rep-
resented as the seemingly logical, natural, and inevitable outcomes of the ideol-
ogy of improved communication: unlike any other medium before, they let their
users act as both senders and receivers of information, wherever they are, immer-
sing them in a vast network of interconnectedness. While we should remain scep-
tical of such rhetoric, mobile communication devices, even accounting for all the
diversity and complexity in their use, do have, by their sheer presence in numbers,
a generalising effect on how communication is to be understood at the beginning
of the twenty-first century: their pervasiveness has rendered them ordinary, and,
in a sense, invisible; they become our environment as they seamlessly blend into
almost every social activity imaginable, extending, as Castells et al. (2007: 126)
write, ‘the beat of life into ubiquitous interactivity’.
The present chapter zooms in on this most recent branch of communication
technologies in order to apprehend how and where idealised ideas of improved
communication find fertile ground in today’s mobile communication’s dis-
courses. It will do so by building upon the main themes covered in the previous
chapters – ideas of progress and utopia that are projected upon idealised concep-
tions of communication, which in turn express themselves materially in the evo-
lution of media technologies – and by formulating an answer to the question to
what extent the many manifestations of mobile communication technologies and
their popular apprehension, reception, and societal justification employ dis-
courses that harbour forceful fantasies of a progressive path towards ultimate
communication.
First, I will pick up the project of uncovering myths of improved communica-
tion in the evolution of communications technologies, and continue to trace those
myths within the various developmental strands of mobile wireless communica-
tion up to the present day. As with the accounts of media developments described
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in chapter 3, the focus will not so much be on giving a dry enumeration of tech-
nological innovations, but more on how the environmental factors, which facili-
tated the evolutionary developments of mobile wireless communication, were
shadowed and oriented by myths of ideal communication. This will be a short
history of the framework within which beckoning and onrushing futures set the
agendas for creating mobile communication devices. As we will see here, myths
serve to strategically create the impression that there is little difference between
what developers of mobile communication technologies consider to be the right
(and therefore profitable) road to travel, and what the general public are offered
as the latest and ‘naturally’ improved technologies to accommodate their commu-
nication needs.
Next, the discussion will shift to analysing the four characteristics that are typi-
cally ascribed to wireless communication technologies by advertisements and
user accounts, in order to gauge the extent to which idealised ideas of improved
communication are articulated in present-day discourses of mobile communica-
tion. These four characteristics are comprised of the ability to facilitate ubiquitous
connectivity, fluid sociability, real-time relief of anxiety, and omniscience and col-
lectiveness through ever-present knowledge. I will explicate how both the fulfil-
ment and the unintended consequences of the longing for a communication
sublime can be located in the various deployments and appropriations of these
characteristics, and subsequently pinpoint the paradoxes that become articulated
in the incessant drive for communication improvement. As will become clear,
because of their ruthless and pervasive connectivity, mobile communication
devices make us painfully aware, perhaps more so than other communication
media, that the actual achievement of ideal communication is both a blessing
and a curse.
The final section of this chapter will show that the mobile communication con-
dition that we live in today is itself, of course, not exempt from the notion that
there are still communication problems to be solved. By discussing two of the
recent trends that are positioned as representing the next important phase in the
ongoing search for improvement in the development of mobile communication
technology, namely location awareness and the creation of an ‘Internet of
Things’, I argue that myths of ideal communication continue to orient our think-
ing about new communication technologies, and are invariably translated from
older forms of myths so to have them work as solutions for present-day commu-
nication problems. Mobile communication technologies are here to stay, but they
are definitely not the final answer.
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Making communication mobile
Dick: I’ll be at 362-9296 for a while; then I’ll be at 648-0024 for about fifteen minutes;
then I’ll be at 752-0420; and then I’ll be home, at 621-4598.
Yeah, right George, bye-bye.
Linda: There’s a phone booth on the corner. You want me to run downstairs and get the
number? You’ll be passing it.
(play it again, sam, Woody Allen 1972)
The development of mobile communication technologies is one that cannot be
isolated from historical, social, economic, and political contexts, nor from the
dreams of perfected communication that pervaded those contexts. Moreover, the
lesson learned so far is that the evolution of electronically mediated communica-
tion knows a myriad of interconnected branches, some still extending themselves
and others long buried under the weight of history. Within these branches we can
locate numerous human and non-human actors, which at some points bred the
most fantastic but stillborn offspring and at other points merged to give life to
contraptions that hit the sweet spot of contemporary communication desires.
The roughly 150 years that span between the commercial deployment of the elec-
trical telegraph and that of the Internet saw many such failures and successes,
and the previous chapter showed that all of these relate in various ways to notions
of wanting to remove obstacles that stand in the way of perfectly communicating
from afar, of making us omnipresent and omniscient. Within this vast forest of
old, new, living, and dead media, we should therefore also be able to find the
areas that harbour the earliest technological roots of personal wireless communi-
cation.
Envisioning personal radio communication
While fantasies of direct, telepathic-like communication are certainly not con-
fined to the last few centuries, it was not until the mastering of electricity and the
development of electronically operated communication technologies that the first
feasible ideas were put forward regarding how actual wireless person-to-person
communication might work. Within the lengthy history of experimenting with
the electromagnetic spectrum and designing devices that could exploit its charac-
teristics, the start of the twentieth century marks a time when two powerful media
constellations had started to approach each other. The first of these two, com-
prised of telephonic dispositifs, had already begun to present itself as a fierce
competitor of the telegraphic constellation. The telephone noticeably made its
way onto the evolving telecommunications scene in the 1880s and 1890s, and had
gained a healthy momentum. Its ease of use, coupled to a simple but smart rental
4. mobile communication dreams 127
scheme pioneered by the Bell Telephone Company and continued by AT&T under
the helm of Theodore Vail, quickly captured the attention of those who needed
swift communication and could afford it (Aronson 1977: 27). At first, subscribers
were predominantly rich people who worked in professional and commercial
industries, but with the expiration of Bell’s key patents in 1893 and 1894, many
small telephone start-ups in the United States began to offer telephonic services at
greatly reduced rates, making them available to the general public as well (Fischer
1992: 42-44). In 1914, around ten per cent of the United States population had a
telephone; in other developed countries, the figures ranged from 6.5 per cent in
Canada to 1.7 per cent in Great Britain (Kingsbury 1915: 530-531). Although far
from being the near-global medium it is today, for many at that time the tele-
phone was a well-known device, symbolising the next significant step in the
direction of the presence of an uninhibited ‘freedom of expression’ of mind
(Boettinger 1977: 203).
The second media constellation that signalled a change in late-nineteenth cen-
tury’s telecommunication discourses presented itself in the form of radiographic
experiments and devices. Still in a phase where the understanding of the wireless
transmission of electromagnetic signals was rudimentary, these new imaginative
conceptions of bridging space by technological means were poised to fully inter-
act with the dominant telephonic dispositifs that had been established. As evident
from the William Crookes’ article discussed earlier, in 1892, wireless point-to-
point communication seemed to be on the brink of invention, and the prediction
of its onset was to be repeated many times, in spite of the fact that later on wire-
less signalling revealed itself to be much better suited for broadcasting purposes.
In a wonderful collection of forecasts brought together by Thomas H. White, we
find, for instance, that in 1901 a commentator in the London Spectator saw that
‘[s]ome day men and women will carry wireless telephones as today we carry a
card case or camera’, and that in 1902 the English journal of electromagnetics The
Electrician reported
that ‘a number of scientists scattered all over the civilised world are eagerly
seeking the solution to the problem of wireless telephony’, and although so
far there had been only limited success, ‘A future generation may conceivably
accomplish as much in wireless telephony as is dreamed of to-day by vision-
aries’. (White 2007)
The persistence of this belief was closely linked to the idea that all that was
needed was new technologies; while the concrete practices of wireless signalling
at the beginning of the twentieth century were far removed from the dreams of
visionaries, further development of radio components like the crystal detector and
vacuum-tube transmitters continued to improve radio’s potential and therefore
fuel the public and scientific imagination. As Pool et al. revealed from a 1910
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article by Herbert Casson, one particular inventive notion was that police work
would benefit greatly if ‘each individual [would] have a number by which he
could be reached telephonically wherever he might be’ (Pool et al. 1977: 138).
The wording closely resonates with the familiar desire for omnipresence and as a
result omniscience through improved communication, something that seemed to
be virtually present merely by cleverly combining available technology. Over the
years, little would change in this expression of this desire; White writes for exam-
ple that in 1919, in the U.S. War Department annual report,
Signal Corps head Major General George O. Squier talked of ‘the day which I
believe is not far distant, when we can reach the ultimate goal so that any indi-
vidual anywhere on earth will be able to communicate directly by the spoken
word to any other individual wherever he may be’. (White 2007, emphasis
added)
The same words, the same wish; out of the ideational entanglement of the tele-
phonic and radiographic constellations came many similar predictions that
echoed hopes for ever-more ubiquitous communication. As is so often the case,
however, the day that the ultimate goal was to be reached would always be further
away than projected. While many dreamed of portable radiophones at the end of
the nineteenth century, the reality was that, for a long time, communication on
the move was only possible if one had a large enough sea or land vehicle to carry
the heavy radio equipment.
Vehicular mobility
The first successful commercial deployment of wireless communication was, in
fact, by its very nature mobile, as Marconi had attracted the British, Italian, and
American navies as well as the maritime insurance company Lloyd’s as main cus-
tomers of his wireless telegraph systems. He competed with wired telegraph net-
works on land as well, but once he had begun to adapt his technology to the
maritime environment in 1897, there was an increased demand for ships to be
fitted with radio equipment (Dunlap 1937: 76-83). After the advantages of having
a reliable means to communicate over long distances had become evident in naval
conditions, Marconi sought to expand the potential market for mobile communi-
cation to other areas. In 1901, the same year he managed to send a radio signal
across the Atlantic for the first time, he equipped a steam-powered wagon with a
transmitter, receiver, and electric batteries so that ‘communication [could] be
maintained while the vehicle [was] travelling’ (Western Electrician, July 27, 1901: 51
cited in White 2005). There was no immediate and direct financial gain made
from this experiment, but an important connection had been established: this
was the world’s first car-based communications system, and as such it is a typical
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example of how the branches in the evolution of communication media, guided
by experimental or entrepreneurial motivations, continuously find new areas to
grow towards.
Around the same time, and emphasising the argument that while the technolo-
gical means to communicate evolve perpetually they have a tendency to converge
towards similar ‘good tricks’, we see another car-bound experiment in mobile
communication, albeit one without radiographic technologies: in 1910, Lars
Magnus Ericsson (the Swedish manufacturer of telegraphs and telephones) and
his wife Hilda built a telephone system into their car, and by physically attaching
that system to the wires of telephone lines using two long grappling poles, they
were able to stop along the road and make a call wherever they could make a
connection (Agar 2003: 8-9). Despite the similarities, there was a significant dif-
ference between this car-bound system and that of Marconi, however, because
even though the technique of ‘hooking up’ a telephone to existent wires provided
ample communication advantages – it had also already been successfully
employed by armies in battle and by telephone companies to test their lines – it
only provided mobility between fixed communication; it was the radio-based sys-
tem of Marconi that made mediated communication itself truly mobile. Within the
general perception of what mobile communication was or could become, for a
long time technical affordances as well as prevailing social necessities would
retain that link between automobiles and radio equipment.
The supervening social necessities for cars that offered mobile communication
capabilities first appeared in the form of a desire to improve law enforcement.
One optimistic forecast that had been made during the fixed telephone network’s
development was that crimes would be solved more easily, because many more
people would be able to quickly report them to the police. This brought forward
the need to have police officers on call as much as possible while on the beat.
With the technology at hand to instantly contact anyone with access to a radio
receiver tuned at a specific frequency, the practical solution to the problem of the
need for increased accessibility of the police became straightforward. From 1921
to 1928, several police officers, all radio amateurs, developed a mobile radio com-
munications system for the Detroit Michigan Police Department, which they fitted
in their cars (IEEE 2007). Initially, this system, which in the early phases relied on
the use of Morse code but later provided fully voice-based communication, was
one-way only, so that alerted police officers had to stop their cars and use a fixed
line to call in (Gow & Smith 2006: 23). It proved to be very successful nonethe-
less, and more police departments quickly followed suit. This technological
momentum was given an extra impulse after the Galvin Manufacturing Corpora-
tion (GMC) produced a two-way radio system under the brand name ‘Motorola’,1
which became the land-mobile radio of choice for many government agencies
and emergency services during the 1930s (Goggin 2006: 25). The subsequent
deployment in the Second World War of the GMC-manufactured AM portable
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two-way ‘Handie-Talkie’ in 1940 and the FM portable two-way ‘Walkie-Talkie’ in
1943 showed the immense and often strategic usefulness of being able to com-
municate back and forth without the restrictive need for a fixed connection, and
paved the way for larger-scale commercial experiments with car-based radio tele-
phony after the war.
These post-war experiments were not without their technical difficulties, which
were of course discursively framed in terms of challenges that had to be over-
come: the problem of requiring wires may have been put out of the way, but there
were other obstacles to uninhibited communication that loomed at the horizon.
Up to the mid-1940s, radio communication had in effect relied on a rather closed
system: you could only talk to someone who used proper radio equipment and
was tuned in on the right frequency. Wireless calls to a fixed phone (or vice versa)
could not be made,2 and the frequency range in which radio communication
worked was limited. Although AT&T and GMC both tried to address all of these
limitations, resulting in the creation of the Mobile Telephone Service in 1946,
radio channels in the available radio spectrum were sparse and suffered heavily
from interference; in addition, the service was costly, the equipment was heavy,
and conversations could only take place using a push-to-talk procedure (Gow &
Smith 2006: 23-25).
What made things still more difficult was that, despite all these drawbacks, the
demand for car telephones in the two decades following the Second World War
was overwhelming; many people who wanted to experience mobile communica-
tion were placed on a long waiting list (Agar 2003: 36-37). Especially for those
who were often on the road, the potential communicative affordances of mobile
telephony far outweighed its technical imperfections. This pressing urge to make
use of mobilised communication manifested itself in many countries, and for a
variety of reasons. In 1949 in the Netherlands, the government-operated Postal,
Telegraph, and Telephone agency created a national public mobile network that
used centralised base stations to establish contact between any telephone and
‘mobilofoons’ (Meulstee 2007). This network was predominantly used by taxi ser-
vices and transport companies, and incidentally proved to be of great importance
for the coordination of emergency services during the 1953 North Sea flood
(Museum voor Communicatie 2006). In Sweden, Ericsson built the world’s first
fully automatic Mobile Telephone A system in 1956, which attracted the patron-
age of many lawyers, doctors, and people living and working in rural areas (Agar
2003: 49; Ericsson 2006). Thus, although it was used mostly in specialised fields
and its costs were much too high for the majority of people to own one, the
personal mobile communication device exerted a powerful attraction on the col-
lective imagination, and had a large appeal for many who saw connectedness as
essential for their everyday functioning.
As had been the case with the fixed telephone, the growing popularity of
mobile communication increasingly put pressure on its infrastructure, creating a
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dire need for further innovation. It was Bell Laboratories, which since 1925 had
represented the institutionalised search for improvements in communication,
that was instrumental in providing the necessary developments and laying the
foundations for the ubiquitous existence of present-day mobile telephones
(Goggin 2006: 26). One of those important developments was the invention of
the transistor in 1948. It made the miniaturisation of radio devices possible, and
as such transformed radio telephones into much less bulky devices. The second
innovation was the idea for a cellular network, in which multiple and intercon-
nected low-powered base stations organised in a decentralised hexagonal grid
would replace the few centralised high-powered radio towers, thus freeing up
frequencies. Conceived in 1947, it would take more than twenty years before the
cellular system would become operational because of two reasons: first, the
American Federal Communications Commission (FCC) refused for a long time to
allocate the requested frequency spectrum, and second, the technology that was
needed to manage call handovers and frequency switching was only developed in
the late 1960s (Farley 2006b, 2006c). Still, the cellular system proved to be key to
the mobile system’s success.
Leaving the car behind
In the late 1960s, while AT&T focused on using cellular technology to improve car
telephony, Motorola (which had changed its name from Galvin Manufacturing
Corporation in 1947) aimed to extend the mobile telephony paradigm beyond the
car. To Martin Cooper, the general manager of Motorola’s Communications Sys-
tems Division at the time, the advantages of a truly portable telephone were
unambiguously clear: ‘When you park your car and leave, you can’t use your
mobile [car phone] but you can take your portable with you’ (Motorola 2007).
Cooper thus described what he called the ‘original dream’ of mobile wireless
communication in well-known terms: to be able to use a communication device
wherever and whenever, and not have it be bound by any physical object other
than the human body itself (Charny 2003). Notably, Cooper reframed the ‘reverse
salients’ of his project, the very concrete and historically contextualised technical
problems that were his daily concern, as standing between him and realising an
apparently long-held dream of unlimited communication. His determination to
realise this dream vividly reflects how myths of improved communication reso-
nate through Western culture, and how they find fertile ground with many peo-
ple, including – especially – those who have a say in the development of new
communication technologies.3 Cooper took free rein and, within five years after
the FCC’s 1968 declaration that if cellular technology proved technically feasible it
would be allocated a large number of frequencies, he and his team had designed
and built a prototype of the DynaTAC, a brick-like portable phone weighing
almost one kilogram. It would take another ten years and many FCC hearings
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before Motorola’s first commercial portable cell phone, the DynaTAC 8000X, was
approved and made available in 1983.
Cooper was not the only one who had the dream of creating boundless mobile
communication; the topos flitted through many a telecommunication designer’s
brain, and this can be seen in the rapid advances made elsewhere in the world.
While the cellular concept and the necessary technologies to make cell phones
work were developed in the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
their commercial deployment was hampered by legislative restrictions and high
costs to such a degree that other countries implemented successful cellular net-
works a few years before the Americans did. In Japan, the Nippon Telephone and
Telegraph company established a cellular service in 1979 (Goggin 2006: 29).
Then there was the Nordisk Mobil Telefoni system, which was put into use in the
early 1980s in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland (but which, curiously
enough, premiered in Saudi Arabia) (Ericsson 2007). The rest of Europe followed
closely after the Advanced Mobile Phone System had been inaugurated in the Uni-
ted States in 1983, with the United Kingdom installing its Total Access Mobile
System, Italy its Radio Telephono Mobile Integrato, France its RadioCom 2000,
Germany its C-Netz, and the Netherlands their second generation Auto Telefoon
(ATF-2)4 network (Gow & Smith 2006: 46; Groen 2006; Ling 2004: 8-9). By the
end of the 1980s, mobile telephony had gained a momentum comparable to that
of fixed telephony in the 1910s: the infrastructure had undergone a major change
in order to service more subscribers (like automated exchanges had done for
wired telephone networks decades earlier), and although not everybody had the
financial means to actually own a mobile telephone, the portable technology had
firmly established itself in the public awareness as the next generation in the
evolution of telecommunications.
Global expansion
Still, the ideal of universal mobile telephone service that Cooper and others had
dreamed of was far from being fulfilled. It was the increasing amount of waiting
potential customers that made this abundantly clear, emphasising that the idea of
personal wireless communication had a broad level of appeal. Despite the consid-
erable costs, the demand for mobile telephony turned out to be much greater
than expected, and soon after the first generation of cellular networks had started
operating, ‘predictions of unlimited capacity […] proved grossly optimistic’ (Fox
1990: 45). Another factor that hampered universal service was that, because all
the different cellular systems were incompatible with each other, it was practically
impossible to use a phone abroad; only countries that shared a similar system
could provide roaming access. Especially in Europe, where both Enlightened uni-
fication ideals and a drive towards global economic competitiveness determined
much of the political and industrial agendas of the Union’s member countries,
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this incompatibility was a thorn in the side of many; therefore, the project to
‘build one European cellular phone system […] would be a major material means
of realising the dream [of unification]’ (Agar 2003: 58). The subsequent develop-
ment and implementation of the Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) in 1991 was completely in line with the European commitment to this
dream: it was adopted as a pan-European standard, lifting cellular systems from
the first (analogue) to the second (digital) generation and freeing up spectrum in
order to manage the rapidly increasing amount of subscribers (Ling 2004: 9).
Concurrently, in the Americas and parts of Asia, newly developed second-genera-
tion digital cellular telephone standards started to employ Code Division Multiple
Access protocols, and in Japan the switch was made to the Personal Digital Cellu-
lar standard (Gow & Smith 2006: 48-49). All in all, at the beginning of the 1990s
in many countries around the world, important technological improvements had
been made to accommodate for a lot more mobile telephone users than the first
generation of cellular systems could have managed.
However self-evident this process of mobilisation might seem, it should be
carefully noted that, even though a lingering desire for media that could establish
personal wireless contact had existed for a long time, it was only when particular
contributing factors and actors5 came together in the media environment of the
early 1990s that the mobile communication condition as we now know it began to
take concrete shape. When it did, we see that, from the mid-1990s onwards, a
rapid increase in the amount of mobile telephone subscriptions took place.6
Although the transition from an analogue to a digital system was instrumental
for this to happen, it was not the only reason why mobile telephones grew in
popularity. With further technological developments and components becoming
smaller and cheaper, mobile telephones had transformed from clumsy heavy
bricks to elegant and even fashionable portable objects, making owning and
using one much less of a hassle – or an embarrassment. No company was more
prominent in the early days of the production and marketing of such small ‘per-
sonal trusted devices’ than Finland-based Nokia, and it had understood very well
that the desire to be constantly in touch was not just to be found among people
doing business. Recognising the demands of regular consumers was the first step
and, accordingly, designing mobile telephones the next. Nokia’s ensuing seg-
mentation of the mass market into a broad range of lifestyle-related niche mar-
kets proved to be enormously successful, and paved the way for the
unprecedented adoption of mobile telephones amongst a huge range of custo-
mers (Steinbock 2005: 167).
Today, mobile communication devices are virtually ubiquitous.7 Their ability to
potentially connect anywhere, anytime, to anyone or anything in the informa-
tional network, combined with an ongoing emphasis of the individual as the
nexus of communication and entertainment, has sculpted the devices into vital
cultural artefacts, providing many more functions than just placing calls. A signif-
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icant proportion of devices nowadays supports text messaging, playing games,
taking pictures or video clips, and listening to radio or digitally stored music; the
more advanced models enable activities such as surfing the Internet, reading
emails or other text documents, managing all kinds of social media hubs, using
Global Positioning System (GPS) applications for location-based services, and
even paying money. Any social activity may now involve using one or more of
these mobile functions at some point, suffusing our understanding of communi-
cation with notions of immediacy, ubiquity, intimacy, reassurance, and knowl-
edge gathering, all potentially available at the press of a few (virtual) buttons.
In the evolution of media technologies, mobile communication devices consti-
tute its more recent branches, and their ‘magical fetish’ (McGuigan 2005: 46)
engenders dreams of improved communication very much like previous genera-
tions of communication technologies did. So much so, in fact, that for some
scholars it is tempting to describe the rise of the mobile society as not only revo-
lutionary, but also almost as a coming home to the ‘true’ balance of communica-
tion which is supposedly hardwired in humankind.8 Mobile wireless
communication technologies, in this view, constitute the ultimate means by
which the longing for improved communication can be fulfilled today. However,
such optimism, while partly justified by the sheer speed with which mobile com-
munication devices have proliferated themselves and have helped many to
improve their businesses or social lives, is not entirely warranted, as it underesti-
mates the inevitable problematic consequences of the search for ideal communi-
cation. Just as with earlier attempts – or even more so because of their
unprecedented ubiquity and pervasive nature – mobile communication devices
will stress the dark side of all that an achievement of perfected communication
entails.
Living the paradoxical dream9
Mystery Man: We’ve met before, haven’t we.
Fred Madison: I don’t think so. Where was it you think we met?
Mystery Man: At your house. Don’t you remember?
Fred Madison: No. No, I don’t. Are you sure?
Mystery Man: Of course. As a matter of fact, I’m there right now.
Fred Madison: What do you mean? You’re where right now?
Mystery Man: At your house.
Fred Madison: That’s fucking crazy, man.
[Mystery Man hands Fred a mobile telephone]
Mystery Man: Call me. Dial your number. Go ahead.
[Fred dials the number and the Mystery Man answers]
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Mystery Man: [over the phone] I told you I was here.
Fred Madison: [amused] How’d you do that?
Mystery Man: Ask me.
[Fred remembers the anonymous video tapes]
Fred Madison: [angrily into the phone] How did you get inside my house?
Mystery Man: [over the phone] You invited me. It is not my custom to go where I am not
wanted.
Fred Madison: [into the phone] Who are you?
[Both Mystery Men laugh mechanically]
Mystery Man: [over the phone] Give me back my phone.
[Fred gives the phone back]
Mystery Man: It’s been a pleasure talking to you.
(lost highway, David Lynch 1997)
The important question that confronts us at this point is how exactly the dis-
courses and infrastructures that co-construct current-day mobile communication
dispositifs sustain idealised ideas of communication. How are these ideas
expressed, to what extent do they influence everyday experiences of mobile com-
munication? In one rather straightforward sense, the speed alone with which the
adoption of mobile technology takes place suggests that there is a significant
overlap between what people consider to be their natural communication needs
and what mobile communication media have to offer. A quick glance at the
breakneck-paced integration of mobile communication devices into everyday life
could easily give the impression that the age-old desire to bridge distances and
instantaneously communicate with anyone and anywhere, which has expressed
itself countless times in predictions and glorifications of new media, is now for
many people closer to fulfilment than ever before. Without truly realising it, we
might already have arrived at the future of communication – as we have always
seemed to be doing, as victims of our wilful amnesia.
But such an explanation would obscure the different reasons why people in
various demographic categories adopt mobile communication technologies.
These adoption strategies in their turn depend on a broad range of cultural,
social, economic, and political settings, which also cannot be ignored as influen-
cing factors in the construction and propagation of representations of idealised
communication. So the question becomes this: while looking at analyses and dis-
courses of everyday practices of mobile communication, do we indeed predomi-
nantly find notions that we have established a true communications utopia? Or is
such a utopia effectively out of reach, despite the ubiquitous presence of the best
candidates so far to satisfy the basic technological requirements for it to exist?
Mobile communication devices may indeed facilitate the kinds of contact that
perfectly fit idealised conceptions of the zenith of communication, but do we
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experience them as such? In other words, what are the kinks in the ideals, where
is the uncanniness, what are the communication paradoxes in the mobile age?
To answer these questions, analytical cuts will be made along four characteris-
tics of current-day mobile communication devices that are typically presented as
their strongest selling points, which are identified in their promises to bring ubi-
quitous connectivity, fluid sociability, real-time relief of anxiety, and omniscience
and collectiveness through ever-present knowledge. In each of these analytical
cuts, the focus is first on how notions of improved communication manifest
themselves, and then on the ways these various expressions and expectations of
idealised communication run into the paradoxes of utopian and universalising
thinking. In order to gauge user experiences from a micro-scale perspective, these
analyses will engage with illustrative examples of research that empirically mea-
sured sociological and psychological ramifications of the use of mobile commu-
nication devices.
Ubiquitous connectivity
The obvious and single most defining characteristic of mobile wireless commu-
nication technology, one that precedes and co-defines its other specific features,
is that it renders space largely irrelevant as a variable in constituting mediated
contact. There is no need to be in a certain fixed location in order to connect to
someone or something; given a well-diffused infrastructure that supports the
sending, carrying, and receiving of radio signals, and provided that one is envel-
oped in one of the hertzian bubbles thereby created, a mobile call or a wireless
Internet connection can be made anywhere. Increasingly, these bubbles are cover-
ing large parts of the Earth, from urban regions to deserted plains, mountain tops
and out at sea. Due to contributing factors such as the standardisation of commu-
nication protocols, the ease of construction of basic technological frameworks,
the portability of devices, the intuitive use of mobile telephones, and the high
social and cultural value of personal communication devices, wireless services
steadfastly have become globally pervasive indeed. What is significant about this
process is that the supporting infrastructure is often rendered almost invisible, in
a conscious attempt to create and uphold the illusion that the wireless connection
is ‘just there’, to be invoked at will to magically synchronise different space and
time coordinates.10 Similar to the early seventeenth-century fantasies of magne-
tised compass needles that would move in communicative rapport wherever they
were, a certain sense of – and need for – telepathic immediacy pervades modern
wireless communication technologies: just turn on the mobile device, and a con-
nection will be guaranteed to exist almost instantly.11
With their near omnipresence, mobile communication devices facilitate the
further compression of geographical space into what Manuel Castells calls the
‘space of flows’, a concept he developed in The rise of the network society (1996), and
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which he defined in later work as ‘the material organization of simultaneous
social interaction at a distance by networking communication, with the technolo-
gical support of telecommunications, interactive communication systems, and
fast transportation technologies’ (Castells et al. 2007: 171). In the space of flows,
people, goods, and information are in a constant state of flux, moving between
physical locations while being part of a dynamic network that is linked together
through the use of communication technologies. It is connections, not places,
that constitute the networks of the space of flows, redefining space ‘into the space
of communication’ (ibid.: 178). What Castells et al. rightly observe is that this
process of emphasising communication over location is accelerated even more
today. Because mobile communication devices radically alter the long-lasting
relationship between communication nodes and fixed locations, spatial vectors in
the space of flows become increasingly heterogeneous, and consequently simul-
taneous social interaction at a distance turns into a pervasive activity that can be
engaged in anywhere, at any time. The space of flows does not completely lose all
sense of place (people continue to use communication technologies to make
arrangements to meet each other, for instance), but places have become less sig-
nificant in the establishment of communication now that the connections that are
required to set up communication have been uncoupled from physical locations.
Many may call the devices ‘mobile’ telephones, and ubiquitous connectivity does
indeed support mobility, but it is the omnipresent availability of connection nodes
that actually defines current-day wireless communication.
What follows is that, when distances and the need for location-specific contact
points are removed as obstacles hindering what is perceived as the ultimate goal
of unchecked communication, we become more and more immersed in what
social psychologist Kenneth Gergen calls the ‘relational net’, in which everyone
and everything can potentially link up (Gergen 2003: 111). Having a wireless com-
munication device like a mobile telephone at one’s disposal implies having access
to ever-present, real-time communication channels, and thus to the means to
engage in dialogue or to disseminate information whenever and wherever one
wants. A mobile telephone therefore provides a very strong psychological ‘fix’ by
supplying an abundance of communicative choice, the freedom to electronically
connect and mediate knowledge, opinions, and desires; it is an apparatus of
opportunity, a potential-rich portal. As such, it resonates with positively conno-
tated notions similar to those found in the lure of the new and in the ideas of
improving communication: as long as there is the chance that things can be
turned around or improved, preferably by purposefully creating or using enabling
technologies, there is the necessary illusion that we have a say in our destiny.
Communicating has always been a fundamental social activity in human exis-
tence, and the idealised drive to improve the means to do so posits itself as an
integral part of media evolution, so it should be no surprise to see that discourses
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of wireless communication technologies exhibit very familiar ideographs such as
‘opportunity’, ‘hope’, and ‘progress’.
Some empirical examples might serve to clarify the above observations. The
tendency to depict mobile telephones as powerful devices that possess an unlim-
ited connective potential, and the habit of conflating this capacity for connectivity
with the idea that it best answers our longings for the ability to create a better
future, are, for instance, reflected by the strong emotional and cognitive invest-
ments that people make in wireless communication technologies. In many coun-
tries they are called ‘hand phones’, or their names refer to the fact that
communication is ‘always on’ and can always be carried along (Thompson 2005:
17-19; Townsend 2002: 68-69). The most dramatically expressed urge to attribute
magical powers to the devices is found in Israel, where a mobile telephone is
called pelephone (after the name of Israel’s first cellular communications company)
which literally means ‘wonder-phone’ (Thompson 2005: 21). One can gather
from these naming conventions that mobile telephones are considered essential
extensions of the body. Moreover, mobile telephones and their invisible but
potentially present connections have now become so intimately integrated into
our being that many people experience feelings of panic when they find they have
not brought their mobile telephone with them, or think it is lost (Vincent 2003:
220; Baron 2011). The severance of the hertzian umbilical cord is felt like an
amputation that many prefer to avoid. To illustrate this further, during the short-
lived offer in 2000 by several mobile telephone operators to provide free calls in
the evenings and on weekends, some people even chose to maintain a constant
connection through their mobile telephones, and listened to each other sleeping
(Licoppe 2003: 177).
From a socio-psychological standpoint, mobile communication devices can be
said to be experienced as the latest candidates to gratify the wish to come closer
to communication utopia. They do so, however, not only because ‘improved com-
munication’ has long been portrayed and perceived by producers and consumers
as the one thing that can actually propel us forward into a utopian future, but also
because the very idea of what constitutes ‘improved communication’ has co-
evolved with media evolution. Chapter 3 showed that idealised ideas of commu-
nication have been expressed in a multitude of ways in a plethora of media dis-
positifs, but in the specific form of small, light, portable, and fashionable mobile
communication devices, these ideals have now taken on the shape of the desire to
always be in control of all available information flows, to be a perpetually con-
nected node in an information-rich network. Mobile communication devices thus
not only represent the most recent bid in a long line of recurring and similar
attempts to improve communication, they also show how material and cultural
aspects of technology co-determine dominant contemporary ideologies of com-
munication media.
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But what does this mean for the understanding of what ‘communication’ is?
Has it indeed been improved? What are the unintended consequences of
increased connectedness, what are the kinks in the ideals? At first, a perpetually
connected state seems to be a perfect point of departure for establishing and
managing all kinds of successful communication situations, and thus for reach-
ing the ideal goal of a common understanding. Indeed, all of the scenarios for
improving communication discussed in chapter 2 rely on the presence of chan-
nels – the essential prerequisites for any type of communication to exist – and, as
the line of thinking goes, what would be a better improvement than making sure
that those channels are available and operative at all times? But a closer inspec-
tion of what is at hand reveals that merely increasing the opportunities to connect
does not suffice, and paradoxically might not even help in bringing people closer
together in a utopian fashion. Through an analysis of several mobile telephone
advertisements, press releases, and news reports, and by contrasting those dis-
courses with ideas of communication found in works by Martin Heidegger,
Jürgen Habermas, and George Myerson (2001), for instance, comes to the conclu-
sion that what he calls the process of ‘mobilisation’ is predominantly geared
towards just making contact, and not particularly towards creating a shared
understanding. Although he is prone to overestimating the significance of press
mumbo-jumbo by taking its seductive scenarios too literally as accurate represen-
tations of how people see and use their mobile telephones in everyday life,
Myerson does pinpoint the industry’s unidirectional sense of what constitutes
ideal communication. He shows that, despite the fact that more and more people
have the opportunity to engage in meaningful conversations, mobile telephones
are marketed as personal communication centres with which one can satisfy indi-
vidualistic wants, simply by making ‘basic contacts’ (Myerson 2001: 27). He
argues that by the very ease with which mobile telephones can facilitate contact,
the focus – in an almost Shannon-like sense – has shifted away from the content
towards the channel of communication, a process that in his view degenerates
our notion of what communication is. By reducing the idea of communication to
the mere act of making contact, Myerson maintains, we actually lose touch with
each other instead of sharing our sense of being (ibid.: 58).
And indeed, there are research findings that can be interpreted as supporting
Myerson’s claim that in the mobile age ‘communication’ is quickly supplanted by
‘making contact’. Studies have shown that people generally take less time calling
on mobile telephones than they do on fixed phones (Licoppe 2003: 175), think of
asynchronous text messaging as ‘quicker and more convenient than voice tele-
phony’ (Ling 2004: 150), and sometimes lock themselves in ‘tele-cocoons’ from
which they only keep in touch with their most intimate friends, refraining from
communicating with the outside world (Ito, Okabe & Matsuda 2005: 10-11). While
some of these phenomena can be explained as user strategies aimed at managing
billing systems and keeping costs low, the suggestion remains that mobile tele-
140 tantalisingly close
phony and its infrastructure offer affordances that primarily invite what Christian
Licoppe calls a ‘“connected” practice of interaction’ instead of a ‘“conversational”
practice’ (Licoppe 2003: 174, 183). The ‘anywhere, anytime’ paradigm so much
pervades interaction in everyday life, Licoppe found, that users prefer to think of
their mobile communication practices mostly as intuitive whenever-you-feel-like
events, which do not have to adhere to conventional communication habits and
routines. As a result, mobile messages – especially text messages – are frequent
but short, and often primarily serve to acknowledge the phatic dimension of com-
munication, the connection that people share (ibid.: 180-181).
While such short communicative gestures are important elements in the shap-
ing and maintenance of what can be called a ‘performative value’ in social rela-
tionships (Green 2003: 207), they do add to swelling flows of information,
messages, and data, all of which affirm one’s connectedness up to a highly
redundant level. If always being connected is what brings pure communication a
step closer, it is also what foregrounds the communication paradox, and forces us
to realise that pure communication is relentless in its intrusive nature. Research
has shown that when the times and places at which people can be contacted for
whatever reason are extended to all possible environments, and those contacts
become more frequent, a tension arises between the desire and expectancy for
immediate and unlimited access to others on the one hand, and the need to filter
out and restrict incoming access requests in increasingly variable circumstances
on the other: the presence of a perpetual connection pressures users of mobile
communication devices into managing all kinds of complicated communication
schemes (Sherry & Salvador 2002: 114-115), into employing inventive ways to cope
with awkward social situations caused by disruptive incoming calls (Ling 2004:
123-143), and even into being deprived of much needed sleep when they are kept
awake at night by calls or text messages (Turrettini 2007). Judging from market-
ing predictions for next-generation wireless devices, such problems are not about
to go away soon; the ‘always on, real-time access’ adage dominates the wireless
industry’s mentality towards the future of communication, reiterating along the
way the wish of Licklider, Otlet, and countless others before them, for omnipre-
sence and omniscience.12
Discourses of wireless communication technologies, then, reflect how the
compression of space through ubiquitous connection nodes is of constitutive
importance in the transformation of our understanding of communication.
Across a wide range of demographic compositions, many social activities that
used to rely on physical proximity or on the pre-arranged coordination of interac-
tion are now reshaped into ad-hoc patterns of de-spatialised and heterogeneous
contacts. Some have argued that the ongoing ‘mediatisation’ of the world blurs
our understanding of social space and related activities to such an extent that we
are left with ‘no sense of place’ (Meyrowitz 1985), or become entangled in the
‘perpetual present’ of a ‘glocalised’ world in which both global and local events
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and activities merely exist by virtue of their potential to be immediately intercon-
nected (Virilio 1997: 129-145). The horrifying endpoint of this trip towards ever-
more connectedness, the argument goes, is one where everything collapses into a
singular flow of being, much like the Borg Collective in the Star Trek universe
experiences everything all at once. In such a scenario, communication in its com-
mon sense ceases to exist; there will be no ‘other’ to relate to.13
The fact that such generalised outlooks on the negative effects of the loss of
relational awareness can be countered by observations that mobile communica-
tion devices restore communal feelings previously eroded by mass media like
radio and television (Gergen 2002), and that they do not by definition homoge-
nise family members – let alone people from different cultures – in their com-
municative behaviour (Castells et al. 2007: 74-75), shows that mobile
communication devices exhibit all the hallmarks of the dominant topos. In part
oriented by idealised ideas of communication, new media appear to bring us clo-
ser to ultimate connectedness, but while doing so they trigger a wide range of
ambiguous uses, appropriations, and behaviours. With the shift towards more
connectedness, we thus experience faster and more often than before that the
desire for pure communication brings us both pleasure and discomfort. As
Michael Arnold asserts, the mobile telephone is Janus-faced; it is part of a socio-
technical system that is ‘not reducible to a direction or valence tipped with a sin-
gle arrowhead, but better understood as a conflation of tangential implications, at
least some of which can be read as ironically and paradoxically self-contradicting
phenomena’ (Arnold 2003: 234). Because of mobile telephony, the paradox hid-
ing in the desire for ideal communication becomes more articulated than ever.
Fluid sociability
The observations on the strong significance of the connectivity aspect of mobile
communication devices might suggest that people value this attribute the most,
and, when asked, will mention it as the principal agent to eliminate communica-
tion problems arising from physical remoteness. Yet, while discourses of mobile
communication devices do indeed underline how their ability to transcend space
and time is profoundly transforming our perception of communication, there are
suggestions that people do not necessarily experience the functioning of those
devices in such bloated terms in everyday life. According to communication scho-
lar Valerie Frissen (2000), the mobile industry’s conception of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) as the tools par excellence to solve commu-
nication problems is not immediately reflected in how people talk and think
about those technologies. Frissen stresses that most ICTs are taken for granted
or seen as double-edged swords, and therefore are not often spontaneously men-
tioned as possible solutions for communication problems resulting from time
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and coordination constraints – even when they are used as such (Frissen 2000:
72-73).
Verifying and adding to Frissen’s empirical research on the role of ICTs in
households, Mark Aakhus (2003) concurs that there is a mismatch between the
industry’s representations of improved communication and the ways in which
actual uses of communication technologies are experienced. Indeed, despite the
notion that a mobile telephone can provide more personal connectedness than
any other medium, it is rather a stretch of the imagination to think of someone
literally proclaiming that she uses a mobile telephone because it is able to solve all
known communication problems. To explain the existence of such mismatches,
Aakhus proposes to reframe common perspectives on communication and its
problems, and to do so in two steps. The first step is to recognise that the ‘preg-
nant image of “perpetual contact”’ – which Aakhus acknowledges as ‘a long-
standing idealization of communication’ – has a strong influence on the design,
use, and thus affordances of ICTs, and therefore will continue to push increased
connectedness as an ideal form of communication (Aakhus 2003: 38). In other
words, user perceptions of how well ICTs can help solve communication prob-
lems can be expected to change over time as those problems become more and
more articulated in terms of inadequate or faulty connections. The second step is
to understand that the use of mediated communication should not solely be inter-
preted as a means to virtually transport to another place, but also as part of a
dialectical exercise to ‘resolve the competing desires and expectations to be sepa-
rate or to be together’ (ibid.: 40). In short, mobile telephone practices in everyday
life are about solving communication problems not so much by substituting face-
to-face meetings, but more by constantly reconfiguring one’s connectedness in
the network of communication flows.
Taking Aakhus’ proposed perspective on communication as a guideline, user
accounts of reconfigurations of connectedness can provide a deeper understand-
ing of how people seek to exploit the range of communicative affordances of
mobile communication devices, and subsequently of how they experience what
are supposed to be idealised ideas of communication sparked by the desire for
perpetual contact. To expand on this, there is one particularly poignant theme
that runs through such user accounts, a theme that underscores the conclusion
drawn previously that mobile telephones increase one’s connectedness without
necessarily diminishing face-to-face meetings. This is the theme of social coordi-
nation, or rather that what Richard Ling and Birgitte Yttri (2002) distinguish as a
combination of ‘micro- and hyper-coordination’. Micro-coordination, according
to Ling and Yttri, is the type of nuanced instrumental coordination typical of a
significant part of mobile telephone use: trips that have already started can be
redirected, people can call or text to say they will be late, and meetings can be
scheduled at a rather loosely defined time or location, only to become more defi-
nite when those who want to meet call each other while they are on their way
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(Ling & Yttri 2002: 143-144). Hyper-coordination brings an expressive layer to this
instrumental use, both in the form of social and emotional communication (chat-
ting, gossiping), and in the form of mobile etiquettes telling where mobile tele-
phones should not be used or which models are in fashion (ibid.: 140). Both types
are specifically about how to manage increasingly connected social networks:
micro-coordination in a logistical way that makes full use of enhanced communi-
cative availability, and hyper-coordination in a cultural way that establishes the
mobile telephone as today’s nec plus ultra means to create, maintain, and express
social bonds and values. In user accounts of both types, elements of ideas of
fulfilment through improved communication seep through voiced expectations
and desires.
First examining micro-coordination, Ling and Yttri find for instance that in
many comments about the motives for using mobile telephones a strong need for
connectedness is conveyed, with the goal of making instrumental communication
proceed as smoothly as possible. As one informant of an interviewed group
summed up reasons for contacting her partner: ‘It is if somebody is late, it can be
if we need to buy something, if there is something important that he needs to
bring home, if he needs to call somebody or if he has been home and has to give
me a message. It is not like “Hi, I am doing fine, etc.” It is something that we
need’ (ibid.: 145). This instrumental approach to mobile telephony is widespread,
if not constitutive. Ling and Yttri retrieved their data mainly from interviewing
Norwegian teens, but similar attitudes towards the importance of being con-
nected for instrumental reasons have already been registered in early social ana-
lyses of the adoption of mobile telephones (see Kopomaa 2000) and have been
identified as largely age-indifferent and cross-cultural phenomena (Castells et al.
2007; Leonardi, Leonardi & Hudson 2006). In such conversations, the emphasis
in communication does not lie so much on reaching mutual understanding
through dialogue, but more on orchestrating each other’s movements and posi-
tions in the space of flows to the point where they ultimately overlap and merge.
This is only possible, however, if permanent reachability and availability is guar-
anteed and is incorporated in the ideology of mobile communication. As another
informant assessed his need for increased connectedness: ‘It is practical to be
available because you do not miss anything. It is also practical that others are
available; at any rate it is irritating not to be able to reach people when you want
to reach them and get them involved in something. It is very irritating’ (Ling &
Yttri 2002: 151).
Echoing the diagnosis of the paradigm of networked communication in chap-
ter 2, the main motivation here for using mobile communication devices lies in
the assumption that if there are more opportunities to connect there will be an
improvement in how we arrange social interactions, and thus in how social
groups function as a whole.14 Of course, this assumption only holds when there
is an agreement on how social interactions should actually be arranged, but in the
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mythical mobile vision – availability solves everything, together is good – the mere
possibility to contact anyone from anywhere is enough to suggest that such prob-
lems can easily be dealt with, simply by making another call or sending another
text message. In the informants’ justifications for using mobile telephones we see
that communication is not so much actually improved, but it is presented as such,
upholding the myth that the devices have indeed made communication better.
In hyper-coordination, the value of being connected is less related to efficient
planning or dealing with practical issues, and more to achieving a certain status
and maintaining intimate social bonds. Such communicative activities are about
sharing experiences and confirming personal links, and can take the form of gos-
siping, catching up on each other’s adventures, or exchanging symbolic gifts
(Johnsen 2003). Now, these practices have been around for a long time, but the
ubiquitous connectivity that the mobile telephone promises to deliver represents a
new and particularly potent means to establish one’s identity and earn a mean-
ingful place in the social hierarchy of family members and friends. In a cross-
cultural study done by Scott Campbell (2007), results showed that people find
that through mobile telephones group connections are enhanced, conversations
gain in intimacy, and there are more opportunities for emancipatory praxis. One
informant in the Ling and Yttri study illustrates this last point: ‘If I am not home
and if I didn’t have a mobile telephone then my parents would be clear about all
the people I hang out with […]. When you have a mobile telephone then you have
a private answering machine and a private telephone’ (Ling & Yttri 2002: 153).
The mobile telephone thus acts as a device that appears to liberate expressive
communication, largely because it makes opportunities for mediated dialogue
and dissemination available to demographic groups that did not readily enjoy
that privilege before the age of mobile communication devices, and because those
people use mobile communication as a way to actively establish and manage their
own social position in relation to others. Here, the ideal of communication as a
free, uninhibited practice resonates quite strongly, and in a literal sense as well,
of course, as expressive communication is also liberated from its physical attri-
butes. Expressing oneself as a unique individual now increasingly takes place in
the virtual media space of mobile conversations, where social differences tend to
be less visible or obtrusive. Ling and Yttri find that many mobile telephone users
think that the most important aspect of coordination activities is that they can be
performed without the involved parties knowing their respective locations, which
adds a highly egalitarian and personalised quality to already existing patterns of
communication (ibid: 143). Compared to the fixed telephone, the mobile tele-
phone offers far more direct and individualised links to other people, properties
that have quickly turned the device into the primary locus where one’s collection
of social connections resides. In the words of another informant: ‘I think that the
mobile telephone is most important in relation to my friendship network because
I have the memory full of phone numbers and that is only mobile numbers. I
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could not get in touch with my friends at their home phones’ (ibid.: 152). Being in
touch and expressing that connected status is what matters in hyper-coordina-
tion. Because mobile telephony is perceived as extending access to others to vir-
tually infinite dimensions, the thought of being perpetually connected in the
symbolically charged mobile network gives an increased existential significance
to relational ties. As Gergen put it: ‘The Enlightenment paean to individualism,
“I think therefore I am” is replaced with “I am linked therefore I am”’ (Gergen
2003: 111).
But, as in all necessary fictions, there are distortions in the image of commu-
nication utopia; increased social connectedness comes with some unintended
consequences. The fact that mere connectivity has come to engulf present-day
imagery of communication has a compelling effect on our relational self, chang-
ing the perception of what it means to co-exist and communicate with others. The
people we interact with most – those who reside in our more intimate social cir-
cles, like family members, friends, and colleagues – are now always only a phone
call or text message away. As Gergen aptly has diagnosed this social condition,
we find ourselves continuously in a state of ‘absent presence’: physically absent,
but electronically at hand (Gergen 2002). While the arrangement of absent pres-
ence offers a psychologically reassuring feeling of closeness, perpetual connect-
edness does not necessarily guarantee reaching a global coming together; Gergen
notes that because communication with absent present others takes place via
readily available channels, and therefore does not require a lot of effort or time in
setting up, it tends to become simpler, shorter, and distributed among several
fragmented micro-communities (Gergen 2003: 106-107). In addition, when peo-
ple are inclined to enclose themselves in connections to their absent present
social network, they exhibit diminished concern for those outside of their com-
municative bubble (ibid.: 109).
Thus, while more and more people gain increased opportunities to connect to
each other, there are reasons to believe that they tend to use mobile communica-
tion devices predominantly to maintain already existing connections, and do not
necessarily employ them to expand their social network (De Gournay & Smoreda
2003). Newly acquainted people might not necessarily become new mobile con-
nections, either because contacts are fleeting or because they do not wish to be
added to one’s group of existing connections. Moreover, adds Myerson, the domi-
nant mobile imagery in advertisements and press releases even enforces the idea
that the maintenance of those existing connections is more about fulfilling perso-
nal desires than it is about getting to know each other better. He states that by
continuously touting the growing amount of mobile telephone users while at the
same time stressing that communication is something that you personally can
control, a paradox is created: ‘On the one hand, we have a language of scale; on
the other hand, we have the separate individual seeking goals’ (Myerson 2001: 20-
21). Even more so than the fixed telephone, a mobile telephone is part of a highly
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intricate, global communication network, all the while being a personal, indivi-
dualised communication technology that favours personal, individualised con-
tact.15 All the necessary (but mostly technological) conditions for a completely
interconnected world may be in place, but a realisation of a grand togetherness is
not automatically in the cards.
What is noticeable as the mobile network grows, of course, is that mediated
communication is brought out more into the open, which presents us with new
scenarios for experiencing being-with-others and strengthens the notion that
anyone carrying a mobile communication device can, potentially, become part of
anyone else’s technology-mediated network. The drawback of the invasion of the
public by the private, however, is that mobile communication behaviour in public
spaces often invades and disturbs social events and face-to-face conversations
with what is perceived as trivial and redundant chitchat or gossip. Now, gossip is
the basic social glue with which humans build and maintain social bonds, and
mobile telephones are very apt at facilitating it anywhere and round-the-clock
(Fox 2001), but when experienced intrusively and only one-sidedly it tends to
aggravate companions, bystanders, and eavesdroppers, causing them to feel dis-
empowered (Plant 2001: 31) or convinced that communication in the mobile age
has become tawdry (Palen, Salzman & Youngs 2000: 207). This strained intermin-
gling of public (outside) space with private (inside) space is what psychologist
Kathleen Cumiskey (2005) calls the paradox of techno-intimacy: to ourselves, our
mobile telephone is a highly convenient personal item and our own mobile com-
munication behaviour is perfectly acceptable, but we tend not to appreciate the
same behaviour and attitude towards the valuation of mobile communication in
others. In this sense, techno-intimacy, the ambivalent relationship between the
desire to be connected and know all on the one hand and the need to stand apart
from the multitude on the other, is itself a typical exponent of the paradox of
idealised communication: an achieved complete togetherness will necessarily
entail the loss of individuality, and mobile telephony will continue to stress this
phenomenon.
Real-time relief of anxiety
If we perceive mobile telephones to be personal devices full of communicative
potential that, through their capability to transgress space and time, can maintain
and strengthen bonds with primary social group members and make coordina-
tion activities more ad-hoc and prominent, one of the following observations
must be that the psychological ‘fix’ attached to wireless communication beha-
viour heavily relies on the involvement of feelings of reassurance. Providing relief
is the perfect medicine for those that desire to be free from the anxieties that
necessary fictions of progress can produce, and the mobile telephone promises
to do exactly that when it comes to dealing with the high expectations that stem
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from the hope that communication will be improved. For many, the emotional
immediacy of the device has registered itself as an indispensable part of their
everyday life, like the aura of a talisman worn for good luck and protection. The
ability to ‘just call’ or ‘just text’ and receive a confirmation of an appointment, an
answer to a question, a promise of help, or an acknowledgement of an intimate
relationship, preferably as quickly as possible or at least within socially acceptable
time limits, makes for a very appealing advertisement premise, as well as for a
credible and legitimate motivation to own a mobile telephone.
And indeed, research has shown that a need for security, safety, and reassur-
ance is high on the list of initial reasons why people decide to buy mobile tele-
phones, either for themselves or for their children or other loved ones. In a cross-
cultural field study undertaken in Berlin, San Francisco, Shanghai, and Tokyo, it
was found that mobile telephones were, alongside keys and money, ‘considered
essential irrespective of culture or gender’ for ‘survival in the modern urban
world’ (Chipchase et al. 2005). In a 1999 qualitative survey of 36 focus groups in
six European countries, Richard Ling reports,
respondents were asked to what degree they agreed or disagreed with the
statement ‘The mobile telephone is useful in an emergency.’ We found that
approximately 82% of the respondents were in complete agreement. There
was no other attitudinal indicator with regard to mobile telephony that had
such an extreme score. (Ling 2004: 37)
Similar results were obtained from studies in the United States and Australia
(ibid.: 38). In yet another study in the United States, safety and security were
identified as forming a common, broad category of motivations, which were
‘often associated with car-related safety or for unknown situations that might
arise’ (Palen, Salzman & Youngs 2000: 204). It should not come as a surprise to
see the car mentioned here; much as was the case with telephones made mobile
by installing them into cars, the modern day mobile telephone is perceived as an
ideal means to travel and still remain in touch with the outside world, offering the
comfort of knowing that when something goes wrong, help is always at hand.
The human fear of calamities and disasters evidently provides a sound reason
why feelings of security and safety play a significant role in the adoption of wire-
less communication technologies. The many modern folk stories that tell of
amazing rescue missions that involve the use of mobile telephones are adamant
examples of how strong the desire is to stress that increased connectedness is a
‘good trick’. Idealised ideas of communication thrive on compelling anecdotes
that allegedly prove that progress has been made, and arguably nothing provides
more conclusive evidence than accounts of lives saved or loved ones protected
thanks to new communication technologies. So, we read in The Guardian that two
British climbers, caught in a blizzard on a Swiss mountain, texted five friends,
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one of whom received the message in London at 5am and immediately notified
the rescue services in Geneva. After having waited another 36 hours because the
conditions were too severe for rescue teams to pick them up, the two climbers
were finally saved (Allison 2003). Similar stories tell of people having become
lost in a pass, shipwrecked on a boat off the coast of Indonesia, or stranded in
the outback of Australia, who were all able to alert friends or family through their
mobile telephones and consequently receive life-saving help (Turrettini 2004). In
the same vein, when in desolated urban environments people find themselves in
threatening situations or feel they are intimidated by the presence of strangers,
mobile telephones can sometimes offer a sense of protection just by their power-
ful symbolism of connectedness (Ling 2004: 44-45). Such stories thus readily feed
myths of improved communication: without the new mobile communication
technologies, lives would have been severely impaired, or even lost.
However, increased security through these technologies can only be guaran-
teed if people are willing to sacrifice some or even all control over when they can
and should be reached, and by whom. Forceful evidence of this highly charged
problem created by the need to relieve anxiety can be found in one of the more
common social relationships where reassurance plays an important role, namely
that between parents and adolescent children. On the one hand, the mobile tele-
phone offers parents the ability to let their children discover the world on their
own, with the added safety of knowing that the teenagers can always call in case
of an emergency. As one Norwegian mother in a group interview acknowledges:
I have a 17 year old and the worst thing I know is when she goes downtown. I
am so afraid but I just have to accept this you know. But it helps that she has a
mobile telephone because she can call if something happens. It is not to con-
trol my daughter that she should take her mobile when she goes out, but it is,
[…] ‘If something happens, call home and we will come immediately!’ you
know. (Ling & Helmersen 2000: 14)
Here we see the familiar themes of safety and emergency closely associated with
the mobile telephone, emphasising its function as a communicative lifeline that
can be used at any time and place.16 In this sense, it shows its appeal as an idea-
lised medium: it is the ever-present ‘materialiser’ of fulfilment of hope, hope that
everything is and will remain fine. Yet, on the other hand, even though we hear
the mother say that she does not want to control her daughter, notions of surveil-
lance and accountability are exactly what will follow from a heightened absent
presence of others. When one’s whereabouts and activities are continuously
under potential scrutiny, the mobile telephone becomes a mobile leash, exerting
a strong influence over its carrier.17 In their adolescent quest for independence
and in response to over-concerned parents, as sociologist Nicola Green has
found, teenagers often develop ‘parent management strategies’ with which they
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regulate their reachability (Green 2002: 39). Some say they had not heard the
device ringing, others automatically redirect their parents’ calls to voice mail, and
there are those that just turn off their mobile telephone when they go out, and say
that their battery was dead.18
While Green notes that what exactly constitutes surveillance and accountability
in mobile relationships is contextually based, and that the dominant association
of these concepts with state-controlled law enforcement does not do justice to the
new ways in which individuals gather and share information, what should be
regarded as most important in her analysis is her contention that the proliferation
of wireless communication technologies has ‘normalised’ the activity of checking
up on others (ibid.: 33). Through mobile telephones, Green writes, individuals
‘engage in routine monitoring of themselves and each other […], and assume
that others are self-regulating and accountable for their use of devices in both co-
present and tele-present contexts’ (ibid.: 43). Thus, everyday notions of what it
means to feel reassured increasingly come to rely on knowing what others are up
to, because the technological means to gain that knowledge are at one’s disposal
at all times. As a result, questions of privacy become more manifest.19 As sociolo-
gist James Rule contends, compared to older mass media systems, today’s infra-
structures of perpetual contact inherently generate more personalised
information available to large institutions, corporations, and groups of individ-
uals, making a future world of ‘total surveillance’ a conceivable reality (Rule
2002: 247). Even though, like Green, Rule does not want to attach a specific value
connotation to the term ‘surveillance’, he does point out that we should be cau-
tious not to easily dismiss the dangers of this outlook, or think that we can always
escape observation by simply turning off our connections when we want to (ibid.:
248). In the mobile age, perpetual contact becomes the norm, and participating
without it difficult indeed.
These observations of ambivalence in mobile reassurance technologies high-
light the pitfall of the desire for unlimited communication: the more opportu-
nities are created to connect and communicate, the more the struggle will be to
hold on to established boundaries between the private and the public, between
what can be known, should be known, and needs to be known. Mobile commu-
nication devices may be able to function as symbolic crowbars, breaking open
social patterns of communicative behaviour, but they can only do so at the
expense of disclosing a lot more information than people might care to consider.
What is more, even if the aforementioned boundaries would blur to such an
extent that more data would become freely available than otherwise possible,
there would still remain the nagging uncertainty whether that retrieved informa-
tion is truly enough for one to be relieved of all anxiety. In fact, by seeking reas-
surance through radical connectedness, another type of anxiety is created, one
that stems from simultaneously being connected to someone far away and know-
ing that that distance cannot be bridged physically. This spatial discrepancy may
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not be so problematic when a call is made for trivial reasons, but when related to
an emergency, the state of being distant but present can instill overwhelming
feelings of isolation and powerlessness.20 A fickle balance between fear and relief
manifests itself in the continuous search for reassurance; when Henrietta
Thompson, for example, states in Phone book that ‘[mobile] phones offer the best
peace of mind it is possible to get’, she does so in the context of Israel’s contin-
uous preparedness for terrorist attacks, where ‘[with] the fear of [terrorism]
always present, the need to communicate is paramount’, and ‘people need to be
able to check-up on their loved ones on short notice’ (Thompson 2005: 55).
So, not only does the longing for perpetual contact create problems with priva-
cy issues, it also multiplies instances of what we could denote as ‘terrifying close-
ness’, moments where mobile communication enables people to be connected in
extreme emotional circumstances while being physically apart. The torment of
such ‘intense immediacy’, as James E. Katz (2006: 104) calls it, becomes ada-
mantly clear in situations of life and death, because, while wanting to let loved
ones know they are on the mind of a dying person is an understandable human
emotion, to think that mobile telephones merely extend the possibility to do so is
to woefully misapprehend the highly disturbing perception of experiencing
remote deaths. Imagine, for instance, the unimaginable conversation between
the stranded mountaineer and his wife, whom he had called from somewhere on
Mount Everest to say he was going to die (Cusk 2001). Or think of those other,
highly profiled accounts of mobile calls in which Eros met Thanatos, made dur-
ing and after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11
September 2001. People in the hijacked planes and those trapped inside the
stricken towers called family members to tell them that they loved them, some-
times right up to the moment when they died. After the towers had collapsed,
rescue workers could hear people from under the wreckage use their mobile tele-
phones to call for help, not seldom in vain. Most dreadful are the accounts of
unanswered mobile telephones ringing in the rubble, or even in body bags.21 All
these cases vividly illustrate how feelings of reassurance and distress can come
palpably close to merging into a single sentiment, how wireless communication
technologies can augment both intimacy and isolation to such a degree that
unlimited communication is indeed virtually reached, in all its real-time glory
and ugliness.
Omniscience and collectiveness through ever-present knowledge
The final characteristic of wireless communication technologies examined here
is, like the three discussed above, intimately connected to topoical expectations
of what new communication technologies ideally should be capable of. It is the
project of freeing access to information and knowledge, which, when pressed to
its radical ending point, should enable anyone to know anything on whatever
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topic, and become a member of a completely transparent society. This is a famil-
iar utopian narrative, of course, and the mobile communication age has sparked
renewed belief in necessary fictions that tell of ways to make this outlook a reality.
Personal wireless communication devices such as mobile telephones are pre-
sented as enabling technologies with emancipating powers, giving instant and
ubiquitous access to people and information resources which would not have
been as easily – if at all – available in the days before wireless communication
technologies. The emphasis in such imagery is often on reaching harmony and
agreement through the exchange of knowledge, and on making progress through
the fusion of ideas. The questions are, though, if these communication technolo-
gies are indeed experienced by their users as such, and to what extent idealised
ideas of making all knowledge and information accessible clash with the realities
of everyday mobile communication.
The force behind the current knowledge and information paradigm in mobile
discourse is ‘largely technology-driven’ (Castells et al. 2007: 110). One thing that
is readily noticeable in the evolution of mobile telephones is that, since the 1980s,
there has been a growing complexity of communication possibilities, which offer
more and diverse ways to interact. First, obviously, there was calling. This facili-
tated spoken dialogue between two individuals who could be located anywhere,
and, especially in its early business-oriented days, it advanced the notion that
people themselves had become more available as social and informational
resources. Then, with the development of the GSM standard in the early 1990s,
text messaging (or short message service, SMS) was added as an asynchronous
‘store-and-forward’ service (Goggin 2006: 69). Although since the end of the
1990s SMS has been appropriated by mainly young people as a means to keep in
touch, its initial proposed purpose was to function as a ‘unidirectional system for
sending “mobile terminated” messages’ (Taylor & Vincent 2005: 79). Both types
of SMS use have been retained over the years, and nowadays SMS enables individ-
uals not only to engage in mediated dialogue, but also to disseminate messages
among larger groups of people, receive automated notifications, and send codes
to computers which are then processed by specialised software. So, at the begin-
ning of the 2000s, mobile telephones did more than just handle telephone calls;
they had been integrated into a diverse range of social practices that involved
retrieving and transmitting knowledge and information. Then, over the last few
years, bandwidth capabilities were drastically increased and additional features
were packed into mobile telephones: photo cameras, music players, games, and
Internet browsers and apps all found their place in the small technological won-
ders, transforming them into smartphones.
We can see that entertainment and data processing functions have increasingly
become significant components of mobile communication. As Castells et al. put
it, ‘[m]obile communication devices are the multipurpose, multi-channel con-
necting points in the network of communication of which everybody becomes a
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personal node’ (2007: 110). Their description of people as ‘personal nodes’ here is
telling, as it raises the question whether entertainment and data processing some-
how corrupt the social nature of the mobile telephone by transforming it into a
converged set of individualising technologies.22 However, while the process of
adding new features has largely been the result of the mobile industry’s search
for more revenue, the quick acceptance by the general public of these features
also testifies to the growing cultural importance for the individual to be con-
nected to her social network in a variety of ways, using more than just speech
and text to communicate. Moreover, both industry push and consumer pull at
least in part originate from the same realm of necessary fictions that say that
increased and diversified connection possibilities are what improve the sharing
of knowledge and the advancement of human cooperation. So, the individual
may be the preferred target of selling strategies, but, crucially, the heterogeneous
interlinking of personal nodes has also intensified the awareness that knowledge
and information become more decentralised in the mobile age, making all con-
nected individuals part of an ever-present collective network where every member
potentially is in the know. This awareness, which clearly echoes ideas of idealised
communication that were found in perceptions of networked communication in
chapter 2, can especially be located in present-day discourses of the mobile/wire-
less Internet and of the perceived democratising nature of mobile telephones.
The Internet carries with it, as we saw earlier, the enlightened ideology of uni-
versal access to all available knowledge. As a medium of media and the facilitator
for the global addition, storage, transmission, and retrieval of whatever kind of
information by anyone with a connection, it remediates all previously known
communication technologies, and as such it has inherited the hopeful aspirations
of every expectation expressed so far that a communication utopia is finally within
reach. Tragically so, it turns out, because there is always the doubt that we are not
quite there yet, that there is still something that needs to be improved. The
current perceived problem of the Internet, aptly voiced by media scholar Paul
Levinson, is that the personal desktop computers that give access to the Internet
make us ‘highly dependent on walls in rooms’: they require lots of energy, and
thus are in need of electrical outlets (Levinson 2004: 38). The solution, he says,
lies in wireless communication technologies, which can bring the Internet out in
the open to create a world of ‘immediate information’ (ibid.: 55). With his ‘reme-
dial’ approach to the evolution of media, in which he sees developments as direct
reactions to perceived disadvantages of existing media, Levinson here conveys the
charged yet familiar and mythical notion that there is a ‘natural desire’ for com-
munication to be free and on the move, that making the Internet wirelessly acces-
sible satisfies a human longing (ibid.: 9-15). And indeed, we see that mobile
technology industries treat the development pattern of wireless Internet as similar
to earlier, established ‘good tricks’ in media evolution, because it, as one enthu-
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siastic chronicler of wireless Internet writes, ‘covers all communication needs of
human beings’ (Jamalipour 2003: 3).23
Such sweeping and skewed remarks are not uncommon in discourses on wire-
less Internet. The perceived magic of wireless technologies, combined with the
imaginative power of a global information system, quite palpably creates a lan-
guage of communication that harbours very familiar idealised statements about
improvement, fulfilment, completeness, cooperation, and so forth. The aptly
named British wireless broadband provider The Cloud, for instance, promises on
its website to deliver ‘[p]roper access to information, communication tools and
mission-critical applications’, which will advance productivity by increasing work
effectivity and ‘keeping your people connected away from home or the office’
(The Cloud 2007, emphasis added). A similar, but user-operated and not-for-
profit project is run by Community Wireless, an organisation that, when advocat-
ing the sharing of wireless Internet connections with community members, says
it represents ‘a global dream’, and propagates on its website the coming of ‘the
Organic Internet. The Internet re-born. The Internet the way it should be’ (Com-
munity Wireless 2001). Such utterances are not limited to advertisements or ideal-
ists’ rhetoric, however; analyses of end users’ perceptions of wireless Internet
applications have also revealed that people expect and experience advantages in
terms of ‘newer and better ways of being […] in touch with information’
(Ng-Krülle et al. 2004: 5).
With the advent of mobile telephones that support high-speed data transmis-
sions, as well as with the growing number of Internet-enabled devices such as
iPhones and Symbian/Android-based smartphones, wireless Internet increasingly
finds its way into the palms of many hands.24 In the past five years mobile tele-
phone producers and service providers have started stressing that the current crop
of devices represent that ‘what computers have become’ (Nokia 2006), that they
finally connect you in any way to ‘the people who matter most’ (T-Mobile 2010),
and that life will become better as ‘[f]rom now on, we all have more time, because
[…] the Internet is now truly mobile, so you can make use of every minute of every
day’ (Vodafone UK 2007). All these slogans of course serve to point out that the
marriage between the Internet and mobile communication devices is a successful
match, but they also subtly push the idea that the arrival of wireless Internet is
part of a natural process, one that is on a trajectory of fusing all information and
people together in a world where opportunities to make use of those fusions are
abundant.
The second important area in which we can identify the idealised notion that,
through their attributed inherent ability to share knowledge and information,
mobile communication devices are instrumental in the construction of an egali-
tarian space of collective intelligence, is in accounts of their supposed democratic
nature. Especially mobile telephones have become powerful symbols of both
communicative liberation and social inclusion, and as such are seen as the instru-
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ments of choice for bridging all forms of divides, be it the political divide, the
economic divide, or any other demographic digital divide variable. The main rea-
son for this symbolic investment lies in the perception of the role of earlier mass
media in constructing a homogenised and even imposing system, in which domi-
nant power relations and an undemocratic control over communication and
information networks largely prohibited individual expressions of opinion to be
made public. Visibly making use of myths of the technological sublime, criticism
of the mass media has taken the shape of celebrating new, decentralised, and
personalised communication technologies, with which old communication obsta-
cles are thought to be eradicated. Thus, next to the Internet, mobile telephones
are often touted as a very effective means to circumnavigate the disadvantages
posed by the mass-media system, and to create new networks of cooperation.
Imaginative stories of how they enable people to group together in what Howard
Rheingold (2002) calls ‘smart mobs’, and subsequently oust presidents, over-
throw governments, or orchestrate massive ad-hoc demonstrations, all serve as
powerful new chapters in necessary fictions of hope and progress achieved
through improved communication technologies.
While such stories are prone to overestimate the role of mobile telephones and
are often more anecdotal than substantive, they do convey a demonstrable and
widely held understanding of wireless communication technologies as catalysts
of changes in societal power relations. With the caveat that he does not want to
suggest any inevitability about mobile telephones opposing centralised power,
science and technology historian Jon Agar, for instance, sees ‘a correlation, a
sympathetic alignment, between the mobile phone and the horizontal networks
that have grown in the last few decades in comparison with older, more hierarch-
ical, more centralised models of organisation’ (Agar 2003: 162). Similarly, after
having been equally careful in avoiding the construction of a technological deter-
minist argument, Castells et al. assert:
Still, it cannot be denied, based on the observation of recent processes of
sociopolitical change, that access to and use of wireless communication tech-
nology adds a fundamental tool to the arsenal of those who seek to influence
politics and the political process without being constrained by the powers that
be. (Castells et al. 2007: 212)
Other empirically gathered evidence of how mobile telephones can assist in
throwing off the shackles of poor government and economic disadvantages can
particularly be found in developing countries, where micro-entrepreneurs use the
devices to access price information themselves instead of relying on suspect state-
controlled media reports (Donner 2003). So, even though we should not discount
other factors that play a part in social, economic, and political change, we can say
that wireless communication technologies are perceived as adding a significant
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impetus to bringing about that change. The idea, again, is that by unlocking
channels to information and knowledge, they empower the individual.
We should be careful, however, not to identify the empowerment of the indi-
vidual and the growth of horizontal networks as unique utterances of the idea-
lised desire to create harmony and ultimate togetherness through improving
communication. Nor would it be wise to ignore the drawbacks of these processes,
which define just as much how we experience the change towards the mobile
communication age. As more and more people are connected, the kinks in idea-
lised ideas of communication will become increasingly articulated. In the grand
project of raising access to knowledge and information to ubiquitous levels, one
of the more conspicuous problems for instance is that, as the flow of information
grows over time, more doubts will arise about the value of retrieved information,
as there will always be more to evaluate. As James E. Katz notes, ‘technologies of
freedom’ such as the Internet and mobile telephones aim to establish ‘pluralism
of expression rather than a dissemination of prefabricated ideas’, and as such
they create ample room for struggles over meanings and interpretations (Katz
2006: 151). Thus, in what he sees as an ironic reversal of Claude Shannon’s axiom
that information is uncertainty reduction, Katz holds that ‘increased information
also leads to increased uncertainty’ (ibid.: 152). A similar observation comes from
Joshua Meyrowitz, who, after having explored how wireless communication me-
dia create new possibilities for ‘non-geographic “groups” to act together’, notes:
Ironically, the increased potential to access, juxtapose, compare and contrast,
and construct alternative narratives is often paired with the reduction in the
psychological inclination to engage in such time-consuming analysis. Para-
doxically, the more our new technologies allow us to accomplish in an instant,
the more we seem to run out of time. (Meyrowitz 2003: 100-101, emphasis in
original)
Meyrowitz here reaffirms the notion that the ever-returning hopes and promises
that social harmony will automatically increase with improved communication
continuously clash with the reality of everyday communication, in which the need
to filter and select is strong but the ability to do so is limited. Echoing the pro-
blematic effects of the desire to achieve communication utopia discussed earlier,
such clashes in the swelling streams of information can induce anxiety over
reachability, transparency, and accountability. What information is true or useful,
and what is not? Where did it originate, and from whom? Just as mobile tele-
phones can easily aid in spreading important news or calls for action, they can
also multiply rumours and inaccurate information, perhaps even more so than
other media because of their personal nature (Fox 2001; Castells et al. 2007: 212).
Furthermore, instrumental as they may be perceived in the possibility of connect-
ing people in a truly democratic fashion, their use is predominantly geared
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towards maintaining existing social networks, and not towards integrating into a
larger social cohesion (Fortunati 2003: 249-250). Again, this reveals the contra-
dictory human tendency discussed earlier to also resist the implications of the for-
mation of a ‘grand togetherness’, and to be wary of a state of existence in which
individuality and belonging no longer carry their current meanings.
As was the case with the previously discussed characteristics of mobile commu-
nication, by radically opening up access to and production of knowledge and
information, wireless communication technologies fervently confront us with the
paradoxes of pure communication, getting us closer to the fulfilment of the desire
for unlimited connectedness but at the same time letting us experience its ruth-
less blending of all actors involved. This process will continue to go on, co-
oriented by the myths that say that there is still room for more improvement.
Improving perfection
Technology. Making ‘better’ better. Onwards, upwards, any way but backwards.
Tapping progress on the shoulder, and saying: more forwards please! (Honda 2006)
If there is one thing that should be adamantly clear after the analysis of how
idealised ideas of communication find their expression in wireless communica-
tion technologies, it is that new devices may on the one hand be presented and
experienced as truly bringing important prerequisites of pure communication a
big step closer to becoming a reality, but that they, on the other hand, strikingly
resemble other and older media technologies in being just another tragic attempt
in the never-ending quest to reach communication utopia. As with those earlier
attempts, both wilful amnesia and myths of progress have accompanied wireless
communication dispositifs from the onset, making sure it is quickly forgotten
that the media we have now are themselves already the result of trying to improve
things, and telling us we need to improve once more. Thus, mobile communica-
tion devices are unstable media, always part of an evolutionary process that
knows no end, always susceptible to all kinds of social, political, and economic
factors that, together with idealised ideas of communication, lay bare strong as
well as weak spots and open up new paths for improvement. Because we continu-
ously run into the paradoxes of the desire for pure communication, we keep on
eliminating as well as creating obstacles, and therefore set ourselves up for the
inevitable lure of the beckoning future or for the looming threat of the onrushing
future. There is still more road to travel and still more to add to what we have got,
is the prevalent attitude. Today, there are two widespread developments in the
wireless communication paradigm that are presented or perceived as making
mobile communication devices even better than they are now: the introduction of
location awareness capabilities and the creation of the Internet of Things.
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Location awareness
One of the most noticeable additions to mobile communication devices in the
past few years has been the possibility to have them ‘know’ where they are in
geographical space, and thus make them location-aware in their functioning. Of
course, because cellular technology works with uniquely identifiable base stations
that provide radio coverage for mobile telephones in small overlapping areas (or
cells), a certain knowledge of where the devices are located has always already
been part of the cellular system. However, the range of these cells can vary
between seven hundred metres to as much as 70 kilometres, making it very hard
to pinpoint exactly where a connected mobile device is when only its cell identifi-
cation is used as a marker.25 It is only now, when GPS processors are slowly but
surely becoming a default feature of mobile telephones, that their location can be
determined much more precisely, with a typical accuracy that ranges between less
than a metre and about fifteen metres. Fuelled not only by the mobile industry’s
need to create additional streams of revenue, but also by FCC and EU regulatory
decisions aimed at aiding rescue workers in accurately responding to emergency
calls made on mobile telephones, GPS-equipped communication devices are
quickly becoming commonplace.26
The effect of this beefing up of wireless communication technologies promises
to be profound. While communication devices such as mobile telephones first
transferred mediated conversations from the ‘situatedness’ of fixed connections
to the highly nondescriptive ‘anywhere’ of media space, their location awareness
now reinserts a spatial variable into our understanding of mobile communication.
Not only does this potentially reconstruct earlier conceptions of what it means to
be spatially connected, but it also incorporates location as yet another type of
accessible information into our growing sense of omniscience. From this process
a new kind of hybrid space emerges, one where additional information layers
have been added to physical locations, and where a user of a mobile device will
have been transformed into an even more tightly integrated node in an ever-
expanding information network (Vries 2012). In such a hybrid space, more and
more variables will be stored in databases and become available for query, to be
used in many conceivable social situations or emergencies (see Gordon & de
Souza e Silva 2011). The digitisation and mobilisation of location can thus be
perceived as adding yet more weight to the persistent idea that mobile wireless
communication technologies can (and are expected to) offer us access to any type
of information, anytime, anywhere.
It is therefore hardly surprising that location awareness is researched and mar-
keted as vigorously as it is today. It presents the opportunity to proclaim renewed
hope in a better, even more beckoning future where communication has yet again
been improved. In a familiar display of how idealised ideas of communication
come to be expressed in wireless technology discourse, the notion is put forward
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in press releases and technical papers alike that with location-aware devices a
‘qualitative leap’ is made in mobile communication, one that will ‘deliver relevant,
timely, and engaging content and information’, and ‘can help reduce confusion’ (Rao
& Minakakis 2003: 61, emphasis added). In scenarios of today’s communication
needs, the modern citizen is portrayed as being in danger of becoming unsettled,
either by daunting tsunamis of information or by her lack of knowledge of her
immediate surroundings, and, as usual, she is promised that new communication
technologies will help solve those problems and make life easier, this time by
interacting with her surroundings in all kinds of ‘intelligent’ ways. The problem-
solving characteristics of new location-aware mobile technologies are especially
highlighted in some of the more recent NTT DoCoMo promotional videos, which
present us with a mobile life in the near future that, through a pursuit of ‘Smart
Innovation’, is strongly integrated with positioning technologies (NTT DoCoMo
2010). There seems to be no limit to what those interactions might be: proposed
applications that make use of added spatial intelligence include the abilities to
navigate unknown roads, find nearby friends, locate restaurants or other busi-
nesses, receive offers from stores while passing them, play location-based games,
walk ‘digitally enhanced’ touristic routes, and so forth.27 The only thing that is
needed to never get lost again in the myriad of data, or so it appears, is the new,
context-sensitive wireless communication device.
In the rhetoric of advertisements and industry forecasts, then, location-aware
mobile devices are often denoted as constituting a new breed of ‘smart’ technolo-
gies. This not only suggests that previous versions of mobile devices and other
older communication technologies were ‘dumb’ and were in dire need of
improvement, but also that the new devices have gained in autonomous beha-
viour. The rationale behind the use of ‘smart’ as an ideograph here fits perfectly
with the discursive strategies that idealised ideas of communication would typi-
cally produce: with added intelligence at hand, packed in a small technological
marvel, the burden to communicate without obstacles cannot be but alleviated,
so it seems. As a result, the perception of what is being ‘smartened’ is not
restricted to the devices only; in one smooth sweep, communication itself also
becomes smart, intelligent, efficient, and freed from obstacles. Again, the fact
that the paradoxical consequences and dilemmas of an actual fulfilment of such
a smart future are cunningly occluded illustrates not only how promises of a bet-
ter future depend on tempting images in general, but particularly on the portrayal
of communication as something that through its improvement has helped us get-
ting to that better future in the first place.
The Internet of Things
From the mobile world in which handheld, networked, and location-aware
devices can interact with their surroundings and create an additional informa-
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tional relationship between people and their spatial context, it is a small step to
envision a world where such ‘intelligent’ connections have become even more
pervasive, and physical objects themselves can compute and communicate infor-
mation across wireless networks. This is more than just a science fiction fantasy;
it is a prominent line of thinking that is visible in discourses produced by the
wireless industry, and already an actual fact in personal micro-networking envir-
onments and in domains where logistics operations and tracking goods are of
particular importance. Several enabling technologies have been developed in the
past few years to make the ubiquitous computing scenario a reality, of which
Bluetooth and radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags are the most common.
The Bluetooth standard, aptly named after the medieval Danish king Harald
Blåtand for his unifying powers,28 was created to make multiple devices commu-
nicate with each other through the use of radio transceiver microchips. Such
Bluetooth-enabled devices can detect and connect to each other to form small
data networks, in theory linking up very heterogeneous technologies such as
mobile telephones, refrigerators, stereo sets, personal computers, and microwave
ovens. RFID tags are somewhat comparable to radiographic bar codes, but with
the added value of being able to store all kinds of contextual information for the
objects they are attached to. They are very small, cheaply produced and easily
distributed radio transceivers that can be embedded in items such as groceries,
clothes, money notes, passports, animals, cars, or mobile telephones. Combined
with growing wireless Internet connection possibilities and the integration of
GPS in mobile communication devices, Bluetooth and RFID add to an ever-finer
mesh of network technologies.
The discursive logic that accompanies the advent of these tiny radio transcei-
vers provides an exceptionally fine case in point to illustrate how wireless net-
working technologies are readily endowed with all kinds of interconnective and
unifying powers, and are perceived as the next step in bringing about an even
more seamless world experience. Originally coined by former Proctor & Gamble
brand manager Kevin Ashton when formulating an RFID-based solution for the
logistical problems of efficiently storing and transporting his company’s prod-
ucts, the phrase ‘Internet of Things’ was at first a rather bloated way of describing
how, as he put it, goods could be tracked ‘from manufacturing to the consumer
and even through recycling’ (Roberti 2002). Indeed, if we look at the predominant
way in which RFID tags are currently being used, we should still be inclined to
think of the term Internet of Things as being somewhat overwrought. At present,
the miniature radio sensors mostly have been deployed in areas where they can
provide an economic or security advantage, for instance by eliminating the need
to manually scan or register bar codes on products, by reducing fraud without
having to physically count and check the authenticity of chips on a casino poker
table, or by increasing the amount of control over who has physical access to
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various infrastructural facilities (Gilbert 2005; Kürschner et al. 2010; Thiesse et al.
2009).
However, this instrumental use is not seldom seen as the starting point of what
could, in a very near future, amount to the more transcendental marriage of bits
and atoms, the vision of a global multipurpose network of sentient and data-col-
lecting objects that is foreseen and popularised by people like Nicholas
Negroponte, Howard Rheingold, and Bruce Sterling. Especially Sterling is of
interest here; as a science fiction writer with an avid interest in all things asso-
ciated with imagined and dead media, and as such a frequently invited keynote
speaker on everything related to the possible futures of new technologies, Sterling
has a well-informed view of some of the more radical implications of implement-
ing small and cheap transceiver technologies on a grand scale. In his book Shap-
ing things (2005), he argues that a massive deployment of RFID tags – which he, in
an attempt to quench the predominantly corporate business-like language con-
noted by the acronym, proposes to call ‘arphids’ – presents us with a mode of
living in which everything has become an information object that is identifiable,
traceable, searchable, readable, filterable, and, most of all, available for use
(Sterling 2005: 85-91). Subsequently, in the resulting – now more aptly named –
‘Internet of Things’, Sterling holds, ‘many previously knotty problems simply
vaporize, they become trivial’ (ibid.: 93). Clearly, the notion of an Internet of
Things thus comes to stand for yet another all-encompassing technological solu-
tion, one that operates as an omnipresent information and knowledge safety net,
as a mental cushion that is seamlessly integrated into everyday life.
Sterling’s views on the possible outcomes and projected uses of such a grand
web of interconnected radiochip-equipped objects resonate across a wide range
of visions on the future of communication technologies, and recall well-known
utopian discourses.29 Most notably, they can be located in the 2005 annual report
of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the specialised United
Nations agency that, since 1865, recommends standards and formulates regula-
tions aimed at strengthening international telecommunications consensus.
Again, idealised ideas of improved communication can be distinguished in this
influential report: the prevalent motive behind the formation of an omnipresent
constellation of networked humans and intelligent devices and objects is that it
fulfils the desire to, in the words of analysts from the Strategy and Policy Unit of
the ITU, take the ‘next logical step in this technological revolution [of] connecting
people anytime, anywhere’, and create an ‘Internet of Things [that] will enable
forms of collaboration and communication between people and things, and
between things themselves, hitherto unknown and unimagined’ (ITU 2005a,
emphasis added). The crux is, of course, that the forms of collaboration and com-
munication that will be enabled are already known and imagined, as they will be
built on deeply ingrained and very familiar desires for ideal communication that
have oriented many of the ‘logical’ steps in media evolution.30 The vision of the
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future of ubiquitous computing and communication simply takes the ‘anytime,
anyplace, anyone’ mantra of the current mobile communication condition, and
radically extends it into ‘anytime, anyplace, anything’, stretching idealised ideas of
communication even more towards their theoretical limits. Equally visible are
notions of beckoning and onrushing futures, which encourage and spur us on to
act upon challenges and concerns. According to the report, the enabling technol-
ogies of the Internet of Things will, especially in the developing world, offer
‘medical diagnosis and treatment, cleaner water, improved sanitation, energy pro-
duction, the export of commodities and food security’; if we do not choose to
employ intelligent technologies that can warn us of a variety of hazards, however,
we risk an increasing ‘loss of life due to natural disasters’ (ITU 2005b: 10-11). The
future thus looks bright, but only if we abide by the presumed logical steps of
technological revolutions; while the ITU is quick to note that the scenario of link-
ing everything to everything might engender concerns over privacy issues, it sees
these concerns as obstacles that can and must be overcome, and warns that if we
are not aware of the future benefits, ‘the development of the Internet of Things
will be hampered if not prevented’ (ibid.: 9). Crucially, the ever-growing depen-
dency on large and complex technological systems is de-presented, masking the
inevitable problems that come with that dependency and thus upholding myths of
improvement.
In the end, the unabashed enthusiasm for what an Internet of Things holds in
store for us is a continuation of earlier dreams of how communication technolo-
gies are able to bring us closer to finally bridging the gaps and removing all
obstacles on the way to the communication sublime. Today, the dream is to use
ubiquitous and pervasive wireless technologies to create an informational cloud,
to facilitate access to an ambient intelligence, to expel anxiety over not being able
to find, know, or understand someone or something, in other words, to construct
a seamless information society where all questions can be answered by, in the
words of the director of the Center for Bits and Atoms, Neil Gershenfeld, ‘embed-
ding the means to solve problems in the things around us’ (Gershenfeld 1999:
10). When, in the future, we are all to dissolve into this global data stream, we
might become like digital angels… but our wilful amnesia will have guaranteed
that we will not consciously realise it.
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Epilogue
It would be practical if for everyone there was something like a dictionary, in which you
could look up the correct meaning if you do not understand someone. It would take away
a lot of confusion. Everything would be clear and certain. But for now, I will have to keep
communicating, in all possible ways and with all kinds of people, so that I will find out
everything myself. And maybe, there will come a day when I will directly understand
everything and anyone. And they understand me.
(We all communicate. But do we understand each other? Anne Geelen 2006)
In 2006, the 14-year-old Dutch high school student Serena Croes asked Anne
Geelen, a television director of children’s programmes, if she would be interested
in making a documentary about the many ways in which people communicate
these days, and whether all the various means of communication such as email,
text messaging, chat software, notes, and telephone calls actually helped in
improving our understanding of each other. Geelen agreed, and for a few days
she followed Serena with her camera, recording conversations with friends and
parents, and interviewing Serena at home. As it turned out, Serena, as adolescents
are prone to do, struggled with the fact that with some people it is easier to com-
municate than with others, and that it can be difficult to determine, and switch
between, the many different modes of communication needed to relate to her
family and friends. At the end of the documentary, we see her writing in her diary
while hearing her say the words I used as the motto for this epilogue: what if
everyone had a dictionary, and we could look up what people actually meant
when we do not understand them? Wouldn’t that be convenient? Wouldn’t it be
even better if, someday, we could understand everyone and everything directly?
Serena reiterates the central thesis of this book in just a few sentences: at one
point or another, we can or will be aware of the desire to know pure communica-
tion, and maybe secretly long for it ourselves, but the reality of everyday life leads
us to realise that it will always be just that: a wish for something that will never
fully materialise but will haunt us nevertheless. Serena is not alone in expressing
this urgent yet ultimately unfulfillable hope for communication utopia. It is a fun-
damental human need to recount myths that tell of progress, of paths that lead to
a utopian sublime state. These myths, powerful as they are, recurrently pervade
every imaginable narrative space, constantly affirming and (re)constructing stor-
ies that establish a two-pole system: on the one end, we live in a world in which
we are confronted with mysterious and age-old questions about the purpose of
our existence, and on the other end is the place where those questions are
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answered, made redundant, or are even deemed irrelevant. The path between
those poles is often presented as one of great hardship and is never really com-
pleted, but the crux of the myths is that at least there appears to be a road that can
be travelled. No matter how unreal or irrational it may seem to actually arrive at
the other end of the two-pole system, necessary fictions tell us it can be done.
Ideas of purpose and progress are thus employed as a heuristic tool to structure
an otherwise chaotic world of phenomena and objects. The creation, telling, and
retelling of stories of hope, progress, and accomplished utopias through time
bolsters our belief that the promise of the new brings with it an endless range of
possibilities, and that it therefore justifies any means necessary to invade this
space of possibility in order to come closer to a certain ideal. From Greek myths
via More’s Utopia to Enlightenment ideals and commercial advertisements in the
information age, we can see that the results of attempts to reach or construct the
ideal state have always been ambiguous and never final. Invariably, all outcomes
have at best shifted the status quo, leaving wide open new possibilities and main-
taining the lure of the not-yet-become. The line of thinking exposed here is that
there is always a tomorrow where the problems and anxieties of today could be
solved; there is always a motive for foreseeing that there will be closure.
This explains the seemingly trans-historical character of necessary fictions that
tell of reaching the communication sublime: full closure is never achieved, as we
perpetually believe that it is just around the corner. The remarkable thing is that
desiring this closure is actually a tragic feat: communicative noise is a constitutive
element that cannot be circumvented, so while it is seen as an obstacle to true
understanding and therefore has to be eliminated, it also makes communication
what it is, namely a process that through continuous negotiations and struggles
with misunderstandings defines us as unique individuals. The desire for closure
by constructing the perfect language or by developing the ultimate communica-
tion technology is thus a desire to transform the human self, to have it become
subjected to universalising tendencies that seek to create a world in which every-
one is equal. A fulfilment of this desire would present us with the paradox of a
fulfilled utopia, a sublime state where conflicts are amended, differences have
disappeared, and only a zombie-like blissful existence remains. Still, even though
dystopian and anti-utopian narratives point us to the sombre outlooks of worlds
in which universalising tendencies lead to the totalitarian regimes that make pos-
sible the elimination of obstacles and differences, the longing for improvement
towards a better, final goal abides.
This longing interacts with our continuous struggles to understand ourselves
and others, as the example of Serena’s wish very aptly shows. Communication
ideals are predominantly expressed in terms of guaranteeing closeness and reci-
procity, reaching consensus, unifying channels, making and sharing multiple
connections, removing semantic fog, tuning to the right frequency, and synchro-
nising thoughts. The ways in which these ideals are to be reached focus largely on
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language and technology; the reasoning being that a common universal language
would remove the problem of interpretation, and ubiquitous communication
technology would guarantee perpetual contact, with which people would be in
direct and constant touch. We keep being confronted and lured by these myths of
the communication sublime for three reasons: first, the instrumental dimension
of communication, in which error-free transfer of information is emphasised,
provides powerful marketing slogans that readily tap into desires for improve-
ment; second, our notions of what lies ahead of us and what we have to do to get
there are influenced by images of beckoning or onrushing futures, and both these
images regard communicative noise as an obstacle that either is or has to be
removed; and third, future-making in itself generally presents only clear-cut out-
comes, and conveniently leaves out the noisy consequences of the programmes
that are presented as leading towards those outcomes. In other words, there is a
clear symbiosis between imagining what improved communication could be, and
acting upon it: on the one side, those working in the business of producing and
selling new communication technologies make very good use of our susceptibility
to myths about ideal communication, and on the other, we let them do so, as, in
the end, we think the same.
We should therefore be fully aware of the strong influence of myths in orient-
ing inventors, scientists, entrepreneurs, producers, marketeers, politicians, con-
sumers, and so forth, towards creating specific materialisations and uses of
communication technologies. The interpretative flexibility of media may engen-
der many media dispositifs, but there are limits to that flexibility, and an inquiry
into myths of communication can help identify what those limits are. In the
words of philosopher Lee Worth Bailey, ‘[a]n entirely new consciousness is
needed’, one that is aware that ‘technological culture is teeming with dreams,
visions, hopes, goals, expectations, and imaginative premises’, and that we need
to understand that technological thinking ‘contains a far larger and more influen-
tial component of enchantment by unconscious fantasies than is commonly
acknowledged’ (Bailey 2005: 17). This is exactly what a media-archaeological and
evolutionary approach to technology development can provide: it has a non-tele-
ological view on history and it acknowledges the various environments in which
military, economic, political, scientific, and social factors play a role in shaping
technologies, but it also recognises the agency of necessary fictions that orient
development towards ‘good tricks’, or, in other words, towards the material
expressions of our desires for utopian communication. When we look at media
history from this media-archaeological and evolutionary perspective, we see that,
despite reality proving many utopian claims wrong, new communication technol-
ogies have been and still are presented and perceived as providing opportunities
for finally realising true democracy, cultural and social unification, the unlocking
of all the world’s knowledge, and so forth. It is what ‘the new’ does: it perpetually
gives our technological imaginary, our yearning for wholeness and completeness
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that is projected upon technology, fresh impulses by portraying existing technol-
ogies as inadequate, and, in the same sweep, by introducing us to the next big
thing as a solution.
Mobile communication devices are undoubtedly the next big thing of today.
They did not suddenly originate in contextual isolation, nor were they exclusively
the result of a carefully planned corporate strategy. They slowly evolved out of the
ground of scientific and technological competence that existed around the 1920s,
during which their development was propelled by, in the first place, a drive to
fully uncover the affordances of the electromagnetic spectrum; second, by super-
vening social necessities such as enhancing the response time of emergency ser-
vices; and third, by a continuously present demand from potential customers who
could afford the technology. In all of these motives, myths of ideal communica-
tion played their powerful and strategic discursive role, doing so through justify-
ing the need for investments and large-scale experiments, through orienting
developers towards realising popular imagery of what the ‘original dream’ of
mobile wireless communication could be, and through advertisements that
upheld the notion that the way that ordinary people experienced mediated com-
munication still needed improvement. We should be careful not to give these
myths all the credit, though; regulatory decisions, political motives, and plain
technological impossibilities also influenced the process, making it far from self-
evident that the mobile communication condition would naturally evolve into the
one we now live in.
Still, today the general attitude towards mobile communication devices seems
to be, despite heterogeneous reception, one of almost unconditional acceptance,
as if the devices truly meet an inherent communicative need. Not only are they
integrated into all kinds of everyday activities in enormously large numbers, but
their accompanying discourses make it very seductive to think that they indeed
present the most logical and natural solution to our communication problems.
Many people experience mobile communication devices as primary and indispen-
sable tools for increasing opportunities to connect, socialise, find relief, and
gather knowledge, giving credence to the idea that they are perceived as being
best suited to fulfil long-held desires for improved communication. What is
more, the devices’ propensity to also further stress the dark sides of a realised
communication utopia is yet another sign that they are part of an evolutionary
path towards what we think is communication utopia: relentless connectivity, a
blurring of the private and public, terrifying closeness, and anxiety over transpar-
ency and accountability are all outcomes of the universalising tendencies that are
inherently present in utopian projects. Moreover, by the looks of things, the
future of wireless communication technologies will only intensify the communi-
cation paradox: when everyone and everything becomes part of the all-encom-
passing Internet and Internet of Things, we will have to learn to live with living in
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the ‘absolute present’ (Allon 2004), in which communication, human relations,
and identities will have taken on a radically different meaning.
This is no small matter. It has to be recognised that, within the current state of
affairs in the communication media landscape, mobile communication devices
have been endowed with the full weight of hopes and desires that have given
shape to many previous attempts to come closer to communication utopia. In
this sense, there is nothing new about their hyped production, marketing, and
reception: we have seen it all before. Nonetheless, we should not be naive to think
it is simply business as usual, because mobile communication devices do have an
unprecedented and very specific impact on our lives. If basic prerequisites for the
constitution of communication utopia are indeed to be understood as being
omnipresent, omniscient, and therefore ‘omniconnected’, then the affordances
of mobile communication devices come a long way in meeting those prerequi-
sites, as they virtually guarantee real-time contact with anyone, anything, anytime,
anywhere. The paradigm of ubiquitous connectivity has been in the cards for
quite some time, and the growing presence and discursive importance of the ima-
gery of mobile communication devices emphatically reflect that. However, omni-
connectedness does not necessarily mean that we will, by definition, move
towards understanding each other better; with ever-growing opportunities to con-
nect and retrieve and store information, successful communication in the mobile
communication condition has de-emphasised the pragmatic dimension of getting
to know the other, and has increasingly taken on more instrumental connotations
such as establishing and maintaining contact, or collecting data. In this sense,
communication’s ‘good trick’ might turn out far more relentless in its conse-
quences than we are able to acknowledge, or are actually willing to see.
Let me conclude this book by saying that the process of writing it has also
revealed itself to be an exercise in duly accepting that while the desire to know
ideal communication exists, it will never be fulfilled. There have been many times
when I just knew that there had to be a better way of expressing my thoughts, that
the words were there, somewhere, yet not readily available for me to write them
down. In those moments of despair, I felt like I was one of the inquisitors in Jorge
Luis Borges’s ‘Library of Babel’ (1998): men who, forever unsuccessfully, search
the infinite collection of books that hold all knowledge for that single volume that
will reveal the fundamental mysteries of humankind. At this last page of my own
addition to the library, I know, more than I ever did before I started writing, that
all we do is perpetually live through the same tragic yet highly meaningful strug-





1. At the time of writing, the discussed video as well as other NTT DoCoMo ‘Vision 2010’
videos are available for viewing on Youtube (see Seadaniel 2006; Thiagobassolli 2007).
From 2008 onwards, as the year 2010 approached quickly and most predictions
increasingly looked set to be proved incorrect, subsequent NTT DoCoMo videos have
been conveniently renamed Vision 201X and Vision 2020.
2. This discursive strategy employed by NTT DoCoMo very much reverberates that of a
memorable AT&T advertisement campaign of the early 1990s, entitled ‘You Will’. In
these ads, the presentation of several futuristic communication scenarios is accompa-
nied by a male voice-over that asks ‘Have you ever…’, and at the end of the ads those
questions are promisingly and reassuringly answered with ‘You will’. See also
Rodowick (1995) for a critical analysis of AT&T’s future-making rhetoric.
3. This shared use of mobile telephones is mainly visible in developing countries. A
poignant example is the ‘Village Phone’ project, in which micro-entrepreneurs set up
shop in rural villages and provide phone calls to the local community on a per-call
basis (Grameen Foundation 2011).
4. The hypothesis of indiscrimination is discursively appealing but does not hold empiri-
cally; as sociologist Leopoldina Fortunati showed, although the mobile telephone
‘expresses a strong capacity for social inclusion’ because of ‘its disposition as an indi-
vidual and not domestic or family technology’, there are still significant differences to
be found in the penetration and possession of mobile telephones between men and
women, young people, adults, and elderly, and between countries (Fortunati 2003:
239-241).
5. The predictive power of industry leaders is not to be underestimated. In their seminal
article ‘Foresight and hindsight: The case of the telephone’, Ithiel de Sola Pool et al.
(1977) provide an analysis of several reasons why developers are better at forecasting
than other commentators, among which the self-fulfilling prophecy plays an impor-
tant role. Developers are often successful as forecasters, Pool et al. hold, because they
‘had the inventions, a vision of how the inventions could be used, and they controlled
the businesses that implemented those visions’ (Pool et al. 1977: 129).
6. See Paragas (2003) for a critical discussion and a reassessment of the supposed coor-
dinating agency of mobile telephones in instigating and directing the event.
7. Just as they can bring people together in harmony, mobile telephones can also be used
to heighten tensions; according to spokesman Bernard Barrett of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, for instance, outbursts of violence in Kenya in 2008
were partly fuelled by rumours that were ‘spread by cell phone text messages’ (CNN
2008).
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8. As culture critic Erik Davis writes, ‘the magical idea that engineering will create [a
more peaceful, virtuous, and wondrous] world is an ominous and tricky dream,
though it seems a mighty difficult dream to shake’ (Davis 1988: 22).
9. In the context of the citation, Mercury, in keeping with the Greek nomenclature,
should of course have been named Hermes. Zeus is known in Latin as Jupiter or Jove.
10. For an elaborate account of the problems that arise when media are ‘ontologised’, see
Boomen (2012).
11. Foucault, in his attempt to cast ideas of historical continuity aside and come to a new
form of historiography in L’Archéologie du savoir (translated as The archaeology of knowledge
in 1972), writes that in order to accomplish this we must rid ourselves of notions such
as ‘tradition’: ‘[I]t is intended to give a special temporal status to a group of phenom-
ena that are both successive and identical (or at least similar); it makes it possible to
rethink the dispersion of history in the form of the same; it allows a reduction of the
difference proper to every beginning, in order to pursue without discontinuity the end-
less search for the origin; tradition enables us to isolate the new against a background
of permanence, and to transfer its merit to originality, to genius, to the decisions
proper to individuals’ (Foucault 1972: 23).
1. Discourses of progress and utopia
1. For a broad overview, see for instance the bibliography of secondary sources on the
website of the New York Public Library’s exhibition on utopian thought, which lists
222 bibliographies, anthologies, conference proceedings, general studies, chronologi-
cal studies, and thematic studies, most of them written in the last three decades of the
twentieth century (NYPL 2000).
2. ‘Expectation, hope, intention towards not-yet-become possibility: that is not only a
basic feature of the human consciousness, but, when concretely corrected and under-
stood, a basic destination within objective reality as a whole.’
3. One of the more notorious reductionist explanations of human behaviour is found in
A natural history of rape: Biological bases of sexual coercion (2000), in which Randy Thornhill
and Craig Palmer claim that the inclination to rape is the result of evolutionary adapta-
tion. They maintained that their work was not written to excuse the acts of rapists but
to better understand how to suppress evolutionary ‘left-overs’. Still, the book caused
both social and academic outrage (Pozner 2000).
4. The image of human organisms as gradually evolved and immensely complex survival
machines of genes was coined by Richard Dawkins in The selfish gene (1976). Dawkins
himself, following Dennett, also joined a growing array of writers (see Atran 2002;
Wolpert 2006) in search of biological explanations of the need to believe by writing
The God delusion (2006), thus emphasising the present-day persistence of understand-
ing systems of hope and belief in evolutionary terms.
5. An excellent account of the ‘art and critique of forgetting’ is found in Harald
Weinrich’s book Lethe (2004), in which he shows that forgetting – even though we
cannot put it into an imperative – can have a strong social and psychological signifi-
cance by providing the enticing image of ‘an opportunity to start all over from the
beginning’ (Weinrich 2004: 165).
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6. Campbell has been criticised, most notably by Pearson and Pope (1981), for having an
old-fashioned view on gender relations, placing women in traditional roles of mothers
and wives, and men as heroes.
7. Religions form the domain par excellence where the sublime, myths, purpose, hopes,
and beliefs find their expressions. According to Paul Wong, Victor Frankl held that
‘[r]eligion encompasses the ultimate meaning, super-meaning, as well as God’
(Wong 2001). Also see the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss on religion and mythology in
Anthropologie structurale (translated as Structural anthropology in 1963) and Paroles donnés
(translated as Anthropology and myth: Lectures, 1951-1982 in 1987).
8. Note the similarities here with the ubiquitous and binding power called ‘the Force’,
found in the six movie episodes of Star Wars (1977-2005). Director and writer
George Lucas was greatly influenced by Campbell’s work, and admitted that he had
rewritten parts of the scripts for the original Star Wars trilogy after having read The
hero with a thousand faces (Larsen & Larsen 2002; Murray 1997: 186).
9. For a detailed breakdown of followers of the world’s religions, see Wikipedia’s entry
on ‘Religions by country’ (Wikipedia 2011).
10. Political theorist Vincent Geoghegan notes: ‘The religious traditions of humanity con-
tain the gold-bearing seams of utopian hope – in many ways the most distant from
existing reality, but also grounded in the most intimate of human concerns’
(Geoghegan 2007: 112).
11. Bloch wrote The principle of hope during his exile in the U.S. after (and because) he had
to flee Nazi Germany. His work can be understood as a reaction against the fact that
the Nazi regime, in his view, misused utopian rhetoric – the use of the term ‘Third
Reich’ being the most obvious example – and institutionalised it in a restrictive way.
See also Kellner (1997a).
12. The argument he used to rationalise the arrangement of an unconscious that is sup-
plemented by a not-yet-conscious was that ‘[w]hat was never conscious cannot
become unconscious’ (Bloch 1919: 355 cited in Bloch 1988: xxxi).
13. J.B. Bury, in his landmark study Idea of progress (1920), maintained the view that a sense
of progress is only possible when one is convinced of history moving at a certain pace
and indefinitely into the future, and that this is typical of the modern frame of mind.
Historian Sidney Pollard writes that ‘the sense of history itself, including the idea of
human progress, was absent in classical times, and could grow only after the mental
fetters inherited from them had, at least in part, been broken’ (Pollard 1968: 1).
14. The word ‘progress’ in classical antiquity was predominantly associated with ‘pushing
forward’ (from the Greek προκοπὴ [prokope]) or ‘an advance’ (from the Latin progres-
sus); both movements that were either cyclical or eventually finite (Wiener 1973: 624).
15. Hesiod himself actually wrote of ‘races’ instead of ‘ages’, and described five stages
instead of four, including an uncharacteristically non-metal Heroic Age in-between
the Bronze and Iron Ages. Later accounts reorganised the scheme by changing the
nomenclature and dropping the Heroic Age (see Baldry 1952; 1956).
16. According to the classification developed by Charles van Doren in The idea of progress,
Hesiod belongs to the ‘regress authors’, most probably because Hesiod wrote he
would rather have died before, or had lived after, the Age of Iron instead of during his
own time period (Van Doren 1967: 9).
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17. Ernst Bloch as well was greatly influenced and fascinated by Joachim de Fiore’s apoc-
alyptic spirituality. Also see Geoghegan (1996: 90-103).
18. The place literally does not exist, its major city is called Amaurot, which means ‘phan-
tom’, and the protagonist is named Raphael Hythloday, which means ‘speaker of non-
sense’ in Greek.
19. For a comparison between Plato and More, see chapter six of After Augustine: The medi-
tative reader and the text (Stock 2001).
20. For elaborate studies on the history of utopian settlements in Northern America, see
Heavens on earth: Utopian communities in America 1660-1880 (Holloway 1966) and A vision-
ary nation: Four centuries of American dreams and what lies ahead (Karabell 2001).
21. Works that aimed to answer questions of why there is a world and why it is the way it
is were most notably written by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. According to historian
Ayval Ramati, Leibniz, in his ‘De Rerum Originatione Radicali’ [‘On the ultimate origi-
nation of things’], asserted that the world ‘had not reached its perfection on the day of
creation’, and that progress should be ‘understood […] as continuous eternal change
toward perfection’ (Ramati 1996: 433).
22. See the introduction to Smith and Marx (1994: xi) for the argument that the ‘determi-
nistic view of technology is a pervasive theme of the mass media nowadays’.
23. Glenn Negley, in his bibliography of utopian literature, lists 239 utopian works writ-
ten from 1650 to 1800 (Negley 1977: 224-225); Bronislaw Baczko counts around 80
‘voyages imaginaires’ in the domain of French language from 1676 to 1789, but while
referring to even more impressive estimates, Baczko maintains that ‘on average more
than 10 and a maximum of 30 “voyages imaginaires” in certain years’ could have been
published (Baczko 1978: 47, author’s translation). Even if many of these texts were of
inferior quality, and even if imaginary voyages do not necessarily describe utopias, as
Baczko cautions, the total amount still adds up to much more than ever before (ibid.:
47-48).
24. Hegel’s historiography has been criticised for being Eurocentric, racist, and totalitar-
ian (Dussel 1993).
25. Desroche notes the intertwined relationship of utopian thought and hope: ‘Are not
utopia and hope, in particular, twin sisters? In utopia there is the hope of a different
society. In hope there is the utopia of a different world. In both of them there is the
strategy of alterity’ (Desroche 1979: 23).
26. An elaborate argument that recurrent apocalyptic thinking is of all times is found in
Richard Abanes’ End-time visions: The road to Armageddon? In this book, Abanes, himself
once a cult member of The Way International, extensively shows how ‘[h]umanity’s
preoccupation with doomsday may go back as far as our earliest evidence of commu-
nal living’ and that ‘[s]everal end-time scenarios from centuries past sound strikingly
similar to each other’ (Abanes 1998: 159).
27. The incessant drive towards the unreachable goal is the core of the paradox. As Jean
Baudrillard, in his depiction of America as the hyperreal achievement of utopia,
remarked: ‘A utopia achieved is of course a paradox, as utopias are not meant to be
achieved’ (Baudrillard 1993: 245, emphasis in original).
28. See also Douglas Hofstadter’s classic Gödel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid (1979), in
which he describes the existence in life of strange loops (instances of self-reference that
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lead to paradoxical situations), and shows that these loops can not only be found in
math, perspective drawings and music, but also – and this is his main argument – in
the very essence of conscious existence itself.
29. All following citations from this book are the author’s translations.
30. Crombag and Van Dun call this fourth solution ‘rechtvaardigheid’, which literally
translates to justice, but here refers more to ‘the solution that makes sure everyone
has access to and control over what is his or hers, and cannot have access to or control
over what belongs to someone else without permission’ (Crombag & Van Dun 1997:
28).
31. The difference between a dystopia (literally meaning ‘bad place’) and an anti-utopia is,
as Wegner explains: ‘[T]he former presents a critique of the limitations of a specific
form of imagining place, the latter a rejection of this cognitive act altogether’ (Wegner
2002: 152-153). I will refer to both narrative forms in the context of this subsection, as
they equally confront the utopian text with its inherent conflicts.
32. Karl Mannheim writes in Ideology and utopia: ‘The representations of a given order will
label as utopian all conceptions of existence which from their point of view can in princi-
ple never be realized’ (Mannheim 1936: 196, emphasis in original). Although this
observation leaves open the conclusion that ‘to think utopian’ has, from the dominant
perspective, always implied having a naive or unrealistic worldview, Mannheim adds a
historical component: ‘According to this usage, the contemporary connotation of the
term “utopian” is predominantly that of an idea which is in principle unrealizable’
(ibid., emphasis added). Frank and Fritzie Manuel, assessing the body of critical stud-
ies of utopias in the twentieth century in their book Utopian thought in the Western world,
remark that ‘to many observers [utopianism] was a corpse’, a ‘Schimpfwort’ for ‘out-
dated and historically superseded fantasies’ (Manuel & Manuel 1979: 10-11).
33. This is not to say that ideal societies are always depicted as artificial constructions and
as distinct from living conditions found in nature’s wilderness; ascetic utopias for
instance seek measures to bring about a return to a Rousseauian natural paradise.
34. Wegner as well observes this necessity in his analysis of Orwell’s text: ‘Nineteen Eighty-
Four […] inexorably drags the reader to the conclusion that every effort to effect a total
change of the present, to institute a utopia […] invariably gives rise to total systems of
domination, systems wherein, ultimately, even the potential for change might be
eliminated’ (Wegner 2002: 191).
35. The protagonist of the novel, Winston Smith, works for the Outer Party in the Ministry
of Truth, where he rewrites historical documentation so that it always fits the Party’s
policy.
36. Following Bloch in recognising the productive quality of dialectical thought, Herbert
Marcuse, in his work on the ‘Orwellification’ of the language of twentieth-century
political discourse in One-dimensional man (1964), advocates a constant refusal as the
proper starting point for political activism against totalitarian oppression. Such a refu-
sal is quite clearly visible in the narrative of We, but also in popular reception of Nine-
teen eighty-four. As Douglas Kellner writes in his essay on Orwell and Marcuse, ‘the very
antithesis between “optimism” and “pessimism” as opposing political mind-sets is a
specious one and supposedly pessimistic ideas can be productively used to mobilize
people against oppression’ (Kellner 1997b).
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2. Communication ideals, communication woes
1. Socrates saw his philosophical work as a form of intellectual midwifery, or maieutics,
giving birth to ideas and insights that promote critical self-reflection.
2. Most notably in works such as Apology, Cratylus, and Phaedrus.
3. The Socratic dialogue does present us with questions concerning equality between
teacher and student; are they indeed equal because the teacher has to admit that she
does not know the answers to the questions she poses, and therefore does not know
more than the student? Or, as Richard Elmore (2005: 279) notes, is the teacher being
manipulative, because she ‘pretends not to know what she knows in order to engage
the student in a line of questioning that leads the student to a predetermined destina-
tion described by the teacher’s knowledge’?
4. Jürgen Habermas’ work on communicative action, arguably one of the twentieth cen-
tury’s most influential endeavours to theorise the ideal speech situation, has also been
identified as having a strong bias in favour of face-to-face dialogue, instead of
mediated conversation (see Page 1996; Schudson 1997).
5. Where ‘Basic’ is an acronym for ‘British American Scientific International Commer-
cial’.
6. Ogden gives some examples of how Basic English works to transpose words and sen-
tences into their elementary parts: ‘Disembark, for example, is broken up into get off a
ship. I am able takes the place of I can; shape is covered by the more general word form;
and difficult by the use of hard’ (Ogden 1935: 14).
7. Especially among the philosophers who attended meetings of Der Wiener Kreis [The
Vienna Circle] in the 1910s and 1920s, with participants such as Moritz Schlick, Otto
Neurath, and Hans Hahn, the use of logical analysis and symbolic logic (based on the
mathematical work by Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein) was aimed at leav-
ing the ambiguity of natural language behind and arriving at unambiguous solutions
to philosophical problems.
8. Shannon’s proof for the possibility of error-free data transmission was extremely use-
ful for Bell’s research division Bell Telephone Laboratories, where Shannon worked
on improving the efficiency of transmitting information in telephone switching cir-
cuits.
9. The notion that communication technologies are not about transferring meaning but
about perfecting the fusing of data streams into a single ‘endless loop’ of ‘absolute
knowledge’ can most notably be found in Friedrich Kittler’s (1999: 2) work.
10. The basis of Lasswell’s model of communications comes down to the question of
‘who says what, through which channel, to whom, with what effect?’ (Lasswell 1948:
37).
11. The word ‘informationalisation’ is translated from the title of chapter 7 in Cyberspace
odyssee [Cyberspace odyssey] (2002). The original word is ‘informatisering’, which is actu-
ally translated as ‘computerisation’ in the leading Dutch Van Dale dictionary. This
shows how much the term ‘information’ has become entangled with a computational
process. See also My mother was a computer (2005) by N. Katherine Hayles for a discus-
sion of how the ‘regime of computation’ has come to determine our present-day
worldview (Hayles 2005: 15-38).
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12. Captured in the precept ‘Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do
to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets’ (Matthew 7: 12)
13. ‘And when much people were gathered together, and were come to him out of every
city, he spake by a parable: a sower went out to sow his seed: and as he sowed, some
fell by the way side; and it was trodden down, and the fowls of the air devoured it. And
some fell upon a rock; and as soon as it was sprung up, it withered away, because it
lacked moisture. And some fell among thorns; and the thorns sprang up with it, and
choked it. And other fell on good ground, and sprang up, and bare fruit an hundred-
fold. And when he had said these things, he cried, He that hath ears to hear, let him
hear’ (Luke 8:4-8).
14. Most of the Frankfurt scholars’ condemnations of the dark sides of mass media were
first informed by their encounters with state-controlled propaganda in Nazi Germany,
and then, to their dismay, by their observation that in democratic countries such as the
U.S. mass media were similarly used to manipulate minds.
15. In the 1970s and 1980s, under the influence of scholars such as Jay Blumler and Elihu
Katz (1974) and Stuart Hall (1980), critical analyses turned more to questions of what
people did with media, than of what media did with people. This shift towards seeing
audiences as ‘active’ has, since the rise of the Internet in the 1990s, been followed by a
movement towards identifying them as ‘participatory’ (Jenkins 1992; 2006). For a cri-
tique of the highly optimistic connotations of the participatory position, see Schäfer
(2011).
16. See for instance Nealon & Irr (2002) for a contemporary ‘rethinking’ and reinstate-
ment of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.
17. From the Greek νους, which means ‘mind’.
18. The exact influence of Teilhard de Chardin on McLuhan’s work is, despite clear simi-
larities, difficult to gauge. According to Tom Wolfe, the journalist who popularised
McLuhan’s work in the 1960s and who became a close friend, McLuhan ‘acknowl-
edged his tremendous debt to Teilhard de Chardin’ privately, but never publicly (Wolfe
2004). This is disputed by Donald Theall, who says that ‘McLuhan quotes or mentions
Teilhard on a number of occasions in his Gutenberg Galaxy; and among those remarks
he clearly indicates the reservations he has concerning Teilhard’s writing’ (Theall
2006: 697).
19. Also see Margaret Wertheim’s The pearly gates of cyberspace, in which she investigates the
captivating yet problematic techno-religious dreams that portray cyberspace as ‘a uto-
pian arena of equality, friendship and virtue’, culminating in ‘a technological substi-
tute for the Christian space of heaven’ (Wertheim 1999: 16).
20. On his website Bloom states in ‘The omnologist manifesto’ that ‘Omnology is a
science, but one dedicated to the biggest picture conceivable by the minds of its prac-
titioners. Omnology will use every conceptual tool available – and some not yet
invented but inventible – to leapfrog over disciplinary barriers, stitching together the
patchwork quilt of science and all the rest that humans can yet know’ (Bloom 2001).
21. In evolutionary biology, the theory of group selection has long been regarded as less
suitable for explaining the behaviour and evolution of organisms; instead, individual
selection, which is based on a gene-centred view, has been favoured. In the last dec-
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ade or two this has changed, and group selection (or multi-level selection as it is now
called) has gained favour (see Sober & Wilson 1998; Boehm 1999).
22. See Russell (1995) and De Kerckhove (1997) for examples of how the notion of the
emergence of a global brain has been informed by the new communication and infor-
mation processing technologies of the late twentieth century.
23. Borgmann’s fear of a loss of materiality in information is conspicuously evident from
the ominous title of his book, Holding on to reality (1999).
24. It is no coincidence that he mimics here the eccentric cyberpunk style of William
Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984); Lévy’s Collective intelligence fits the genre of books that
portray a futuristic digital universe and use vivid language to sweep readers off their
feet.
25. A particularly poignant display in popular culture of the inevitable loss of identity in
universalising processes is found in the science fiction TV and movies series Star
Trek, in which a technologically enhanced race called the Borg assimilates individ-
uals into its collective hive-mind in a quest for ongoing improvement. Communication
in the hive-mind is instant; every Borg entity knows exactly what all the other Borg
entities in the Collective know. For a discussion on the role of the Borg as the repre-
sentation of the dystopian future of humankind, especially in relation to communica-
tion, see Kavanagh, Keohane & Kuhling (2001: 14-18).
26. In explaining the fundamental anxiety of the universalising aspects of utopia, Fredric
Jameson writes that it is ‘the fear of losing that familiar world in which all our vices
and virtues are rooted (very much including the very longing for Utopia itself) in
exchange for a world in which all these things and experiences – positive as well as
negative – will have been obliterated’ (Jameson 2005: 97).
27. At the 2003 ARS Electronica Festival in Linz, Lévy presented a bewildered and
bemused audience with an elaborate system consisting of 96 different behavioural
patterns with which he intended to capture the essential meaning of all symbolic activ-
ities taking place on the Internet.
28. See also the conclusion to Eco’s The search for the perfect language (1995: 337-353), in
which he notes that myths of a universal understanding are inherently countered by
everyday experiences of quirks in any language, and that it is precisely because of
differences in languages that interesting projects (such as the long-term project of
building a united Europe) are initiated.
29. Elimination might not be the correct word as it implies that technical noise can always
be entirely taken out of the equation, but, following Shannon, even if there is technical
noise in a channel it can be overcome to such an extent that the original message is
received unchanged, as if there were no noise at all.
30. It is commonly assumed that Kierkegaard was anti-Hegelian, but according to Jon
Stewart his criticism was more directed to contemporary Danish Hegelians than to
Hegel himself. Kierkegaard’s criticism was that advocating abstract universal thought
tends to over-marginalise the difficulty of individual existence (Stewart 2003).
31. There is no single existentialist doctrine or school of thought; many philosophers who
are traditionally categorised as existentialists – Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
Sartre, Jaspers – had widely diverse backgrounds, beliefs and opinions. They do, how-
ever, all emphasise that people are thrown into the world, and thus have to experience
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their existence as an interdependence between themselves and others (Reinhardt
1952).
32. Steven Shaviro makes a similar observation in his analysis of how proponents of arti-
ficial intelligence programmes such as Vernor Vinge and Ray Kurzweil propagate the
coming of what they call the ‘Singularity’, a rupture in human history that is brought
about by ever-accelerating technological change. In this mode of reasoning, Shaviro
notes, artificial intelligence is presented as ‘the next step in evolution […] and our only
viable option is to Get With The Program’ (Shaviro 2003: 121). Here we see the linear
argument at work again, framing the Singularity as the inevitable final goal of ‘a nec-
essary and continual upward progression to a state of transcendence’ (ibid.: 122).
3. The rise… and rise of media technology
1. The rise of the industrial age did not exclusively engender ideas of progress, of course;
pollution, lost jobs, hard labour, poor housing conditions, and an increase in stressful
environments led to pessimistic expectations as well. Still, new technologies com-
monly perpetuated myths of progress.
2. Vice versa, having a technological determinist disposition does not always mean see-
ing things in positive progressive terms; see the work of Jacques Ellul (1964; 1980;
1990) for a predominantly pessimistic determinist view on technology.
3. The academic consensus in the past few decades has been that ‘the term “determinis-
tic” tends to be a negative one’, and some even use it as ‘a term of abuse’ (Chandler
2002).
4. See for instance Grint & Woolgar (1997) for the argument that technological artefacts
can be ‘read’ in virtually unlimited ways.
5. In the words of historian Michael Smith as he questions the persistence of technologi-
cal determinism, it is necessary to come to understand ‘[h]ow something so demon-
strably wrong-headed [can] continue to sway adherents’ (Smith 1994: 39).
6. As Chris Harman has noted on Marx’s claim: ‘The summation is crude. It is also
historically inaccurate. What accompanied the rise of European feudalism after the
10th century was not the spread of the handmill, but its replacement over the centu-
ries, the watermill – and the watermill then went on to play an important role in the
genesis of industrial capitalism. But Marx’s central point was correct’ (Harman 2004).
7. Unlike Hegel, however, Marx thought that the activity of Geist ought to be understood
in more pragmatic terms; its self-realisation was to be found in ‘the actual social and
political institutions that encompass man’, instead of in perfected abstract knowledge
(Bernstein 1971: 40).
8. See for instance William H. Shaw (1979: 172-175), who is nonplussed by the fact that
many Marxists tend to condemn as vulgar the view that Marx’s theory of history is one
of technological determinism, while such an interpretation of Marx, Shaw argues,
‘does not impute to him a wildly implausible theory’, and can be ‘positively helpful’ in
‘stimulating fresh and useful research, uncovering new facts, and promoting empiri-
cal hypotheses and models.’
9. Also see MacKenzie (1984) for an extended argument why Marx’s writings ought not
necessarily be seen as technologically deterministic.
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10. The multiscalar approach suggests following and describing interactions between
micro-scale, meso-scale, and macro-scale actors. The meso scale here should be
understood as ‘the region conceptually intermediate between the macro and the
micro’, in which ‘institutions intermediate between the firm and the market or
between the individual and the state’ reside (Misa 1994: 139). I primarily want to stress
here that I think it is productive to go back and forth between the various levels, and
not, as might be suggested when looking for a balanced view between macro and
micro levels, to focus solely on the meso level.
11. As an example of a technological artefact that is presumed to be universally adopted
and recognised as the quintessential symbol of progress when it was invented, Basalla
refers to the wheel, which, in fact, is ‘a culture-bound invention whose meaning and
impact have been exaggerated in the West’ and ‘is not a unique mechanical contri-
vance necessary, or useful, to all people at all times’ (Basalla 1988: 11). See also Wright
(2000: 46).
12. For a comprehensive account of the dark sides of technology see Edward Tenner’s
Why things bite back: Technology and the revenge of unintended consequences (1996), in which
he lists ‘revenge effects’ of, amongst other examples, the computerisation of the
office, which has led to health problems such as carpal tunnel syndrome.
13. The popularity of evolutionary theories in attempts to explain a myriad of behaviour
phenomena has led to many uneasy and downright inadequate applications of evolu-
tionary principles, so it is important here to stress the possibilities and the limitations
(see Laland & Brown 2002).
14. The list can hold many more items; for instance, historian Alex Roland finds that
demands are imposed by external factors (such as perceived need, resources, national
and regional style, ideology and philosophy, politics, military economics, and science)
and internal factors (such as entrepreneurs and translators, inertia and momentum,
systems, institutions, plateaus, standardisation, and secrecy) (Roland 1992: 84-90).
15. See Whyte (2007: 46) for a discussion of the difficulties of using evolutionary theories
– in which intentionality plays a marginal role at best – to explain ‘the deliberate and
intentional nature of design practice’.
16. Thomas P. Hughes, in his work on the electrification of Western society, sees inven-
tions and technological developments mainly as the result of attempts to correct
‘reverse salients’, a term with which he describes that, when technology is viewed as a
goal-seeking system, some components of that system are perceived ‘to fall behind or
out of line’ and thus are redefined as ‘critical problems’ that need to be solved
(Hughes 1983: 80). He adds: ‘Outstanding inventors, engineers, and entrepreneurs
usually have a record of defining and solving such problems’ (ibid.).
17. In historiography, there seems to be a repetitive tendency to construct theoretical con-
cepts with which to understand and explain differences and similarities in constella-
tions of cultural and technological artefacts. Memes and topoi are most suitable for
my argument here, but one can also think of tropes, paradigms, clichés, and so forth
(Vries 2006).
18. The contention that imagined media can still be interesting research objects is sub-
scribed to by Huhtamo as well, when he notes that ‘unrealized “dream machines”, or
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discursive inventions (inventions that exist only as discourses), can be just as revealing
as realized artefacts’ (Huhtamo 1994).
19. The assumption that ‘true’ identities of media exist, is, for instance, poignantly visible
in Paul Levinson’s ‘anthropotropic’ view on media evolution, with which he explains
how ‘the balance which we orchestrate in our media is but a reflection of our own
internal, pre-wired balance’, a balance that ‘[humans] come programmed with’ and
consists of ‘time and space projectors that we shine upon the world’ (Levinson 1997:
60).
20. Kessler derives his understanding of the dispositif mostly from the work of French
philosophers Jean-Louis Baudry and Michel Foucault. Often (but problematically)
translated into English as ‘apparatus’, the dispositif in Baudry’s sense implies a certain
viewing situation of spectators, for instance of those watching a movie in the cinema
(Kessler 2006).
21. In one particular and anecdotal story about Morse, the origin of his drive to improve
communication is traced back to 1825, when he was on a business trip and only
learned of his young wife’s sudden death a week after it had happened and she had
already been buried. After that, so the story goes, ‘[h]e never wanted anyone to go
through the pain that he had endured and so set about perfecting an easy to use mes-
sage system’ (Luscombe 2007).
22. For a comparison between the telegraph and subsequent communication technolo-
gies, see Standage (1998: 205ff). Standage names the telephone, the fax machine, and
especially the Internet as technologies that have much in common with telegraphy
networks.
23. From the 1850s to the 1920s, Britain dominated the world’s cable telegraphy industry,
connecting almost all of its colonies into a single communications network. As a
‘quintessential technology of empire’, telegraphy helped shape and maintain Britain’s
control over vast territories (Hunt 1997: 313).
24. Unitel Telegram Services, a Swiss-based private company, now owns, handles, and/or
operates many former national telegram services after they were officially abandoned
by state companies and large commercial enterprises at the beginning of the twenty-
first century. In the Netherlands, it costs €27 to send a telegram and have it delivered
in person (Telegram Service 2008).
25. A string telephone is also known as a ‘lovers’ telephone’: by connecting two paper
cups with a tight string, sound waves can travel along that string.
26. Only in 2002 was it officially resolved by the U.S. House of Representatives that ‘the
life and achievements of Antonio Meucci should be recognized, and his work on the
invention of the telephone should be acknowledged’ (U.S. House of Representatives
2002: 2).
27. Reis’ telephones functioned on the principle of ‘making and breaking’ an electrical
current, in fact mimicking how telegraphy works. For speech to be converted into
electrical signals, however, there has to be a continuous, variable contact between the
transmitter and the electrical circuit. It is believed that Reis’ experiments would even-
tually have led to speech-transmitting telephones, had he not died prematurely in 1874
(Thompson 1883: 8).
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28. Popular myth has it that Gray’s documents were delivered at the U.S. Patent Office at a
later time than those of Bell. According to Evenson (2000: 68-69), however, Gray’s
caveat was handed in before Bell’s patent application, but the latter was given priority.
Bell’s dossier was thus processed earlier, relegating Gray to the sidelines of the tele-
phone industry.
29. Claude Fischer notes that advertisements for telephone services often stressed
increased security and practicality, and promised that the telephone would bring peo-
ple closer together in a better understanding of each other (Fischer 1992: 163-164).
Such optimistic notions of improvements in communication are of course ideologi-
cally biased; as Carolyn Marvin writes, the idea that ‘[i]nstantaneous electric commu-
nication augured a universal language […] and global harmony’ was a ‘distinctly
Anglophile solution’ (Marvin 1988: 193).
30. In ‘Misunderstanding and its remedies: Telephone miscommunication’ (1991), Kent
Drummond and Robert Hopper note that a telephone conversation is of course con-
strained to sounds, making the telephone a ‘leaner’ medium than face-to-face speak-
ing. However, they also note that there are more similarities than differences between
the two, and that both of their conversational strategies to circumvent or repair mis-
understandings are quite alike (Drummond & Hopper 1991: 314).
31. It is of course still possible to use the telephone to call in and obtain information, for
instance in the form of time telling or weather forecast services, but such information
is often automatically ‘narrowcasted’ to the caller instead of being broadcasted con-
tinuously.
32. The rate of growth of the telephone networks was not uniform across countries. Tech-
nical and organisational issues often caused delays or even cancellations of both
national and international network expansions. In addition, in countries where tele-
phone networks were mostly or completely owned and controlled by the state, political
interference not seldom hampered the speed of development. For an elaborate histori-
cal account of the construction and maintenance of the Dutch telephone network, see
Onno de Wit (1998); for the French perspective, see Catherine Bertho-Lavenir (1988);
for the German telephone history see Frank Thomas (1988).
33. Carolyn Marvin would characterise Casson’s hopeful expectation as a typical expres-
sion of a strong belief in new media’s promise of ‘complete cross-cultural understand-
ing’, which would break down barriers and bring ‘appreciation and friendliness’ to all
cultures (Marvin 1988: 194).
34. As physicist John Ambrose Fleming explained: ‘The physical effect we call light, and
that which we have up to the present moment merely called electric radiation, are
really identical in nature, and both consist in waves propagated through the space-
filling æther, the only difference between them is in wave-length and wave-amplitude’
(Fleming 1902: 254).
35. The existence of the æther was first put into question by experiments of Albert
Michelson and Edward Morley, and subsequently rejected in 1905 by Albert Einstein’s
special theory of relativity (Peters 1999: 103).
36. The developments in this constellation were in no sense unilinear, as Flichy notes:
‘What appears today as a series of naturally articulated steps is, in reality, the history
of a difficult passage from one domain to another; from science to technology (and
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vice versa), from the military to telecommunications, from commercial information to
entertainment, and so forth’ (Flichy 1995: 100).
37. Crookes was an English chemist and amateur physicist who was very much influenced
by Spiritualist views on communication.
38. See Blaine (1905) for a contemporary account of the development of wireless tele-
graphic devices.
39. The headstrong hero myth is quite prominent with Marconi. According to Orrin E.
Dunlap, ‘Marconi never gave up. Skeptics could not dent the armor of his faith.
Always he plodded ahead under the slogan, ‘Occorre progredire!’ – ‘We must pro-
gress!’ He was endowed with a plastic power; he mastered circumstances’ (Dunlap
1937: 34).
40. ‘DX’ stands for ‘distance’. ‘Dxing’ meant trying to make contact with other radio
operators who were as far away as possible (Douglas 1987: 307).
41. Jenkins and Baird were of course not alone at the time in arriving at functional televi-
sion systems; other names include Max Dieckmann in Germany, Frank Gray and Philo
Farnsworth in the United States, Eduoard Belin in France, and Kenjiro Takayanagi in
Japan (Abramson 1987: 73-107). The experiments of Jenkins and Baird, however,
remain the most prominently known.
42. It has to be noted that in these movies two-way television is not always portrayed in a
positive light; in Metropolis and Modern times, for instance, the device is used
by an ominous ruler/boss to keep an eye on his workers and tell them when they have
to speed up their activities.
43. For an excellent account of failure in technology in general and of the failure of
AT&T’s Picturephone in particular, see Kenneth Lipartito (2003). Lipartito as well
stresses that studying dead media can be as revealing as looking at successes: ‘Failed
technologies, far from being dead ends or even mere cautionary tales, may persist well
beyond their material life. They may reinforce rather than undermine technological
paths, even when those paths are questionable or undesirable. Failures, the story of
Picturephone suggests, can echo like footfalls down corridors not taken, leading us to
the present’ (Lipartito 2003: 53).
44. See Sixma (2007) for a detailed overview of the many experiments with videophones
up until today, as well as of the strategic uses of the topoi of mediated closeness and
immersive presence that have always accompanied the development of videophone
systems.
45. As Manuel Castells noted: ‘While the media have become indeed globally intercon-
nected, and programs and messages circulate in the global network, we are not living in
a global village, but in customized cottages globally produced and locally distributed’ (Castells,
1996: 341, emphasis in original).
46. Together with his friend Henri La Fontaine, Otlet was a prominent advocate for the
creation of the League of Nations and its educational body The International Commis-
sion on Intellectual Cooperation (which later became UNESCO).
47. All translations from Otlet’s originally French work are the author’s.
48. Otlet imagined all the world’s knowledge to be centrally stored on standardly for-
matted three-by-five-inch cards. Later he tried using microfilm instead. Attempts to
create and maintain a central, universal library, one which he called the Palais Mondial
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or Mundaneum, were largely unsuccessful due to excessive maintenance needs and an
uncooperative government. Also see Rayward (1991).
49. As another example of how the evolutionary nature of technology development can
orient independent experimenters and thinkers towards the same ‘good tricks’, Bush’s
design for a microfilm selector was predated by one that was patented and developed
by the Russian-born German photography expert Emanuel Goldberg in 1931
(Buckland 1992).
50. According to Internet Systems Consortium (ISC), the number of hosts in October 1985
was 1,961. In October 1990, this number had grown to 313,000; in July 1995, to
6,642,000; in July 2000, to 93,047,785; and in July 2005, to 353,284,187. As of January
2011, a total of 818,374,269 Internet hosts had been counted (ISC 2011).
51. Grassroots hobbyists’ computer networks had already existed since the end of the
1970s in the form of Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs), computers that ran software that
could dial into other computer systems using regular phone lines.
52. See Negroponte’s Being digital (1995) for a particularly telling account of how atoms
and bits are believed to be merging into a single stream of information.
53. The dot-com bubble at the beginning of the 2000s, itself the product of an overhyping
of the assumed limitless possibilities of the digital new economy, is often mentioned
as a prime example of what was wrong with how the Web was used. See O’Reilly
(2005) for an illustration of this type of reasoning.
54. Because its emphasis on increased possibilities for collaboration, participation, and
sharing has over the years become best visible in new software platforms that display
and interconnect all kinds of users’ profile information, the Web 2.0 metaphor is
nowadays quickly being replaced by the term ‘social media’.
55. For a well-founded criticism of present-day software’s increased reliance on the dis-
closure of personal information, see ‘The externalities of search 2.0: The emerging
privacy threats when the drive for the perfect search engine meets Web 2.0’ (Zimmer
2008). Also see Lanier (2010) and Schäfer (2008).
4. Mobile communication dreams
1. Compounding ‘motor’ and ‘ola’, implying ‘sound in motion’.
2. There were some sporadic experiments with systems that could interact with the fixed
telephone network; in 1924, Bell Labs tested a car-bound radio telephone that could
place two-way voice calls with land-based telephones (Farley 2006a).
3. In the documentary How William Shatner changed the world (Jones 2005),
Martin Cooper names the popular 1960s science fiction television series Star Trek as
a major influence on his thinking. Commenting on how he was fascinated by how
Captain Kirk’s versatile and universal ‘communicator’ operated, he says: ‘that was not
a fantasy to us, […] to me that was an objective: […] the idea of being able to talk not
only to the next floor of the Enterprise, but to people on the planet’.
4. ‘Auto’ can also mean ‘car’. The ATF-2 system still made reference to cars because of
its relation to the first ATF netwerk, but the Carvox 2453 mobile telephone model
could be used outside of a car (Groen 2006).
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5. Such as the availability of micro-electronic components, a consumer market that was
susceptible to novel and personalised technologies, and companies and business
structures that were aimed at capitalising on the opportunities that arose out of that
consumer market.
6. Numbers from Eurostat show that in the current 27 EU countries in 1998 there were
about 20 mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; this figure rose to 78 in
2003 and to 125 in 2009 (Eurostat 2011).
7. The GSM Association predicted in a 2010 press release that the number of global
mobile connections would reach 6 billion ‘in the first half of 2012’ (GSM Association
2010).
8. Paul Levinson’s Cellphone: The story of the world’s most mobile medium and how it transformed
everything! (2004) provides a good example of the argument that mobile communica-
tion devices are a perfect fit for ‘natural’ human communication needs.
9. This section has, in an edited version, previously been published as ‘The vanishing
points of mobile communication’ (Vries 2008).
10. It has become a regular and accepted practice for telecom operators to disguise high
towers of mobile base stations as trees in order to conceal them from view, or inte-
grate telecommunications equipment into highly placed infrastructural objects such as
bell towers or, in a striking expression of ‘angelic communication’, even church
crosses. See Stealth (2008) for some telling examples.
11. Also see Robison (2003) for the argument that the terminology of mobile communica-
tions is guided by ‘the ideology of telepathy: an ultimate, implied goal of total conver-
gence between machine, man, knowledge and communication’ (Robison 2003: 175,
emphasis in original).
12. Also see Churchill and Wakeford (2002) for examples of how advertisements for wire-
less mobile communication devices explicitly state goals of ‘unlimited access to others
and unlimited access to information’ (Churchill & Wakeford 2002: 163, emphasis in ori-
ginal).
13. The prospect of today’s young generations being always connected has prompted
some scholars to state that ‘the youth, they truly are the Borg’ (Ahonen 2006). While
this is of course an exaggerated claim, mainly because we can safely assume that most
young people are still very much unique individuals, it does show that the Borg are
iconic and easily understandable examples of what a radically increased connected-
ness might entail. Also see Gunkel (2000) in this respect.
14. Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo described the ideal of building a world community
through unlimited communication as one that aimed for a complete ‘transparent
society’, in which communication media would offer ‘a kind of concrete realization of
Hegel’s Absolute Spirit: the perfect self-consciousness of the whole of humanity, the
coincidence between what happens, history and human knowledge’ (Vattimo 1992: 6).
In his work, Vattimo exposes this ideal as illusory, stating instead that in the media
society we will become aware of the significance of plurality and the non-existence of
‘perfect knowledge’ (ibid.: 7).
15. For explorations of the debate on whether mobile communication technologies inher-
ently create a more individualised society, see Arnold (2003: 247ff), Geser (2004) and
Horst & Miller (2006: 81ff).
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16. Also see Rakow and Navarro, ‘Remote mothering and the parallel shift: Women meet
the cellular phone’ (1993).
17. For a rather striking example of how the metaphor of the leash is readily used to give
expression to how parents might think of improved communication as an antidote to
their anxiety, see the ‘Safe & Sound: a wireless leash’ technical proposal by MIT scho-
lars Natalia Marmasse and Chris Schmandt: ‘Safe & Sound […] is a location-based
information system that allows parents to monitor their children’s location. The
child’s phone continuously streams location information to the parent’s phone. A
voice channel between the parent and child enables negotiating with, and perhaps
educating of, the child. As the title of the project implies, we emphasize both security and
communication for this solution to a common parental concern’ (Marmasse & Schmandt 2003:
726, emphasis added).
18. See Ling (2004: 119-121) for further illustrations of how issues of parental control are
often part of processes of emancipation of adolescents.
19. For similar diagnoses of the risks of losing control over new mobile technologies, see
Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk, and digital discrimination (Lyon 2003) and ‘The
wireless leash: Mobile messaging service as a means of control’ (Qiu 2007).
20. The idea that mediated communication stresses and problematises the physical
absence of the other was of course already articulated by Socrates, as noted in chapter
2. For a detailed account of how telephonic conversations can separate people while
being connected (and of how this affected dramatic cinematic structures in the early
twentieth century), see Tom Gunning’s essay ‘Heard over the phone: The Lonely Villa
and the de Lorde tradition of the terrors of technology’ (1991).
21. Similar stories of ‘ringing body bags’ could be heard after the Madrid terrorist attacks
in 2004 (BBC News 2004) and the Virginia Tech shootings in 2007 (King 2007). See
also the song ‘Cell Phones Ringing (In the Pockets of the Dead)’, released by singer-
songwriter Willie Nile in 2004 after the Madrid bombings.
22. See Wellman (2002) for the argument that new media technologies increasingly indi-
vidualise people.
23. The practice of seeing the initial use of new technologies simply in terms of a conti-
nuation and improvement of that what worked well in old technologies is what Scott
Jenson calls ‘legacy vision’ (Jenson 2005: 307). Because the development of the Inter-
net and the subsequent uptake of the World Wide Web run roughly along the same
time line as the development of cellular telephony and its spectacular rise as the me-
dium of choice to communicate on the move, Jenson says, a ‘manic belief’ took hold
in the late 1990s that ‘web + phone has got to be better’ (ibid.)
24. According to the International Data Corporation, in 2010 a total of 302.6 million
smartphones were sold, up 74.4% from 2009 (IDC 2011); the proportion of people
with a smartphone at the end of 2010 was 27% in the U.S. and 31% in Europe
(comScore 2011). A 2010 Forrester survey showed that 47% of mobile telephone users
in Japan accessed the mobile Internet at least once a month, with China coming in at
43%, the U.S. at 22% and Europe at 12% (Reitsma 2011).
25. There are several location techniques available within the cellular network, such as
triangulation and multilateration, that can help increase the accuracy of locating
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mobile telephones, but there would still be an uncertainty in location of 100 metres or
more.
26. In 2010, GPS-enabled devices amounted to 295 million units, with forecasts seeing
that number rise to 940 million units by 2015 (Berg Insight 2011).
27. For a comprehensive taxonomy of location-based services, see Ratti et al. (2006: 729-
731).
28. In the tenth century Blåtand brought rivalling tribes in Denmark and Norway together
under one rule (Gow & Smith 2006: 125).
29. See for instance IBM’s Smarter Planet website, where we learn that through instru-
menting the world’s systems and interconnecting them, all we have to do next is
make them intelligent and the planet will be ‘smart’ and even know ‘world peace’
(IBM 2010). Otlet and Licklider would have been proud.
30. Sterling, speaking at the LIFT 2006 conference, noted as well that an Internet of
Things will logically ‘grow out of what we have right now’, as ‘a natural evolution
from a world of digital devices that people are already carrying, laptops, media
players, camera phones,WANs, and the wireless and wired land broadband networks
that are serving them in locations as they move about, and the global Internet, and its
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